I know I'm asking a lot of you, the reader, by providing discussion of these texts before the events in my life to which they may or may not have pertained. So you have to either make a snap analysis of me (and perhaps think I'm really out in left field), or suspend judgment until you actually hear my story.
This is sort of a risk I have to take, because while I did this research afterward most of the events occurred, I knew what I was experiencing (although I didn't necessarily understand why or what the significance may have been for any particular experience). You, however, don't have that advantage of being there, so I think it would be harder for you to believe me without some potentially helpful background information. But I don't know you either, and it's quite possible that you have some knowledge or experience pertinent to one thing or another that I address here and may actually be able to offer some new insight that I don't have.
It's sort of a catch-22; I can't be sure 100% that approaching my story this way is the best way, but my inclination is that it is the best way, so I'll continue on unless I become convinced otherwise somewhere along the way. When I reveal my true identity I'll be able to provide more documentation too.
***
This next source is a book:
Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal. (1993) Sarbin, Theodore R., Carney, Ralph M., & Eoyang, Carson (Eds.). Westport, CT: Praeger.
***
Chapter 3: A History of Recent American Espionage, by Katherine L. Herbig
"Within the community of those holding security clearances, another more ironic source of suggestibility for committing espionage is provided routinely by well-meaning security staff: the briefing on hostile intelligence service methods. It would be irresponsible to clear people for access to sensitive information and then not to war them about the interest of foreign intelligence services in obtaining such information. Civilian and military defense employees and contractors all receive such briefings." (p. 48)
So this clearly would apply to my dad, as having had such briefings. So he must surely have known about risks of my interest in the Soviet Union. At least it's hard for me to imagine otherwise. But then maybe he thought I'd be safe and secure in the hands of missions that cooperate very nicely with the U.S. government, thank you. So there you have it, risk diverted. And everyone lives happily ever after. Of course this is speculation, but not completely unfounded.
***
"...[M]otivatioin is among the most individual and unpredictable of human qualities, and the motivations for espionage are similarly idiosyncratic." (p. 48-49).
If I was a subject of a sex lure, they tried 3 times and it was only on the 3rd try that they got it right. But there are still a lot of things that aren't completely clear there either, including what exactly the motive was. Several important contextual things happened in those 3-4 years though that may have disrupted initial plans, especially if it was to use me to get to my father.
***
"The spy puts himself, his need for money, thrills, or some other satisfaction, above the well-being of his fellow citizens and the nations." (p. 55)
If there were a possibility I would be a spy, I'm not sure which of these they'd use. At this point, I'm not very emotionally attached to my country, so I wouldn't care too much about that though. Also, I even thought there was too much of the spy thriller type work in East European missions and eventually wanted more long-term residential (vs. traveling in and out) ministry. I wasn't drawn to that part of the world because of it being Communist and thus an "exciting" place to work, so that kind of thrill-seeking wouldn't have been a call for me. I'm sure if my dad had remained in his job they would have probably found some way or another to snag me though. At least, that's how I see things.
***
Okay, here's a big one - I'll test you afterward to see if you caught it:
"The second trend that increased vulnerabilities to espionage by overloading the security system was the growth of highly classified 'black' research programs with severely restricted access policies during the 1980s. Details about these programs are by their nature closely held and, therefore, not described in the press. Nevertheless, it was apparent that programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative and others generated a new category of secrets under the rubric of 'Special Access Programs' within the industrial contractor community." (p. 63)
Are you with me? Do I need to spell it out? My dad was a program manager in the "industrial contractor community" in SDI; he oversaw engineers and scientists as they wrote proposals for defense contracts and then carried them out.
***
"Nations can temporarily lose the voluntary loyalty of their citizens if their leaders disillusion them or betray them..." (p. 65)
I'm taking this a bit out of context here, but it's true that my loyalty to the US (although I also wasn't in a position requiring special loyalty either) has weakened with my interpretation of events in my life pointing to me not having constitutional freedoms to live my life as I choose... all because of my dad. Maybe that's an overstatement, but how I've felt for a long, long time now. For me to be vulnerable to being open to working with the Soviets, however, I think they would have had to prove themselves to be better than the US. I would have been pretty slow to believe that that was the case, given all that I already knew about them prior to me even going to Vienna. I'd researched how they treated believers, heck, I even read the Gulag Archipelago (complete version) cover to cover. They would have had a pretty hard time convincing me they were better than the US, no matter how badly I thought of the US.
***
Here's an interesting tidbit that's actually a footnote to this chapter:
"Security clearance investigations are not centralized; rather, responsibility for them resides with at least seven different agencies; the Defense Investigative Service does them for the Department of Defense, which has the most clearances; Office of Personnel Management does them for civilian agencies, largely the Department of Energy with its nuclear responsibilities; the Federal Bureau of Investigation does them for high-level political appointees, White House staff, and some employees of federal courts and congressional committees; and the CIA, NSA, State Department, Secret Service, and some other agencies do their own investigations for their employees...." (p. 66-67)
I was a contracting librarian for the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Central Library a few years ago and they did a, what seemed to me rather thorough, background check on me. I had to have references for every place I'd lived, every job I'd had, etc. back 5 years. When you've moved around as much as I have that can be pretty daunting, especially since it's hard to get to know people very well under such circumstances (moving around so much). Anyway, I passed and they let me in. And I can assure you I never did anything to abuse that privilege. Well, I mean, I was tempted to yell out "yoo-hoo all you idioti (that's the Russian plural for 'idiots') down there in New Orleans, guess what? We have lots of research dating back 5 or 10 years that shows that you've been eroding the grasslands which makes you more vulnerable to hurricanes!!"* But I didn't do that, I quietly fumed and directed my curses at the TV instead. I trust that didn't qualify as a betrayal of the national trust bestowed on my in that venerable position of contracting cataloging librarian.
~ Meg
*Actually it wasn't just the people in New Orleans, but others involved in various ways in the erosion.
