After I finished writing my last entry last night I was up till after 2 a.m. going through the material I'd found... and I couldn't find the specific articles I'm looking for. So now I'm really tired and frustrated. I can't think where else I could have put them. So I'll probably now have to go through all my unpacked boxes of books (I don't want to put my wall shelves up until I know I'm going to be here for a while, and even then, knowing my luck, once i do that I'm sure something will happen so that I have to move again... that's how my life goes.)
But while I do my morning stimulator session I can't do much else other than sit here at the computer, especially since some of my electrodes are losing their stickiness, so I'll continue on with the next chapter of Taming the Troops.
***
Chapter 3: Professional Paternalist Control
***
This chapter begins by comparing how different groups of people view autocratic leadership in the military, where the nonveterans polled thought that autocratic means must be the only way they could get people to do that they do in the military (e.g., kill). But people with military experience thought that using autocratic techniques was a sign of being a poor combat leader and led to low morale. "Generally, they believed that fear techniques should be used only when all else had failed." (p. 55)
"... Why do these ex-military people place such an emphasis on morale and de-emphasize autocratic, punishment-oriented techniques of control? As we have shown, it is because they have seen that people will do far more if they are willing to do something than if they are forced to. Forcing people is inefficient; it inevitably seems to result in resistance of some kind, such as go-slows and mistakes." (p. 55)
First of all, it should be noted that the earlier discussions (in chapter 2, which I discussed in my last post) of uses of autocratic control were used with a specific group of soldiers (dissidents and organizers) and not with units as a whole. As far as that goes for Vienna, I don't think others got the treatment I did. Even such concrete things as moving around in offices and positions was unusual from what I saw there, so it could be that I was treated differently than others this way, although a lot of it would be hard to disentangle as such. But there were a few concrete things that point to my being treated differently. Since one of the main indicators comes up fairly early in my time in Vienna, this does seem to point in favor of my theory that at least part of what I experienced in Vienna might have been an effort to try to get me out of there because of my dad. I don't know why I would have been singled out like that so early in my time there. One possibility of why they might have treated me that way starting so early, though, would be that since I was living alone and had some grasp of the language and culture I was harder to sort of coral into their group.
***
The author, by citing a military officer's telling of an incident, which the author sums up as his having struck a balance "between military objectives and group morale. Contrast this with a coercive leader who would simply follow orders and deal with the consequences after they arose." (p. 58).
As such, I don't think the leadership in Vienna took this tack. Instead, I think they got such a commitment to their leadership that people were so used to portraying an image, whether to other people around them in Vienna, to their supporters back home, or as part of their trying to avoid suspicion by authorities & snitches while "in-country" (in an East Bloc country). So the Vienna missionaries got so much into this mode of living, where they were sort of living double lives, that it was pretty easy to lead them along, and I think that anything perceived as being otherwise (not acting as a sheep in the flock following their caring shepherds) would have led to a sort of identity crisis wherein the double living could be at risk of unraveling for anyone not following the flock, which would put their sanity (whether in appearance only or otherwise) at risk. It's sort of like there was this "secret life of missionaries" that was under the radar, and it was so well lived out that trying to unravel it, describe it or prove it would be difficult. That's despite being told by one of our military chaplain h.r. staff that they were "not professionals." He didn't say professional what but it seemed like it was "professional spy/intelligence" workers, because they were obviously professional theologians and missionaries.
This being said, can you imagine what my thought was when a few short years later I was asked by this Soviet guest during the Seattle Goodwill Games, who was undoubtedly a Soviet intelligence worker, if my dad paid me? First of all, I was surprised at the bluntness of the question and the question itself, but I even right then almost laughed inside myself (I didn't actually demonstrate any sign of humor), thinking "No, whatever I learned that might make you ask this I learned from missionaries in Vienna! Boy are you off-track - way off-track." Heck, my dad had even suggested I apply to be a Russian translator for Boeing, to which I, without even thinking, unhesitatingly answered a forceful, "No." I thought, what on earth would I do at Boeing (this was the year or more before the Soviet putsch) with Russian? The last thing by that point that I wanted was to get anywhere near sensitive-type work, and I was mad that his line of work had apparently hindered me so much - although I don't think I ever thought that my experiences in Vienna were totally connected to him. After all, the missions there had to have been in a position to start with to be able to treat me like that at all.
***
I've finished my stimulator, which means 45 minutes has already gone by, and I've hardly even started on this chapter. I'm going to get my breakfast now though, and then I'll continue on.
***
I'm back now, and I just had another thought that maybe I could add here in case I miss it later on: While I was in Vienna one of my responses to what I felt were authoritarian/cult-type authority relations was, "The only person I let have that much authority over me is God, not even pastors or mission leaders have that much authority over me. I still maintain the right to "search the Scriptures daily to see whether these things were so" like the Bereans in the New Testament, and come to conclusions apart from these supposedly spiritual leaders (leaders who are not perfect). I was, after all, the renegade woman in Bible school who exhibited markedly unfeminine characteristics in engaging in theological discussions (this gender role issue is cultural among certain Protestants, and seemed to be strong amongst student in my school, although this aspect was not necessarily pushed by the school administration). My God has many names, none of which are "(human) missionary leader" or "(human) pastor".
Leaders, and probably others in Vienna too, would argue that they never required this kind of submission, but they are referring to their "on the surface" and "literal" requirements, not how things were actually done. And in response to some specific examples, I can just see even right now years later, the lead chaplain in h.r. saying with sort of a boyish innocence (raised eyebrows, a bit of a pout), "We have your best interests at heart." It's very disarming, even approaching an interrogation technique (this subject is part of another file).
I would love to meet that same chaplain again now and say, "Gee remember how I had 'culture shock' after 5 months in Vienna? Well, it's a good thing that I stayed out of missions after I left Vienna, and went to Siberia on my own. After all, it seems my 'culture shock' only happens when I'm with a mission, apparently. Hmmm, I wonder why that is...? Any ideas, Mr. Chaplain,... sir?"
***
Getting back to our chapter...
In this next section, that continues directly from the last piece, a situation is described where this same officer who gave the earlier narration, describes a situation in which he had to defuse some building tension between squads that ended up being uniformly of differing races. He handled it by moving people around.
"Both of these instances show a tendency on the part of the officer to take a quick, decisive action... This officer also demonstrates a nonconfrontation style of dealing with his subordinates." (p. 59)
I'm sure that in the case of the racial issues the soldiers probably had an idea of why the moves were happening, but, although the text doesn't explain this, I suspect that another ostensible reason(s) was/were given. But since the officer is the more powerful one, especially as formal power is concerned (power by virtue of his rank), he gets to frame the issues (I learned about this topic in my social movement learning research). That means if he says the moves were done for thus and such reasons, even if those under him suspect otherwise, he can make this be the formal understanding by things like what he puts on the paperwork involved in such moves (I assume there is paperwork - since we're talking about a major bureaucracy here) and perhaps in things like company newsletters. For example, he could write something like: "We are sorry to see Pvt. Smith move to unit XXX, but he has skills that are much needed there and I'm sure he will be a great asset to that unit." I'm just being hypothetical here, but this is how framing is done by those with more power that have more access to and control over these kinds of things. The newsletter might even go into Army archives where it will be used by historical researchers down the road.
This happens in missions too, and I'm rather aghast at the newsletters I found yesterday... newsletters that I wrote! Now people will look at these and say, but you wrote them, why are use saying something different now? I wrote what I wrote, especially the newsletter which the mission had to approve, almost under duress knowing that if I wrote anything differently there would negative consequences/reinforcements for me. In Pavlovian terms, that would mean I'd get a swift kick in the behind to teach me to do otherwise. I face the threat of my double life caving in; of course, I suppose most missionaries eventually meld the worlds - the facade they've carefully built up for the mission - and the rest of their being, so that they don't have much if any conflict between the two and for all practical purposes they meld together to become one. Unfortunately (or fortunately) for me, I never accepted their norms and the two standards never even came close to melding. If there ever would have been a potential, given more time, of them melding in me, it would have been from being worn down and coalescing as a self-preservation method, which would have, I suppose, eventually been indistinguishable from other roads leading to melding. Of course, some would call this process socialization. Other might call it brainwashing. Can you see the potential for seeming psychotic in the midst of this? That's the threat of not playing along... fully playing along... brainwashing-type playing along.
***
I with there were section breaks in these chapters, but there don't appear to be. But I do need to start getting cleaned up and start on my weekly laundry. I'll be back later on, though.
~ Meg
Showing posts with label files. Show all posts
Showing posts with label files. Show all posts
Saturday, August 21, 2010
Friday, August 20, 2010
82. Defense & High-Reliability Firms File, Part 7 (Radine, pt. 1)
I guess I really should at least get one more text done today. It's not that I haven't been working on this today, it's just that it's been more behind the scenes work. Now I think there are 2 articles I can't find. So that makes me think I may have more material stashed somewhere, so I've started rummaging through things trying to figure out where that might be.
I don't know if you know what it's like to move and then not be able to find everything for a while afterward... well it's like that, except I've had 2 moves back to back where a lot of things weren't unpacked between moves. I got handy the things I use all the time, but when I was arranging things for ready access to what I thought I would need, I didn't know I would need these things yet. I thought I'd get better quicker and be able to get a part-time job sooner. With my health demands and limits working part-time might not make it so feasible to work on this blog, certainly not as much as I have been.
Also, I have bad news on the garden front. I haven't heard back from the the extension people yet, but I'm getting more and more problems with the squash and cucumbers, so I'm seriously considering just digging them up. The good news, though, is that more of the plants from the butterfly garden seed packet that I planted have started blooming. Some are still just coming up too, so there will definitely be more to come. I would have felt badly if the flowers came out as badly as the vegetables seem to have, since it's something I did for the neighbor and not for myself. It's one thing for things to bomb out if you're doing it for yourself, and it's another thing if you're doing it for someone else.
***
Okay, the next one is a big one, so fasten your seat belts...
Radine, Lawrence B. (1977). The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. (Contributions in Sociology, No. 2)
***
"Manipulative controls are difficult to recognize because they are subtle and rational and seem liberal in contrast to coercive controls....
The Taming of the Troops develops two key themes: (1) the overall shift in Army controls from coercion to manipulation and (2) the change in military controls to more closely resemble civilian controls... The result is an organization that, in my opinion, is all the more capable of controlling deviant and politically outspoken soldiers....
Furthermore, some of the techniques developed in the Army have been borrowed by civilian sectors... Some leadership and organizational principles discussed in this book have been taken up by industrial organizations... [T]he Army can be viewed as a vanguard bureaucracy in the development of new techniques of control, as well as a recipient of civilian controls." (p. ix-xi)
This is a little different tack then we've taken before. We saw earlier that there were some authoritarian aspects of the Vienna mission, but this might go further in explaining some things I experienced. We'll see if the Vienna mission picked up any military approaches to things.
***
"This pattern of increasing oppressiveness is effective because repression is difficult to respond to when it is applied in small increments; no one step is sufficient cause to rally opposition around... Thus, repression on the installment plan can institute a form of domination that would almost inevitably be resisted if one of the later steps were applied to early... Thus, there is an internal logic to techniques of domination: they are most effective when applied in a sequential pattern." (p. 4)
A couple of things here. First of all, I don't know how the mission in Vienna got to be the way it was. Since it was an agglomeration of a bunch of missions, I assume you'd have to look to those founding missions, and then the others as they were added too, and the governing board, which met twice a year. Those of us who came after it was well up and running didn't see that incremental aspect, if it existed.
As far as how I personally was treated - my experience of the mission - I don't see anything incremental about it. Rather, I see a patchwork hodgepodge of back to back encouragement and being knocked down. As such, it was hard to make sense of, as far as what was really wanted of me. That's how I felt.
***
"If an individual resister is considered to be a security risk, evidenced by his having belonged to a subversive organization or committing certain politically motivated acts, his personnel file is flagged. His file is thus spotted as belonging to someone whom the Army will not assign to certain positions, such as missile duty, Army intelligence, and so forth." (p. 7)
About the only thing I could have been flagged for before arriving in Vienna is disagreeing with some of the things the Slavic Gospel Association did. Unfortunately, they were a very powerful mission and one of the founding missions of the collaborative mission I was assigned to work with. ECM, my sending mission, knew of these issues from discussions during Candidates' Course, so that probably followed me there. But I don't think they thought they'd have any problems with me. Maybe I'm just too American for my own good - after all that's why we fight most of our wars, isn't it (at least on paper). so we can keep our freedom. I just happen to like thinking for myself, especially where values are concerned.
But to be honest, they could have been as puzzled about me (what I was thinking) as I was of their behavior toward me. And in going through my materials, what little I have left, of that time, I see that I seem to have seldom let on what I was really thinking. I think that was because I didn't trust them and there was a certain amount of fear of them too, although not right away.
Although I'm currently not involved in anything, after my return to the States from Russia I did quite a lot that would have flagged me as a potential troublemaker. For example, I hadn't yet been arrested for trespassing on Lockheed-Martin's property in a protest near Philadelphia. We just stepped foot on the grass and were arrested for trespassing.
***
"As we shall see in the next chapter, basic trainees are usually too psychologically disorganized and overwhelmed to think of formulating a coherent resistive response." (p. 8)
Since we already know I never left the boot camp/introductory socialization phase in Vienna, I think this is a pretty good one-sentence summary of why it would have been very difficult for me to openly protest. At least part of why it would have been difficult. I didn't understand it myself at the time, which is why years later when my life just seemed to go from bad to worse (well, maybe awful to more awful), I did the research that I'm sharing with you now. It really was hard to make heads or tails of what was going on.
And I'm also generally the kind that doesn't stand up for something unless I'm pretty well convinced I'm right and I have something good to back up my position too. I was just 18 years old, fresh out of high school, and that summer, since I could work full time with no school commitments, I was in charge of pictures and pets - two small departments. That meant I had to do the ordering, keep the shelves looking nice, set up displays for sales, etc. However, I didn't have to do this all the time, so I also worked a lot in the garden shop, home improvement and building materials departments. The garden shop manager had been asking me to help him a lot and I always tried to accommodate, but it was getting so that I was neglecting my departments and we were in the back room, where the ordering was done, and I stood up for myself and laid out what had been happening and said I couldn't right then. It just so happened that the marketing manager was in the room too and heard the whole thing and nothing else was said about it. I think Randy was pretty taken aback that I'd be so firm and logical in my response.
But I couldn't do that in Vienna because, beside the issues being a lot bigger, I didn't understand what was going on well enough and I felt like anything to make myself vulnerable was just an opportunity for them to just sort of swoop down and snatch me away. Well, not exactly, but it would give them an in, a hook to drag me into this thing that I didn't think I wanted to conform to. That's how I felt, although I'm probably being clearer in expressing it now than I could have then.
***
"Many people maintain a fiction of their omnipotence: they feel that if they were really committed to something, they were not back down to any power. But GIs I have interviewed have asserted that the Army, at least during basic training, seems to be interested in destroying that self-confident state of mind that is so important for resistance." (p. 8)
The GIs should be glad boot camp lasted only 8 weeks (or however long), because I had this kind of treatment for 2 years!! I know it's not exactly the same - the other components of boot camp, but this part is strikingly familiar to me. In my 1989-1990 journal after returning home I laid bare and even wrote that I was afraid to even write my true thoughts in Vienna, and I was devastated, convinced that I had all these bad qualities that had finally sunk in from those 2 years.
Of course, then the question is, if it was that bad, why did you stick it out even? Well, getting out wouldn't have been quite as hard as trying to get out of the military early, but it would have been pretty hard. Think about it: I had prepared for 8 years (1978 to 1986) for that ministry. I had worked part-time with one of the most influential missions to that world and had major ethical disagreements with them. I had written a questionnaire to 30+ missions to that part of the world and only 2 had responses that I thought were at all reasonable. So what would I have done if I'd left? In fact, when I did leave, after my 2-year term had expired, I eventually came to the conclusion that I couldn't work with a mission, although even when I was in Russian I contacted a couple groups working with women.
***
"Rather than being carefully assigned, a flagged soldier may temporarily be unassigned to any permanent work detail or base but held in what is called a holdover company. Thus while everyone he knows is sent off to various bases, he exists in a kind of limbo, unable to develop his organization or maintain contacts." (p. 10)
This could very easily have been written with me in mind. Technically, I had a position, but I wasn't treated as if that was really what they wanted... Sort of like how the Komsomols (Young Communist League) got me to Siberia a few years later. Be upfront people... what do you REALLY want? I'm ready to be a secretary; I brought my little secretary handbook, which I assiduously studied before arriving. I offered to take a computer class, but couldn't be told what software I'd be using. And being a secretary is more or less 9-5, right? I mean, okay, you have other little things that need doing here and there, social interactions and helping others, but otherwise, I'm not supposed to be a secretary, right? My job descriptions says I'm a secretary, right? Right? Hello? Hello? That's a little of how I felt.
***
Speaking of the experience of some organizers in the Army: "The Army labeled the incoming organizer as a troublemaker by telling company members that a communist was being transferred into their unit" (p. 12)
I had a friend, the same one that was with me in leaving the USSR after we'd left our study group, who was from a small rural town in the Northeast (USA) who said that sometimes people there thought she was a communist for studying Russian. When I returned from Russia for good in 1997 and people who knew me began to realized that my socio-political views had changed I think there was some of this labeling of me going on, but not so much to my face. Of course, some people in the USA seem to be think that in order to be saved you also have to be a Republican. They might not say that, but it's true. And if you're not a fire-breathing die-hard Republican they'll just as likely treat you as a sinner going to hell, even though you may be otherwise a strong Christian.
***
After some discussion about how the Army escalates its treatment of organizers, leading to harassing inspections which can turn up evidence that can lead to direct punishment:
"This demonstrates the usefulness of a military justice system in which substantive law is based on protecting the organization from the individual rather than the reverse." (p. 14)
In the Vienna mission there was NO protection for the individual. In fact, I was very much let down by my sending church's mission board who did nothing in my defense, even writing to the mission or anything. There was absolutely no recourse for a missionary in that setting. The only thing you could ever have had any recourse about is if they blatantly broke the law. But there's a whole machinery in place to support and defend the mission, and the business of that machinery does not include a system of redress. Heck, if I get a secular job and I have a complaint against my boss, there is a whole grievance procedure in place as to how to deal with it. Not so in the Vienna mission. Thee is no recourse, none, zip, nada, and zilch. None.
***
"The training military intelligence men receive for handling enemy prisoners of war can easily be put to use in intimidating anti-war GIs." (p. 14)
I've wondered since leaving Vienna what exactly military chaplains do. I mean, I have copies even of some of the manuals explaining how they are supposed to lead religious services according to their church's tradition, when in port make contact with religious leaders there, etc., etc. I do know that they're supposed to be part of the system to keep the morale and the morals high. And they do advise other officers on certain issues in their sphere of work. So it seems they must have to know something about the military and support what it does. This is the kind of think in adult education I didn't like (I wasn't in this aspect of adult education but it's strong in the USA and elsewhere), that human resource development is really ultimately there to build up the organization, so you're like that propaganda person in the Soviet factory, right? And does the mindset of the military rub off on these chaplains? What kinds of things might the 2 chaplains in the Vienna mission human resource office have brought with them from their military experience. I haven't found good answers from the literature.
***
"[The Defense Investigative Review]'s director has testified that every request to carry out 'covert surveillance' on a GI anti-war group has been granted." (p. 16)
Those are even worse odds than civilian activists are confronted with. I wish I knew some of the laws and loopholes about things that affected (or seemed to) me later on.
***
"Given the vagueness of military law, even the most competent organizer can be arrested eventually by a military authority." (p. 16)
Sounds a bit like what dissidents in the former USSR faced. Not that things are completely cleaned up now, but they're certainly a lot better than they were there. But Putin hasn't exactly been a friend of dissidents.
***
Here we are! -
"And at another base, Actions 'that have been taken to minimize the impact of dissident activities' included the following:
... (4)... Counterintelligence efforts have been used for the early identification of dissidence and violence...
(7) Under the sponsorship of the local Chaplaincy, an on-post coffee house activity was initiated in 1969." (p. 26-27)
A couple of things here. First of all, it's nice that they put that in about the Chaplaincy. So the chaplain is involved in quashing dissident activities and religion is a nice guise to do that in. The text goes on to explain how the coffee house did actually provide an outlet for gripes to be aired, which helped reduce tensions that might have otherwise surfaced in less helpful ways.
But also, I would like to bring up another subject that I've wondered for years and my dad consistently balked at, preferring to think of me as mentally unstable, is that there were times when things happened that were otherwise not your everyday occurrence and I wondered if there wasn't something political going on. I mean, really, us Westerners find it much easier to believe that my phone was bugged in Russia than, say, in Vienna. I never thought it was bugged in the USA though. But there were other things in the USA that were puzzling.
Of course, the military has it's own laws and rules, which are quite distinct from the civilian counterparts, but if the issue of concern is my dad, and he's in a responsible, high visibility military-related position... if such things were to happen as seemed to happen to me, would that military connection be enough to have whatever loopholes are available take effect? I don't know.
***
I've finished the first chapter (we have 6 more to go), but it's time for me to take a break.
~ Meg
I don't know if you know what it's like to move and then not be able to find everything for a while afterward... well it's like that, except I've had 2 moves back to back where a lot of things weren't unpacked between moves. I got handy the things I use all the time, but when I was arranging things for ready access to what I thought I would need, I didn't know I would need these things yet. I thought I'd get better quicker and be able to get a part-time job sooner. With my health demands and limits working part-time might not make it so feasible to work on this blog, certainly not as much as I have been.
Also, I have bad news on the garden front. I haven't heard back from the the extension people yet, but I'm getting more and more problems with the squash and cucumbers, so I'm seriously considering just digging them up. The good news, though, is that more of the plants from the butterfly garden seed packet that I planted have started blooming. Some are still just coming up too, so there will definitely be more to come. I would have felt badly if the flowers came out as badly as the vegetables seem to have, since it's something I did for the neighbor and not for myself. It's one thing for things to bomb out if you're doing it for yourself, and it's another thing if you're doing it for someone else.
***
Okay, the next one is a big one, so fasten your seat belts...
Radine, Lawrence B. (1977). The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. (Contributions in Sociology, No. 2)
***
"Manipulative controls are difficult to recognize because they are subtle and rational and seem liberal in contrast to coercive controls....
The Taming of the Troops develops two key themes: (1) the overall shift in Army controls from coercion to manipulation and (2) the change in military controls to more closely resemble civilian controls... The result is an organization that, in my opinion, is all the more capable of controlling deviant and politically outspoken soldiers....
Furthermore, some of the techniques developed in the Army have been borrowed by civilian sectors... Some leadership and organizational principles discussed in this book have been taken up by industrial organizations... [T]he Army can be viewed as a vanguard bureaucracy in the development of new techniques of control, as well as a recipient of civilian controls." (p. ix-xi)
This is a little different tack then we've taken before. We saw earlier that there were some authoritarian aspects of the Vienna mission, but this might go further in explaining some things I experienced. We'll see if the Vienna mission picked up any military approaches to things.
***
"This pattern of increasing oppressiveness is effective because repression is difficult to respond to when it is applied in small increments; no one step is sufficient cause to rally opposition around... Thus, repression on the installment plan can institute a form of domination that would almost inevitably be resisted if one of the later steps were applied to early... Thus, there is an internal logic to techniques of domination: they are most effective when applied in a sequential pattern." (p. 4)
A couple of things here. First of all, I don't know how the mission in Vienna got to be the way it was. Since it was an agglomeration of a bunch of missions, I assume you'd have to look to those founding missions, and then the others as they were added too, and the governing board, which met twice a year. Those of us who came after it was well up and running didn't see that incremental aspect, if it existed.
As far as how I personally was treated - my experience of the mission - I don't see anything incremental about it. Rather, I see a patchwork hodgepodge of back to back encouragement and being knocked down. As such, it was hard to make sense of, as far as what was really wanted of me. That's how I felt.
***
"If an individual resister is considered to be a security risk, evidenced by his having belonged to a subversive organization or committing certain politically motivated acts, his personnel file is flagged. His file is thus spotted as belonging to someone whom the Army will not assign to certain positions, such as missile duty, Army intelligence, and so forth." (p. 7)
About the only thing I could have been flagged for before arriving in Vienna is disagreeing with some of the things the Slavic Gospel Association did. Unfortunately, they were a very powerful mission and one of the founding missions of the collaborative mission I was assigned to work with. ECM, my sending mission, knew of these issues from discussions during Candidates' Course, so that probably followed me there. But I don't think they thought they'd have any problems with me. Maybe I'm just too American for my own good - after all that's why we fight most of our wars, isn't it (at least on paper). so we can keep our freedom. I just happen to like thinking for myself, especially where values are concerned.
But to be honest, they could have been as puzzled about me (what I was thinking) as I was of their behavior toward me. And in going through my materials, what little I have left, of that time, I see that I seem to have seldom let on what I was really thinking. I think that was because I didn't trust them and there was a certain amount of fear of them too, although not right away.
Although I'm currently not involved in anything, after my return to the States from Russia I did quite a lot that would have flagged me as a potential troublemaker. For example, I hadn't yet been arrested for trespassing on Lockheed-Martin's property in a protest near Philadelphia. We just stepped foot on the grass and were arrested for trespassing.
***
"As we shall see in the next chapter, basic trainees are usually too psychologically disorganized and overwhelmed to think of formulating a coherent resistive response." (p. 8)
Since we already know I never left the boot camp/introductory socialization phase in Vienna, I think this is a pretty good one-sentence summary of why it would have been very difficult for me to openly protest. At least part of why it would have been difficult. I didn't understand it myself at the time, which is why years later when my life just seemed to go from bad to worse (well, maybe awful to more awful), I did the research that I'm sharing with you now. It really was hard to make heads or tails of what was going on.
And I'm also generally the kind that doesn't stand up for something unless I'm pretty well convinced I'm right and I have something good to back up my position too. I was just 18 years old, fresh out of high school, and that summer, since I could work full time with no school commitments, I was in charge of pictures and pets - two small departments. That meant I had to do the ordering, keep the shelves looking nice, set up displays for sales, etc. However, I didn't have to do this all the time, so I also worked a lot in the garden shop, home improvement and building materials departments. The garden shop manager had been asking me to help him a lot and I always tried to accommodate, but it was getting so that I was neglecting my departments and we were in the back room, where the ordering was done, and I stood up for myself and laid out what had been happening and said I couldn't right then. It just so happened that the marketing manager was in the room too and heard the whole thing and nothing else was said about it. I think Randy was pretty taken aback that I'd be so firm and logical in my response.
But I couldn't do that in Vienna because, beside the issues being a lot bigger, I didn't understand what was going on well enough and I felt like anything to make myself vulnerable was just an opportunity for them to just sort of swoop down and snatch me away. Well, not exactly, but it would give them an in, a hook to drag me into this thing that I didn't think I wanted to conform to. That's how I felt, although I'm probably being clearer in expressing it now than I could have then.
***
"Many people maintain a fiction of their omnipotence: they feel that if they were really committed to something, they were not back down to any power. But GIs I have interviewed have asserted that the Army, at least during basic training, seems to be interested in destroying that self-confident state of mind that is so important for resistance." (p. 8)
The GIs should be glad boot camp lasted only 8 weeks (or however long), because I had this kind of treatment for 2 years!! I know it's not exactly the same - the other components of boot camp, but this part is strikingly familiar to me. In my 1989-1990 journal after returning home I laid bare and even wrote that I was afraid to even write my true thoughts in Vienna, and I was devastated, convinced that I had all these bad qualities that had finally sunk in from those 2 years.
Of course, then the question is, if it was that bad, why did you stick it out even? Well, getting out wouldn't have been quite as hard as trying to get out of the military early, but it would have been pretty hard. Think about it: I had prepared for 8 years (1978 to 1986) for that ministry. I had worked part-time with one of the most influential missions to that world and had major ethical disagreements with them. I had written a questionnaire to 30+ missions to that part of the world and only 2 had responses that I thought were at all reasonable. So what would I have done if I'd left? In fact, when I did leave, after my 2-year term had expired, I eventually came to the conclusion that I couldn't work with a mission, although even when I was in Russian I contacted a couple groups working with women.
***
"Rather than being carefully assigned, a flagged soldier may temporarily be unassigned to any permanent work detail or base but held in what is called a holdover company. Thus while everyone he knows is sent off to various bases, he exists in a kind of limbo, unable to develop his organization or maintain contacts." (p. 10)
This could very easily have been written with me in mind. Technically, I had a position, but I wasn't treated as if that was really what they wanted... Sort of like how the Komsomols (Young Communist League) got me to Siberia a few years later. Be upfront people... what do you REALLY want? I'm ready to be a secretary; I brought my little secretary handbook, which I assiduously studied before arriving. I offered to take a computer class, but couldn't be told what software I'd be using. And being a secretary is more or less 9-5, right? I mean, okay, you have other little things that need doing here and there, social interactions and helping others, but otherwise, I'm not supposed to be a secretary, right? My job descriptions says I'm a secretary, right? Right? Hello? Hello? That's a little of how I felt.
***
Speaking of the experience of some organizers in the Army: "The Army labeled the incoming organizer as a troublemaker by telling company members that a communist was being transferred into their unit" (p. 12)
I had a friend, the same one that was with me in leaving the USSR after we'd left our study group, who was from a small rural town in the Northeast (USA) who said that sometimes people there thought she was a communist for studying Russian. When I returned from Russia for good in 1997 and people who knew me began to realized that my socio-political views had changed I think there was some of this labeling of me going on, but not so much to my face. Of course, some people in the USA seem to be think that in order to be saved you also have to be a Republican. They might not say that, but it's true. And if you're not a fire-breathing die-hard Republican they'll just as likely treat you as a sinner going to hell, even though you may be otherwise a strong Christian.
***
After some discussion about how the Army escalates its treatment of organizers, leading to harassing inspections which can turn up evidence that can lead to direct punishment:
"This demonstrates the usefulness of a military justice system in which substantive law is based on protecting the organization from the individual rather than the reverse." (p. 14)
In the Vienna mission there was NO protection for the individual. In fact, I was very much let down by my sending church's mission board who did nothing in my defense, even writing to the mission or anything. There was absolutely no recourse for a missionary in that setting. The only thing you could ever have had any recourse about is if they blatantly broke the law. But there's a whole machinery in place to support and defend the mission, and the business of that machinery does not include a system of redress. Heck, if I get a secular job and I have a complaint against my boss, there is a whole grievance procedure in place as to how to deal with it. Not so in the Vienna mission. Thee is no recourse, none, zip, nada, and zilch. None.
***
"The training military intelligence men receive for handling enemy prisoners of war can easily be put to use in intimidating anti-war GIs." (p. 14)
I've wondered since leaving Vienna what exactly military chaplains do. I mean, I have copies even of some of the manuals explaining how they are supposed to lead religious services according to their church's tradition, when in port make contact with religious leaders there, etc., etc. I do know that they're supposed to be part of the system to keep the morale and the morals high. And they do advise other officers on certain issues in their sphere of work. So it seems they must have to know something about the military and support what it does. This is the kind of think in adult education I didn't like (I wasn't in this aspect of adult education but it's strong in the USA and elsewhere), that human resource development is really ultimately there to build up the organization, so you're like that propaganda person in the Soviet factory, right? And does the mindset of the military rub off on these chaplains? What kinds of things might the 2 chaplains in the Vienna mission human resource office have brought with them from their military experience. I haven't found good answers from the literature.
***
"[The Defense Investigative Review]'s director has testified that every request to carry out 'covert surveillance' on a GI anti-war group has been granted." (p. 16)
Those are even worse odds than civilian activists are confronted with. I wish I knew some of the laws and loopholes about things that affected (or seemed to) me later on.
***
"Given the vagueness of military law, even the most competent organizer can be arrested eventually by a military authority." (p. 16)
Sounds a bit like what dissidents in the former USSR faced. Not that things are completely cleaned up now, but they're certainly a lot better than they were there. But Putin hasn't exactly been a friend of dissidents.
***
Here we are! -
"And at another base, Actions 'that have been taken to minimize the impact of dissident activities' included the following:
... (4)... Counterintelligence efforts have been used for the early identification of dissidence and violence...
(7) Under the sponsorship of the local Chaplaincy, an on-post coffee house activity was initiated in 1969." (p. 26-27)
A couple of things here. First of all, it's nice that they put that in about the Chaplaincy. So the chaplain is involved in quashing dissident activities and religion is a nice guise to do that in. The text goes on to explain how the coffee house did actually provide an outlet for gripes to be aired, which helped reduce tensions that might have otherwise surfaced in less helpful ways.
But also, I would like to bring up another subject that I've wondered for years and my dad consistently balked at, preferring to think of me as mentally unstable, is that there were times when things happened that were otherwise not your everyday occurrence and I wondered if there wasn't something political going on. I mean, really, us Westerners find it much easier to believe that my phone was bugged in Russia than, say, in Vienna. I never thought it was bugged in the USA though. But there were other things in the USA that were puzzling.
Of course, the military has it's own laws and rules, which are quite distinct from the civilian counterparts, but if the issue of concern is my dad, and he's in a responsible, high visibility military-related position... if such things were to happen as seemed to happen to me, would that military connection be enough to have whatever loopholes are available take effect? I don't know.
***
I've finished the first chapter (we have 6 more to go), but it's time for me to take a break.
~ Meg
Thursday, August 19, 2010
80. Defense & High-Reliability Firms File, Part 6 (Nebeker, pt. 1/Deluga, pt. 1)
Okay, I'm back. I went for a walk and did a few other things around here. I have to exercise for my fibromyalgia, and walking is one of the things my physiologist stresses. It sure is muggy out though. My little WeatherBug app says it's currently 89.5F out and the humidity is 59%. It feels more humid than that though. My body temperature gauge hasn't been too good since I got fibromyalgia, and I understand that's common. Sometimes I think I've become a cold blooded animal with FM now. But I am happy to report that I haven't had a fever in several days now, so I'm crossing my fingers that maybe I really am (finally!!) getting over this bug that has been plaguing me since last December - about 9 months now. Hopefully before too long I'll be able to really think about working part-time.
***
This next article, actually a book chapter, will be a short one as far as comments go.
Nebeker, Delbert M. (1994) I/O and OB in the military services: past, present, and future. In Greenberg, J. (Ed.) Organizational Behavior: The State of the Science. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, p. 245-273.
***
"Industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology and organizational behavior (OB), as applied sciences, have many ties to subspecialties in psychology as well as other disciplines. Also, they have many ties to institutions and industries that have provided impetus and opportunity for them to develop. None of these ties, however, are as strong as the tie between I/O psychology and the military..." (p. 245)
I haven't even started on the files that touch on these kinds of subjects yet, but it just figures that the military would predominate in this kind of thing. Once again the military is the provider (or at least the stimulus) of some useful insight into my experiences in Vienna.
Later on in this article the author provides some details on current military research in this field. In 1992 alone there were over 790 research and development projects. That's enough to populate a few with articles, for sure.
***
Here's the next article:
Deluga, Ronald J. (1991). The relationship of leader and subordinate influencing activity in naval environments. Military Psychology, 3(1), 25-39.
***
"Rooted in social exchange theory, transactional leadership suggests that most leaders engage in a bargaining relationship with subordinates..." (p. 26)
This doesn't fit the Vienna situation. There wasn't really any room for bargaining. I suppose once one got past the socialization state (which I didn't) there might be limited room for this.
***
"Transformational leadership moves beyond social exchange theory and amplifies the impact of transactional leadership by propelling subordinates beyond self-interest. The theory suggests that the leader cultivates subordinate awareness and acceptance of the work group mission. The leader-subordinate relationship is one of mutual stimulation. The leader realizes these outcomes by appealing to subordinate higher level needs in three ways. Charisma is the primary factor, describing how the transformational leader develops an almost reverent relationship with the identifying subordinates... The leader inspires subordinates by generating a vision of what the group can accomplish. Second, Individual Consideration is the mechanism by which the leader strives to meet subordinate individual needs. This factor describes the leader's mentoring and developmental orientation with subordinates. Third, Intellectual Stimulation describes how the leader fosters new subordinate thinking patterns, encouraging subordinates to think of old problems in new ways..." (p. 26-27)
I think this is a reasonable facsimile of what I experienced as far as leadership style is concerned. The only thing I would not find fitting, at least in my experience, is the third point, Intellectual Stimulation. I felt like there was more pressure to conform than to be intellectually stimulated. I'm not sure I can think of anything that was particularly intellectually stimulating while I was there - the closest thing was having to read the software manuals, but that's another story.
***
There's a section here called "Upward Subordinate Influencing Activity", but none of this really clicks with me. I felt like the only influence I could have is within the very narrow confines of whatever my job description was at the moment (yes, it was a moving target, more on that too), something along the lines of how to set up a file system or the like.
***
The rest of the things in this folder are long, so I'm going to take another break for tackling any of them.
Bye for now...
~ Meg
***
This next article, actually a book chapter, will be a short one as far as comments go.
Nebeker, Delbert M. (1994) I/O and OB in the military services: past, present, and future. In Greenberg, J. (Ed.) Organizational Behavior: The State of the Science. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, p. 245-273.
***
"Industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology and organizational behavior (OB), as applied sciences, have many ties to subspecialties in psychology as well as other disciplines. Also, they have many ties to institutions and industries that have provided impetus and opportunity for them to develop. None of these ties, however, are as strong as the tie between I/O psychology and the military..." (p. 245)
I haven't even started on the files that touch on these kinds of subjects yet, but it just figures that the military would predominate in this kind of thing. Once again the military is the provider (or at least the stimulus) of some useful insight into my experiences in Vienna.
Later on in this article the author provides some details on current military research in this field. In 1992 alone there were over 790 research and development projects. That's enough to populate a few with articles, for sure.
***
Here's the next article:
Deluga, Ronald J. (1991). The relationship of leader and subordinate influencing activity in naval environments. Military Psychology, 3(1), 25-39.
***
"Rooted in social exchange theory, transactional leadership suggests that most leaders engage in a bargaining relationship with subordinates..." (p. 26)
This doesn't fit the Vienna situation. There wasn't really any room for bargaining. I suppose once one got past the socialization state (which I didn't) there might be limited room for this.
***
"Transformational leadership moves beyond social exchange theory and amplifies the impact of transactional leadership by propelling subordinates beyond self-interest. The theory suggests that the leader cultivates subordinate awareness and acceptance of the work group mission. The leader-subordinate relationship is one of mutual stimulation. The leader realizes these outcomes by appealing to subordinate higher level needs in three ways. Charisma is the primary factor, describing how the transformational leader develops an almost reverent relationship with the identifying subordinates... The leader inspires subordinates by generating a vision of what the group can accomplish. Second, Individual Consideration is the mechanism by which the leader strives to meet subordinate individual needs. This factor describes the leader's mentoring and developmental orientation with subordinates. Third, Intellectual Stimulation describes how the leader fosters new subordinate thinking patterns, encouraging subordinates to think of old problems in new ways..." (p. 26-27)
I think this is a reasonable facsimile of what I experienced as far as leadership style is concerned. The only thing I would not find fitting, at least in my experience, is the third point, Intellectual Stimulation. I felt like there was more pressure to conform than to be intellectually stimulated. I'm not sure I can think of anything that was particularly intellectually stimulating while I was there - the closest thing was having to read the software manuals, but that's another story.
***
There's a section here called "Upward Subordinate Influencing Activity", but none of this really clicks with me. I felt like the only influence I could have is within the very narrow confines of whatever my job description was at the moment (yes, it was a moving target, more on that too), something along the lines of how to set up a file system or the like.
***
The rest of the things in this folder are long, so I'm going to take another break for tackling any of them.
Bye for now...
~ Meg
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
69. Espionage (CIA, KGB, FBI) File, Pt. 10 (Levinger, pt. 1) (Was:Spy File, Part IX)
I'm skipping over several things I have in my file that are sort of interesting but only tangentially applicable, maybe. So now I'm down to 2 books that I'm not sure about - whether to proceed with them or not here. But I'll touch a little on the first one now (and decide on the other one later).
This one is actually a special issue of the Journal of Social Issues (v. 43, no. 3, 1987) on "Covert Facilitation of Crime" with the issue editor being George Levinger.
The topic at hand here is really about issues around the use of "covert facilitation" of law enforcement agencies in the apprehension of crime in the USA. In the editor's introduction he gives this definition:
"As defined by Braithwaite, Fisse, and Geis in this issue, covert facilitation, is 'the practice of law enforcement officials who seek through the conscious use of deception to encourage criminal acts under circumstances where they can be observed by undercover operatives.' (p.6); the goal is to catch potential offenders." (p. 2)
The only way that I can think of for that to apply to my situation exactly, would be if a U.S. law enforcement agency / officer(s) tried to see if I had any intentions getting involved in espionage (via my dad, for example). I can't say that I experienced anything like that. But sometimes I did feel like I was being intimidated indirectly by (to me what seemed to be) unusual events, so that I would forsake my interest in Eastern Europe/USSR. This is really something different and it's probable that completely different laws, at least, would be involved, if not also different possible agencies.
So the one thing this book does give me, though, is some indication of what law enforcers do/can do by way of covert facilitation that may at least let me know if any of the things I experienced had been used in this covert facilitation context, and if so, maybe such means could be used to protect my dad and his work by means of trying to hinder me.
I know this is rather circuitous thinking, but, believe me, if you'd been through some of the things I had been through, you'd understand that any sort of glimmer that such things might happen even if in a somewhat different context, then it possibly could have happened to you to. That's a lot of hedging, but it's hard living with a lot of questions unanswered about some really awful things.
So that's why I even have this journal issue in this file, and I'll proceed with it from that standpoint.
***
From the lead article:
Covert facilitatation and crime: restoring balance to the entrapment debate, by John Brathwaite, Brent Fisse & Gilbert Geis, p. 5-41.
***
The referenced articles (which I omit as noted by the ...) are dated from 1977 to 1986.
"Criminal justice practices have become increasingly subversive of privacy... There has been expanded use of undercover agents and informers, and increased emphasis on campaigns to have citizens report drug users to the police (including instances of children turning in their parents), phone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, hidden cameras, periscopic prisms, electronic bracelets for tracking persons under house arrest, lie detector tests, 'spy dust,' computerized data banks, satellite surveillance, and similar procedures... Gary T. Marx... has been the leading figure in documenting what Michel Foucault ... called the modern state's 'subtle calculated technology of subjection.'" (p. 7)
Some of these things, like "computerized data banks", seem pretty routine today, but others, such as the eavesdropping and hidden cameras might raise a few hackles. If law enforcers are doing these kind of things in an effort to apprehend (potential) criminals, it seems likely that it would be easy for them to use these things in a case like mine, depending on the laws and other possible restrictions different from the covert facilitation context discussed here. And this was roughly the time frame too, that it might have applied in my case.
***
"Covert facilitation guidelines cannot be written to provide much practical protection against abuse. Nor can the prior approval of a judge bring in substantial practical control over any unfairness by the police in carrying out the undercover operation as it unfolds." (p. 12)
If protection in covert facilitation is difficult, I think it would be even more so in a case involving protecting a high-profile military project such as SDI.
***
"Covert facilitation is an appealing law enforcement tactic to nab drug addicts, dissidents, or prostitutes, but a less attractive strategy when it comes to white-collar criminals." (p. 25-26)
This is only interesting because of my social movement research in which agents did infiltrate cell groups preparing for major protests.
***
"Milgram's... renowned work indicated that experimental subjects are prone to obey authority figures when commanded to perform hurtful and, by general standards, immoral acts." (p. 34)
If you are unfamiliar with this experiment check out what Wikipedia has to say about it, or BBC's re-enactment of it.
Using this kind of psychology, what would it have taken for people to turn against me if told to do so? (But who would tell them to do so if they did?) I don't know, but I also do not know how some of the things happened to me that did during my Vienna tenure.
***
Restoring realism and logic to the covert facilitation debate, by Gary T. Marx, p. 43-55.
"Looking at the history of U.S. law enforcement, the key question is: How over the last century (and particularly the last decade), has the United States gone from being among the Western nations most opposed to domestic secret police practices to being their leading practitioner (and even exporter) for criminal cases...?" (p. 46)
It seems to me that even though the immediate topic is covert facilitation in this whole journal issue, that this question is broader than that, and refers to all sorts of "domestic secret police practices." Without any other details to go on, it doesn't tell us much, but is sort of enlightening if researchers of the field note this broad trend. It could provide a context wherein some of my experiences might have been more plausibly explained. I hope I'm not too far out in left field or grasping at straws in my hopes for some clarity regarding my life experiences.
***
"The recent expansion of undercover tactics does not stand alone; it must be seen as part of gradual changes that are making social control more intrusive, manipulative, hidden, intensive, and extensive. Covert facilitation must be considered alongside enhanced dossier, electronic, biological, and chemical means of surveillance and control." (p. 54)
Well, now we at least have a blatant extension of the trend to other areas. But what are biological and chemical means of surveillance?
***
The risks of covert facilitation, by Jerome H. Skolnick, p. 79-85.
"The requirements for issuing a warrant to wiretap are stringent. Title III of 18 U.S.C. #2510-20 prescribes a careful procedure for obtaining a warrant, and federal law preempts state law." (p. 82)
I never felt like the U.S. was eavesdropping on me. But in the USSR/Russia yes, and maybe also in Austria, but I'd need to check my notes about that time period, since so much has happened since.
***
"That covert facilitation will not be used indiscriminately - against politically dangerous persons - seems naive. Once we institutionalize a practice to control one set of dangerous criminals, we are scarcely in a position to protest its use against another 'dangerous' category." (p. 83)
I think the author means by "politically dangerous" someone who could be harmful to one's (a politician's) political aims - maybe Watergate-like targets.
But still, the point here is that the use of something like covert facilitation wouldn't just end where it was supposed, with the legal uses of it.
That's the whole trouble with covert things, if I may take a moment to go into a tirade (that's one of the benefits of this being my blog), once you enter a world of secrecy than everything is possible... well, almost. But you know what I mean.
Here's my understanding of the Scriptural stance on these kinds of things:
John 3:17 For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved.
18 He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.
19 And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.
20 For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved.
21 But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God.
Ephesians 5:11 And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them.
12 For it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret.
And instead of trusting in our own wisdom and strength, here's another way that doesn't involve secrecy and hiding and doing things in the dark, behind closed doors:
For we would not, brethren, have you ignorant of our trouble which came to us in Asia, that we were pressed out of measure, above strength, so that we despaired even of life: But we had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God who raiseth the dead (II Cor. 1:8-9)
Of course, missions and Christians in general should particularly consider these things, but it also shows in general what I think of this whole secrecy thing.
***
Here's another excellent quote that reaches far beyond the specific subject matter it addresses:
"But it seems just as reasonable to focus on the psychology of the investigator. Can psychologists help answer the question of whether we should be skeptical of the testimony of an investigator who has spent much of his career covert facilitating? Put more abstractly, to what extent do deceptive practices - especially those encouraging wrongdoing - generalize to become absorbed throughout one's personality, thus impairing the moral character of the wrongdoer? Put more colloquially, can an accomplished conman - with or without badge - ever be trusted?" (p. 85)
Let me rephrase this a bit:
Can an accomplished missionary to 'closed' countries, considering s/he's spent much of his/her career being deceptive in his/her ministry ever be trusted? If such a missionary is deceptive with border patrol, others asking about the work ("we do publishing"), other missionaries, where does the deception end?
I really hope someone, and NOT a mission itself, write an honest history of what really went/goes on in 'closed' country missions, and specifically those who worked in the former East Bloc countries.
But I also feel that my dad may have been guilty here to a certain extent. Overall I think he had a lot of integrity, but I think regarding things of his work, and even sometimes as related to me, he may have had to live a bit in this underworld. I do know that after he retired he was able to focus more on his spiritual life and I think he really grew in that realm, so I wonder if not just having more time as a retired person, but the constraints of his work freed him inside to have a deeper spiritual life. I'm not sure, but maybe.
***
That's all for that book. There wasn't a lot of substance to help me unravel my experiences, but it might help with some of the broader framework issues.
~ Meg
This one is actually a special issue of the Journal of Social Issues (v. 43, no. 3, 1987) on "Covert Facilitation of Crime" with the issue editor being George Levinger.
The topic at hand here is really about issues around the use of "covert facilitation" of law enforcement agencies in the apprehension of crime in the USA. In the editor's introduction he gives this definition:
"As defined by Braithwaite, Fisse, and Geis in this issue, covert facilitation, is 'the practice of law enforcement officials who seek through the conscious use of deception to encourage criminal acts under circumstances where they can be observed by undercover operatives.' (p.6); the goal is to catch potential offenders." (p. 2)
The only way that I can think of for that to apply to my situation exactly, would be if a U.S. law enforcement agency / officer(s) tried to see if I had any intentions getting involved in espionage (via my dad, for example). I can't say that I experienced anything like that. But sometimes I did feel like I was being intimidated indirectly by (to me what seemed to be) unusual events, so that I would forsake my interest in Eastern Europe/USSR. This is really something different and it's probable that completely different laws, at least, would be involved, if not also different possible agencies.
So the one thing this book does give me, though, is some indication of what law enforcers do/can do by way of covert facilitation that may at least let me know if any of the things I experienced had been used in this covert facilitation context, and if so, maybe such means could be used to protect my dad and his work by means of trying to hinder me.
I know this is rather circuitous thinking, but, believe me, if you'd been through some of the things I had been through, you'd understand that any sort of glimmer that such things might happen even if in a somewhat different context, then it possibly could have happened to you to. That's a lot of hedging, but it's hard living with a lot of questions unanswered about some really awful things.
So that's why I even have this journal issue in this file, and I'll proceed with it from that standpoint.
***
From the lead article:
Covert facilitatation and crime: restoring balance to the entrapment debate, by John Brathwaite, Brent Fisse & Gilbert Geis, p. 5-41.
***
The referenced articles (which I omit as noted by the ...) are dated from 1977 to 1986.
"Criminal justice practices have become increasingly subversive of privacy... There has been expanded use of undercover agents and informers, and increased emphasis on campaigns to have citizens report drug users to the police (including instances of children turning in their parents), phone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, hidden cameras, periscopic prisms, electronic bracelets for tracking persons under house arrest, lie detector tests, 'spy dust,' computerized data banks, satellite surveillance, and similar procedures... Gary T. Marx... has been the leading figure in documenting what Michel Foucault ... called the modern state's 'subtle calculated technology of subjection.'" (p. 7)
Some of these things, like "computerized data banks", seem pretty routine today, but others, such as the eavesdropping and hidden cameras might raise a few hackles. If law enforcers are doing these kind of things in an effort to apprehend (potential) criminals, it seems likely that it would be easy for them to use these things in a case like mine, depending on the laws and other possible restrictions different from the covert facilitation context discussed here. And this was roughly the time frame too, that it might have applied in my case.
***
"Covert facilitation guidelines cannot be written to provide much practical protection against abuse. Nor can the prior approval of a judge bring in substantial practical control over any unfairness by the police in carrying out the undercover operation as it unfolds." (p. 12)
If protection in covert facilitation is difficult, I think it would be even more so in a case involving protecting a high-profile military project such as SDI.
***
"Covert facilitation is an appealing law enforcement tactic to nab drug addicts, dissidents, or prostitutes, but a less attractive strategy when it comes to white-collar criminals." (p. 25-26)
This is only interesting because of my social movement research in which agents did infiltrate cell groups preparing for major protests.
***
"Milgram's... renowned work indicated that experimental subjects are prone to obey authority figures when commanded to perform hurtful and, by general standards, immoral acts." (p. 34)
If you are unfamiliar with this experiment check out what Wikipedia has to say about it, or BBC's re-enactment of it.
Using this kind of psychology, what would it have taken for people to turn against me if told to do so? (But who would tell them to do so if they did?) I don't know, but I also do not know how some of the things happened to me that did during my Vienna tenure.
***
Restoring realism and logic to the covert facilitation debate, by Gary T. Marx, p. 43-55.
"Looking at the history of U.S. law enforcement, the key question is: How over the last century (and particularly the last decade), has the United States gone from being among the Western nations most opposed to domestic secret police practices to being their leading practitioner (and even exporter) for criminal cases...?" (p. 46)
It seems to me that even though the immediate topic is covert facilitation in this whole journal issue, that this question is broader than that, and refers to all sorts of "domestic secret police practices." Without any other details to go on, it doesn't tell us much, but is sort of enlightening if researchers of the field note this broad trend. It could provide a context wherein some of my experiences might have been more plausibly explained. I hope I'm not too far out in left field or grasping at straws in my hopes for some clarity regarding my life experiences.
***
"The recent expansion of undercover tactics does not stand alone; it must be seen as part of gradual changes that are making social control more intrusive, manipulative, hidden, intensive, and extensive. Covert facilitation must be considered alongside enhanced dossier, electronic, biological, and chemical means of surveillance and control." (p. 54)
Well, now we at least have a blatant extension of the trend to other areas. But what are biological and chemical means of surveillance?
***
The risks of covert facilitation, by Jerome H. Skolnick, p. 79-85.
"The requirements for issuing a warrant to wiretap are stringent. Title III of 18 U.S.C. #2510-20 prescribes a careful procedure for obtaining a warrant, and federal law preempts state law." (p. 82)
I never felt like the U.S. was eavesdropping on me. But in the USSR/Russia yes, and maybe also in Austria, but I'd need to check my notes about that time period, since so much has happened since.
***
"That covert facilitation will not be used indiscriminately - against politically dangerous persons - seems naive. Once we institutionalize a practice to control one set of dangerous criminals, we are scarcely in a position to protest its use against another 'dangerous' category." (p. 83)
I think the author means by "politically dangerous" someone who could be harmful to one's (a politician's) political aims - maybe Watergate-like targets.
But still, the point here is that the use of something like covert facilitation wouldn't just end where it was supposed, with the legal uses of it.
That's the whole trouble with covert things, if I may take a moment to go into a tirade (that's one of the benefits of this being my blog), once you enter a world of secrecy than everything is possible... well, almost. But you know what I mean.
Here's my understanding of the Scriptural stance on these kinds of things:
John 3:17 For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved.
18 He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.
19 And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.
20 For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved.
21 But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God.
Ephesians 5:11 And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them.
12 For it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret.
And instead of trusting in our own wisdom and strength, here's another way that doesn't involve secrecy and hiding and doing things in the dark, behind closed doors:
For we would not, brethren, have you ignorant of our trouble which came to us in Asia, that we were pressed out of measure, above strength, so that we despaired even of life: But we had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God who raiseth the dead (II Cor. 1:8-9)
Of course, missions and Christians in general should particularly consider these things, but it also shows in general what I think of this whole secrecy thing.
***
Here's another excellent quote that reaches far beyond the specific subject matter it addresses:
"But it seems just as reasonable to focus on the psychology of the investigator. Can psychologists help answer the question of whether we should be skeptical of the testimony of an investigator who has spent much of his career covert facilitating? Put more abstractly, to what extent do deceptive practices - especially those encouraging wrongdoing - generalize to become absorbed throughout one's personality, thus impairing the moral character of the wrongdoer? Put more colloquially, can an accomplished conman - with or without badge - ever be trusted?" (p. 85)
Let me rephrase this a bit:
Can an accomplished missionary to 'closed' countries, considering s/he's spent much of his/her career being deceptive in his/her ministry ever be trusted? If such a missionary is deceptive with border patrol, others asking about the work ("we do publishing"), other missionaries, where does the deception end?
I really hope someone, and NOT a mission itself, write an honest history of what really went/goes on in 'closed' country missions, and specifically those who worked in the former East Bloc countries.
But I also feel that my dad may have been guilty here to a certain extent. Overall I think he had a lot of integrity, but I think regarding things of his work, and even sometimes as related to me, he may have had to live a bit in this underworld. I do know that after he retired he was able to focus more on his spiritual life and I think he really grew in that realm, so I wonder if not just having more time as a retired person, but the constraints of his work freed him inside to have a deeper spiritual life. I'm not sure, but maybe.
***
That's all for that book. There wasn't a lot of substance to help me unravel my experiences, but it might help with some of the broader framework issues.
~ Meg
Monday, August 16, 2010
65. Espionage (CIA, KGB, FBI) File, Pt. 7 (Sarbin & Eoyang, pt. 2) (Was: Spy File, Part VII (Sarbin, et al Cont'd))
The next chapter we're going to look at is...
Chapter 4, Models of Espionage, by Carson Eoyang
***
In the section "Psychological Models"
"... Despite the attractive simplicity of MICE, it is deficient in not recognizing other espionage motives such as alienation/disaffection (Air Force Sergeant Davies), revenge/vindictiveness (Army Sergeant Daniel Richardson), alcoholism/drug use (Christopher Boyce), and whimsy (Sir Anthony Blunt)." (p. 72)
The focus of this chapter seems to be on how to predict who will become a spy in order to deny such individuals security clearance to begin with. And the author is pointing out how difficult this is to do. Here he refers to "MICE" which appears to be a variant of "SMICE" from the earlier article.
Even as a teen I remember feeling that dad was always "right". It's like he was a bulwark of seeming perfection with no possible avenue of corruption. I understood that even how he behaved on business trips put his colleagues to shame. I'm sure this put him in a good position regarding his work, but I never had the impression that it was contrived or anything. This may have even dated back to when he was a teenager and his dad would basically berate him into perfection. Mom and dad were careful to avoid some of the things they experienced growing up, so we didn't get that kind of treatment that his dad gave him.
On my part, out of all of these things listed, revenge would probably have been my weakest point. I already discussed alienation, and said the Russians/Soviets would have had to prove that they were any better than the U.S. But revenge is different, I think, and wouldn't have perhaps required me to think anything particular one way or another about Russia. But if I were to help them you'd still have to come back to why would I want to help them if I didn't think they were any better than the U.S.? When I was in Russia I checked into getting a dual citizenship, and I would have liked that (maybe even still - if I had a dual citizenship I could have returned to Russia and found work when I had so many problems here finding good work). It's ironic how things turn out sometimes, but I won't go into that any more yet.
It's sort of like there were these two big bullies (the USSR/Russia and USA) that were itching to fight each other and I was caught in the middle. To borrow the words of a song: "Jokers to the right of me, clowns to the left, here I am stuck in the middle with you, and I don't know what it is I should do..."
***
Apologies to Mr. Eoyang, but I'm going to take some liberties with this next text. The parts in brackets are my contextual changes:
"The very intensive efforts of the Soviet intelligence services to penetrate the [Christian mission] and compromise [missionaries] stationed there has been well known for decades. The hostile threat coupled with the cultural isolation of foreigners made Moscow perhaps the highest-risk [mission] in the world..." (p. 77)
That's how it felt there when I was in Vienna with the mission. They isolated themselves though; it wasn't technically thrust upon them. It's not that I think that they were the target of Soviet efforts in the way that the US embassy in Moscow was (that's what the original text was about), but that's how it felt from the way the mission acted. That was my experience of working with them.
***
"The administration of industrial security programs further reinforces this pervasiveness of evil by subjecting all employees to inspection, control, and monitoring." (p. 78)
I wonder how pervasive this was in dad's work.
***
"S-models do not address why some people contact the FBI as soon as they encounter any suspicious contacts, while others are recruited fairly easily or even volunteer to work with foreign intelligence services." (p. 80)
I am proud to say that although I was in no position requiring clearances, I did once in 1990 contact the FBI in a situation where I thought I might be dealing with a Soviet spy trying to recruit me (to get to my dad). I didn't dilly-dally about it, although I did deliberate a few days on what to do about it before deciding that I should make that call. It's not that I was going to cooperate, but it's just that I'd not had to deal with that kind of thing before and wasn't sure what to do. A professor of mine at the time had extensive experience in the Soviet Union and I shared my concerns with her and she helped by confirming my concerns, which then prompted me to act. But that's later, so I'll tell you about that when we get there. But I did act in good faith; I didn't want anyone to think that I had any intentions of cooperating with the Soviet Union.
***
"Since espionage may unfold in several ways, it is very likely that different types of personal characteristics may be associated with the different espionage categories - just as these different kinds of espionage may occur in various situational circumstances. So identification of, and protection against, premeditated treason, opportunistic volunteers, recruited agents in place, defectors, and planted moles should not be the same." (p. 88)
I'm not sure exactly what some of these espionage categories are, what they mean in layman's terms. I could have been considered a defector at one point, but by then it was just about a non-issue as my dad was fairly suddenly retired, although I understand that there's still a certain length of time after that that he could have had still-useful information (from a Soviet perspective).
***
There's this really fantastic chart on page 89 called "Behavioral Countermeasures" that's very interesting. It'll be hard to put here, and I don't know if I should scan it in and upload it as an image, because I don't want to press the copyright issue.
The column headings are: clearances; training, education; leadership/counseling, situational matching
The row headings are: Intention; planning/conspiracy; access; acquisition; deception; foreign contact; exchange; consumption; escape.
I'll just address a few of the individual boxes that seem pertinent to my experiences.
1. Personnel rotation. I know they had this at dad's work with each new contract / proposal, but even missions did this, although, I'm not sure how much of it was for security reasons.
2. Group cohesion. This was really strong in Vienna. It sort of reminded me of an ingrown toenail, though, almost like those 18th century mission compounds in Africa. Any activities outside the mission generally was for the good of the mission, such as starting an English speaking Christian school (where the missionary kids could go to school).
3. Travel restrictions. When my parents visited me in Vienna we were planning on taking a trip into Hungary. Dad said he'd submitted his request to go into Hungary the day he left (so there wouldn't be time for whoever it was to object). There was an experience in Hungary that really had dad on edge too, in a taxi there.
***
"More effective would be training and education efforts to publicize the great risks and minimal rewards of espionage, and leadership and counseling programs to reduce the alienation and disaffection that underlie so many recent cases of espionage by Americans." (p. 89)
Sheesh! I feel alienated and disaffected, and I wasn't even a spy! I can't imagine being more alienated and disaffected than I am. Do spies feel even more alienated and disaffected that I am? That must be terrible, to say the least.
***
"The actions of an ideological spy who is committed to world disarmament, for example, are directed toward advancing a strongly held moral position." (p. 109).
Now this is an interesting proposition. I did research on social movements, which I started in my doctoral studies in adult education. Actually, most of this work came after I left because I didn't want to be a professor and I was being led to believe that that's exactly what I would be if I got the doctorate.
Anyway, the point here is that an pacifist of the nature described in this quote would consider this an act of "civil disobedience", which says that there are moral standards that are above any government and any government (for example) violation of these standards is illegitimate, and therefore disobedience is justified.
Actually, missions in "closed" countries really act on this premise too, although I don't remember it ever being called "civil disobedience". In such cases, for example, deception is justified because government limitations on the practice of religion are illegitimate, so disobedience is then legitimized.
I hadn't really thought this through before like this, that I can remember anyway, until now. But there is a key difference between these two positions. The pacifist may or may not be a Christian, but the (Christian) mission is, presumably, anyway (in a sense I'm not God to make the final determination on whether they are Christian or not) is. So the Christian mission, especially if they're evangelistic Protestant, should be answerable to Biblical teachings. Titus 1:2 says that God cannot lie. In contrast, it is the devil who "is a liar and the father of lies" (John 8:42-44). And here's what Revelations has to say about lying:
"But the cowardly, unbelieving, abominable, murderers, sexually immoral, sorcerers, idolaters, and all liars shall have their part in the lake which burns with fire and brimstone, which is the second death." (Revelation 21:8)
I think this passage is talking especially about people who practice these things as a way of life, and my contention is that when you have to routinely use deception in ministry that is a "way of life" and is pretty serious.
Of course, if the pacifist is an evangelical Protestant s/he would also have to deal with texts like these. I'm specifying evangelical Protestant here because some other Christians have some other authorities, such as Church tradition, and liberal Christians may accept other texts or question the Bible's authority.
***
I'd really like to finish this tonight, but it's already after midnight. So I'm going to have to finish it in the morning. At least we'll be beginning a new chapter.
Good night.
~ Meg
Chapter 4, Models of Espionage, by Carson Eoyang
***
In the section "Psychological Models"
"... Despite the attractive simplicity of MICE, it is deficient in not recognizing other espionage motives such as alienation/disaffection (Air Force Sergeant Davies), revenge/vindictiveness (Army Sergeant Daniel Richardson), alcoholism/drug use (Christopher Boyce), and whimsy (Sir Anthony Blunt)." (p. 72)
The focus of this chapter seems to be on how to predict who will become a spy in order to deny such individuals security clearance to begin with. And the author is pointing out how difficult this is to do. Here he refers to "MICE" which appears to be a variant of "SMICE" from the earlier article.
Even as a teen I remember feeling that dad was always "right". It's like he was a bulwark of seeming perfection with no possible avenue of corruption. I understood that even how he behaved on business trips put his colleagues to shame. I'm sure this put him in a good position regarding his work, but I never had the impression that it was contrived or anything. This may have even dated back to when he was a teenager and his dad would basically berate him into perfection. Mom and dad were careful to avoid some of the things they experienced growing up, so we didn't get that kind of treatment that his dad gave him.
On my part, out of all of these things listed, revenge would probably have been my weakest point. I already discussed alienation, and said the Russians/Soviets would have had to prove that they were any better than the U.S. But revenge is different, I think, and wouldn't have perhaps required me to think anything particular one way or another about Russia. But if I were to help them you'd still have to come back to why would I want to help them if I didn't think they were any better than the U.S.? When I was in Russia I checked into getting a dual citizenship, and I would have liked that (maybe even still - if I had a dual citizenship I could have returned to Russia and found work when I had so many problems here finding good work). It's ironic how things turn out sometimes, but I won't go into that any more yet.
It's sort of like there were these two big bullies (the USSR/Russia and USA) that were itching to fight each other and I was caught in the middle. To borrow the words of a song: "Jokers to the right of me, clowns to the left, here I am stuck in the middle with you, and I don't know what it is I should do..."
***
Apologies to Mr. Eoyang, but I'm going to take some liberties with this next text. The parts in brackets are my contextual changes:
"The very intensive efforts of the Soviet intelligence services to penetrate the [Christian mission] and compromise [missionaries] stationed there has been well known for decades. The hostile threat coupled with the cultural isolation of foreigners made Moscow perhaps the highest-risk [mission] in the world..." (p. 77)
That's how it felt there when I was in Vienna with the mission. They isolated themselves though; it wasn't technically thrust upon them. It's not that I think that they were the target of Soviet efforts in the way that the US embassy in Moscow was (that's what the original text was about), but that's how it felt from the way the mission acted. That was my experience of working with them.
***
"The administration of industrial security programs further reinforces this pervasiveness of evil by subjecting all employees to inspection, control, and monitoring." (p. 78)
I wonder how pervasive this was in dad's work.
***
"S-models do not address why some people contact the FBI as soon as they encounter any suspicious contacts, while others are recruited fairly easily or even volunteer to work with foreign intelligence services." (p. 80)
I am proud to say that although I was in no position requiring clearances, I did once in 1990 contact the FBI in a situation where I thought I might be dealing with a Soviet spy trying to recruit me (to get to my dad). I didn't dilly-dally about it, although I did deliberate a few days on what to do about it before deciding that I should make that call. It's not that I was going to cooperate, but it's just that I'd not had to deal with that kind of thing before and wasn't sure what to do. A professor of mine at the time had extensive experience in the Soviet Union and I shared my concerns with her and she helped by confirming my concerns, which then prompted me to act. But that's later, so I'll tell you about that when we get there. But I did act in good faith; I didn't want anyone to think that I had any intentions of cooperating with the Soviet Union.
***
"Since espionage may unfold in several ways, it is very likely that different types of personal characteristics may be associated with the different espionage categories - just as these different kinds of espionage may occur in various situational circumstances. So identification of, and protection against, premeditated treason, opportunistic volunteers, recruited agents in place, defectors, and planted moles should not be the same." (p. 88)
I'm not sure exactly what some of these espionage categories are, what they mean in layman's terms. I could have been considered a defector at one point, but by then it was just about a non-issue as my dad was fairly suddenly retired, although I understand that there's still a certain length of time after that that he could have had still-useful information (from a Soviet perspective).
***
There's this really fantastic chart on page 89 called "Behavioral Countermeasures" that's very interesting. It'll be hard to put here, and I don't know if I should scan it in and upload it as an image, because I don't want to press the copyright issue.
The column headings are: clearances; training, education; leadership/counseling, situational matching
The row headings are: Intention; planning/conspiracy; access; acquisition; deception; foreign contact; exchange; consumption; escape.
I'll just address a few of the individual boxes that seem pertinent to my experiences.
1. Personnel rotation. I know they had this at dad's work with each new contract / proposal, but even missions did this, although, I'm not sure how much of it was for security reasons.
2. Group cohesion. This was really strong in Vienna. It sort of reminded me of an ingrown toenail, though, almost like those 18th century mission compounds in Africa. Any activities outside the mission generally was for the good of the mission, such as starting an English speaking Christian school (where the missionary kids could go to school).
3. Travel restrictions. When my parents visited me in Vienna we were planning on taking a trip into Hungary. Dad said he'd submitted his request to go into Hungary the day he left (so there wouldn't be time for whoever it was to object). There was an experience in Hungary that really had dad on edge too, in a taxi there.
***
"More effective would be training and education efforts to publicize the great risks and minimal rewards of espionage, and leadership and counseling programs to reduce the alienation and disaffection that underlie so many recent cases of espionage by Americans." (p. 89)
Sheesh! I feel alienated and disaffected, and I wasn't even a spy! I can't imagine being more alienated and disaffected than I am. Do spies feel even more alienated and disaffected that I am? That must be terrible, to say the least.
***
"The actions of an ideological spy who is committed to world disarmament, for example, are directed toward advancing a strongly held moral position." (p. 109).
Now this is an interesting proposition. I did research on social movements, which I started in my doctoral studies in adult education. Actually, most of this work came after I left because I didn't want to be a professor and I was being led to believe that that's exactly what I would be if I got the doctorate.
Anyway, the point here is that an pacifist of the nature described in this quote would consider this an act of "civil disobedience", which says that there are moral standards that are above any government and any government (for example) violation of these standards is illegitimate, and therefore disobedience is justified.
Actually, missions in "closed" countries really act on this premise too, although I don't remember it ever being called "civil disobedience". In such cases, for example, deception is justified because government limitations on the practice of religion are illegitimate, so disobedience is then legitimized.
I hadn't really thought this through before like this, that I can remember anyway, until now. But there is a key difference between these two positions. The pacifist may or may not be a Christian, but the (Christian) mission is, presumably, anyway (in a sense I'm not God to make the final determination on whether they are Christian or not) is. So the Christian mission, especially if they're evangelistic Protestant, should be answerable to Biblical teachings. Titus 1:2 says that God cannot lie. In contrast, it is the devil who "is a liar and the father of lies" (John 8:42-44). And here's what Revelations has to say about lying:
"But the cowardly, unbelieving, abominable, murderers, sexually immoral, sorcerers, idolaters, and all liars shall have their part in the lake which burns with fire and brimstone, which is the second death." (Revelation 21:8)
I think this passage is talking especially about people who practice these things as a way of life, and my contention is that when you have to routinely use deception in ministry that is a "way of life" and is pretty serious.
Of course, if the pacifist is an evangelical Protestant s/he would also have to deal with texts like these. I'm specifying evangelical Protestant here because some other Christians have some other authorities, such as Church tradition, and liberal Christians may accept other texts or question the Bible's authority.
***
I'd really like to finish this tonight, but it's already after midnight. So I'm going to have to finish it in the morning. At least we'll be beginning a new chapter.
Good night.
~ Meg
64. Espionage (CIA, KGB, FBI) File, Pt. 6 (Sarbin & Eoyang, pt. 1) (Was: Spy File, Part VI)
I know I'm asking a lot of you, the reader, by providing discussion of these texts before the events in my life to which they may or may not have pertained. So you have to either make a snap analysis of me (and perhaps think I'm really out in left field), or suspend judgment until you actually hear my story.
This is sort of a risk I have to take, because while I did this research afterward most of the events occurred, I knew what I was experiencing (although I didn't necessarily understand why or what the significance may have been for any particular experience). You, however, don't have that advantage of being there, so I think it would be harder for you to believe me without some potentially helpful background information. But I don't know you either, and it's quite possible that you have some knowledge or experience pertinent to one thing or another that I address here and may actually be able to offer some new insight that I don't have.
It's sort of a catch-22; I can't be sure 100% that approaching my story this way is the best way, but my inclination is that it is the best way, so I'll continue on unless I become convinced otherwise somewhere along the way. When I reveal my true identity I'll be able to provide more documentation too.
***
This next source is a book:
Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal. (1993) Sarbin, Theodore R., Carney, Ralph M., & Eoyang, Carson (Eds.). Westport, CT: Praeger.
***
Chapter 3: A History of Recent American Espionage, by Katherine L. Herbig
"Within the community of those holding security clearances, another more ironic source of suggestibility for committing espionage is provided routinely by well-meaning security staff: the briefing on hostile intelligence service methods. It would be irresponsible to clear people for access to sensitive information and then not to war them about the interest of foreign intelligence services in obtaining such information. Civilian and military defense employees and contractors all receive such briefings." (p. 48)
So this clearly would apply to my dad, as having had such briefings. So he must surely have known about risks of my interest in the Soviet Union. At least it's hard for me to imagine otherwise. But then maybe he thought I'd be safe and secure in the hands of missions that cooperate very nicely with the U.S. government, thank you. So there you have it, risk diverted. And everyone lives happily ever after. Of course this is speculation, but not completely unfounded.
***
"...[M]otivatioin is among the most individual and unpredictable of human qualities, and the motivations for espionage are similarly idiosyncratic." (p. 48-49).
If I was a subject of a sex lure, they tried 3 times and it was only on the 3rd try that they got it right. But there are still a lot of things that aren't completely clear there either, including what exactly the motive was. Several important contextual things happened in those 3-4 years though that may have disrupted initial plans, especially if it was to use me to get to my father.
***
"The spy puts himself, his need for money, thrills, or some other satisfaction, above the well-being of his fellow citizens and the nations." (p. 55)
If there were a possibility I would be a spy, I'm not sure which of these they'd use. At this point, I'm not very emotionally attached to my country, so I wouldn't care too much about that though. Also, I even thought there was too much of the spy thriller type work in East European missions and eventually wanted more long-term residential (vs. traveling in and out) ministry. I wasn't drawn to that part of the world because of it being Communist and thus an "exciting" place to work, so that kind of thrill-seeking wouldn't have been a call for me. I'm sure if my dad had remained in his job they would have probably found some way or another to snag me though. At least, that's how I see things.
***
Okay, here's a big one - I'll test you afterward to see if you caught it:
"The second trend that increased vulnerabilities to espionage by overloading the security system was the growth of highly classified 'black' research programs with severely restricted access policies during the 1980s. Details about these programs are by their nature closely held and, therefore, not described in the press. Nevertheless, it was apparent that programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative and others generated a new category of secrets under the rubric of 'Special Access Programs' within the industrial contractor community." (p. 63)
Are you with me? Do I need to spell it out? My dad was a program manager in the "industrial contractor community" in SDI; he oversaw engineers and scientists as they wrote proposals for defense contracts and then carried them out.
***
"Nations can temporarily lose the voluntary loyalty of their citizens if their leaders disillusion them or betray them..." (p. 65)
I'm taking this a bit out of context here, but it's true that my loyalty to the US (although I also wasn't in a position requiring special loyalty either) has weakened with my interpretation of events in my life pointing to me not having constitutional freedoms to live my life as I choose... all because of my dad. Maybe that's an overstatement, but how I've felt for a long, long time now. For me to be vulnerable to being open to working with the Soviets, however, I think they would have had to prove themselves to be better than the US. I would have been pretty slow to believe that that was the case, given all that I already knew about them prior to me even going to Vienna. I'd researched how they treated believers, heck, I even read the Gulag Archipelago (complete version) cover to cover. They would have had a pretty hard time convincing me they were better than the US, no matter how badly I thought of the US.
***
Here's an interesting tidbit that's actually a footnote to this chapter:
"Security clearance investigations are not centralized; rather, responsibility for them resides with at least seven different agencies; the Defense Investigative Service does them for the Department of Defense, which has the most clearances; Office of Personnel Management does them for civilian agencies, largely the Department of Energy with its nuclear responsibilities; the Federal Bureau of Investigation does them for high-level political appointees, White House staff, and some employees of federal courts and congressional committees; and the CIA, NSA, State Department, Secret Service, and some other agencies do their own investigations for their employees...." (p. 66-67)
I was a contracting librarian for the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Central Library a few years ago and they did a, what seemed to me rather thorough, background check on me. I had to have references for every place I'd lived, every job I'd had, etc. back 5 years. When you've moved around as much as I have that can be pretty daunting, especially since it's hard to get to know people very well under such circumstances (moving around so much). Anyway, I passed and they let me in. And I can assure you I never did anything to abuse that privilege. Well, I mean, I was tempted to yell out "yoo-hoo all you idioti (that's the Russian plural for 'idiots') down there in New Orleans, guess what? We have lots of research dating back 5 or 10 years that shows that you've been eroding the grasslands which makes you more vulnerable to hurricanes!!"* But I didn't do that, I quietly fumed and directed my curses at the TV instead. I trust that didn't qualify as a betrayal of the national trust bestowed on my in that venerable position of contracting cataloging librarian.
~ Meg
*Actually it wasn't just the people in New Orleans, but others involved in various ways in the erosion.
This is sort of a risk I have to take, because while I did this research afterward most of the events occurred, I knew what I was experiencing (although I didn't necessarily understand why or what the significance may have been for any particular experience). You, however, don't have that advantage of being there, so I think it would be harder for you to believe me without some potentially helpful background information. But I don't know you either, and it's quite possible that you have some knowledge or experience pertinent to one thing or another that I address here and may actually be able to offer some new insight that I don't have.
It's sort of a catch-22; I can't be sure 100% that approaching my story this way is the best way, but my inclination is that it is the best way, so I'll continue on unless I become convinced otherwise somewhere along the way. When I reveal my true identity I'll be able to provide more documentation too.
***
This next source is a book:
Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal. (1993) Sarbin, Theodore R., Carney, Ralph M., & Eoyang, Carson (Eds.). Westport, CT: Praeger.
***
Chapter 3: A History of Recent American Espionage, by Katherine L. Herbig
"Within the community of those holding security clearances, another more ironic source of suggestibility for committing espionage is provided routinely by well-meaning security staff: the briefing on hostile intelligence service methods. It would be irresponsible to clear people for access to sensitive information and then not to war them about the interest of foreign intelligence services in obtaining such information. Civilian and military defense employees and contractors all receive such briefings." (p. 48)
So this clearly would apply to my dad, as having had such briefings. So he must surely have known about risks of my interest in the Soviet Union. At least it's hard for me to imagine otherwise. But then maybe he thought I'd be safe and secure in the hands of missions that cooperate very nicely with the U.S. government, thank you. So there you have it, risk diverted. And everyone lives happily ever after. Of course this is speculation, but not completely unfounded.
***
"...[M]otivatioin is among the most individual and unpredictable of human qualities, and the motivations for espionage are similarly idiosyncratic." (p. 48-49).
If I was a subject of a sex lure, they tried 3 times and it was only on the 3rd try that they got it right. But there are still a lot of things that aren't completely clear there either, including what exactly the motive was. Several important contextual things happened in those 3-4 years though that may have disrupted initial plans, especially if it was to use me to get to my father.
***
"The spy puts himself, his need for money, thrills, or some other satisfaction, above the well-being of his fellow citizens and the nations." (p. 55)
If there were a possibility I would be a spy, I'm not sure which of these they'd use. At this point, I'm not very emotionally attached to my country, so I wouldn't care too much about that though. Also, I even thought there was too much of the spy thriller type work in East European missions and eventually wanted more long-term residential (vs. traveling in and out) ministry. I wasn't drawn to that part of the world because of it being Communist and thus an "exciting" place to work, so that kind of thrill-seeking wouldn't have been a call for me. I'm sure if my dad had remained in his job they would have probably found some way or another to snag me though. At least, that's how I see things.
***
Okay, here's a big one - I'll test you afterward to see if you caught it:
"The second trend that increased vulnerabilities to espionage by overloading the security system was the growth of highly classified 'black' research programs with severely restricted access policies during the 1980s. Details about these programs are by their nature closely held and, therefore, not described in the press. Nevertheless, it was apparent that programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative and others generated a new category of secrets under the rubric of 'Special Access Programs' within the industrial contractor community." (p. 63)
Are you with me? Do I need to spell it out? My dad was a program manager in the "industrial contractor community" in SDI; he oversaw engineers and scientists as they wrote proposals for defense contracts and then carried them out.
***
"Nations can temporarily lose the voluntary loyalty of their citizens if their leaders disillusion them or betray them..." (p. 65)
I'm taking this a bit out of context here, but it's true that my loyalty to the US (although I also wasn't in a position requiring special loyalty either) has weakened with my interpretation of events in my life pointing to me not having constitutional freedoms to live my life as I choose... all because of my dad. Maybe that's an overstatement, but how I've felt for a long, long time now. For me to be vulnerable to being open to working with the Soviets, however, I think they would have had to prove themselves to be better than the US. I would have been pretty slow to believe that that was the case, given all that I already knew about them prior to me even going to Vienna. I'd researched how they treated believers, heck, I even read the Gulag Archipelago (complete version) cover to cover. They would have had a pretty hard time convincing me they were better than the US, no matter how badly I thought of the US.
***
Here's an interesting tidbit that's actually a footnote to this chapter:
"Security clearance investigations are not centralized; rather, responsibility for them resides with at least seven different agencies; the Defense Investigative Service does them for the Department of Defense, which has the most clearances; Office of Personnel Management does them for civilian agencies, largely the Department of Energy with its nuclear responsibilities; the Federal Bureau of Investigation does them for high-level political appointees, White House staff, and some employees of federal courts and congressional committees; and the CIA, NSA, State Department, Secret Service, and some other agencies do their own investigations for their employees...." (p. 66-67)
I was a contracting librarian for the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Central Library a few years ago and they did a, what seemed to me rather thorough, background check on me. I had to have references for every place I'd lived, every job I'd had, etc. back 5 years. When you've moved around as much as I have that can be pretty daunting, especially since it's hard to get to know people very well under such circumstances (moving around so much). Anyway, I passed and they let me in. And I can assure you I never did anything to abuse that privilege. Well, I mean, I was tempted to yell out "yoo-hoo all you idioti (that's the Russian plural for 'idiots') down there in New Orleans, guess what? We have lots of research dating back 5 or 10 years that shows that you've been eroding the grasslands which makes you more vulnerable to hurricanes!!"* But I didn't do that, I quietly fumed and directed my curses at the TV instead. I trust that didn't qualify as a betrayal of the national trust bestowed on my in that venerable position of contracting cataloging librarian.
~ Meg
*Actually it wasn't just the people in New Orleans, but others involved in various ways in the erosion.
63. Espionage (CIA, KGB, FBI) File, Pt., 5 (Bittman, pt. 1/Eells & Nehemkis, pt. 1/Dobbs, pt. 1) (Was: Spy File, Part V)
As it turns out, there is nothing more I want to say about the rest of the Smist book, so we'll just move on to another source.
I'm not really picking these in any order but just flipping through them to see if there is anything potentially relevant to my situation. It's been a long time since I last read these, and I've worked on other project since collecting these, so it's a review for me too.
The next one is a book chapter.
Bittman, Ladislav. (1981). Soviet Bloc 'Disinformation' and other 'Active Measures'. In Pfaltzgraff, Jr., R.L., Ra'anan, U., & Milberd, E. (Eds.) Intelligence Policy and National Security. Hong Kong: MacMillan, p. 212-228.
***
This first quote is in the section titled "Theory and Practice of Special Operations."
"Special operations are a kind of a game where the players belong to one of three basic categories: (a) The Operator - author and conductor of the operation; (b) The Adversary - this can be a foreign state as a whole, its ruling authorities, or even individual citizens. From the standpoint of communist intelligence, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are most often cast in the adversary role; (3) The Unwitting Agent - a game player who without being aware of his true role, is exploited by the Operator as a means of attacking the Adversary. An Unwitting Agent also can wind up being the target of countermeasures taken by an Adversary, who mistakes him for the real Operator... The role of Adversary and Unwitting Agent can be played also by governmental agencies, institutions, or even individual persons within a given country.
Basic Game-Plan Versions
(1) The Operator strikes at an Adversary indirectly, through an Unwitting Agent. The Operator gears his efforts toward influencing the actions of the Unwitting Agent who voluntarily, though unaware, takes on the role of (indirect) Operator and strikes at the Adversary on his own initiative, even at the risk of becoming the target of countermeasures by the Adversary.
(2) The Operator strikes at the Adversary, who defends himself, but in view of the lack of clear and concrete evidence to the contrary mistakes the Unwitting Agent for the real Operator. The Unwitting Agent thus becomes the target of countermeasures taken by the Adversary, takes action to defend himself, and this, in turn gives rise to the trading of charges and accusations between the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent, rebounding to the advantage of the Operator. The latter can include this eventuality in his basic operational plan, but he can also resort to this tactic on a contingency basis.
(3) The Operator strikes directly at the Adversary, who is unable or unwilling to interpret such an attack as a hostile act; rather, he perceives it as being essentially a consequence of his own shortcomings or regards it as an element of the natural course of events and does not categorise it as an attack per se.
(4) The Operator strikes simultaneously both directly at the Adversary and through the Unwitting Agent, assuming that his thrust will trigger another exchange of hostile moves between the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent. In order to use this version of the game-plan, the Operator has to be able to convince both the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent, or at least one of them, that the Unwitting Agent is the (real) Operator vis-a-vis the Adversary, and the Adversary is the (real) Operator vis-a-vis the Unwitting Agent." (p. 215-216)
Can you imagine living in a world like that? I mean, when I lived in Siberia I had a dickens of a time mastering walking on ice in my boots, but maneuvering around a "Game" as is described seems like it would make my walking on ice problem a piece of cake in comparison.
This passage, if it has any ramifications for my life would have to be in relation to who my dad was. There are enough questions about why things happened the way they did that if someone in intelligence came up to me today and explained how I was an Unwitting Agent I wouldn't be too surprised, but I don't know that I was. And just think, if there are times, as in variant 3 above, that Adversary-Nations don't even recognized attacks when they happen, how much more difficult it would be for little ol' me to make heads or tails of this kind of thing!
***
That's all for that source. And here's another brief one:
Eells, R. S. F. & Nehemkis, P. (1984). Corporate Intelligence: A Blueprint for Executive Decision Making. NY, NY: Macmillan.
i just want to cite one entry in the "Glossary of Espionage Terms" at the back of the book:
"Surveillance Hot and Cold: Cold surveillance is secretive and intended to go unnoticed by the target, whereas hot surveillance is open tailing or bugging of an individual for purposes of harassment or intimidation." (p. 242)
In Siberia at least part of the time my phone was bugged, I'm pretty sure. There would often be a clicking in the background that would come and go and sometimes I'd be in the middle of a conversation and would be cut off at strategic points in the conversation. I'll get into that more later, but it was well after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
***
And next, we're going in a completely different direction (are you dizzy yet from all the different directions I'm taking you?). This one's a newspaper article.
Dobbs, Michael. (1987. April 12). Sexpionage: Why We Can't Resist Those KGB Sirens. The Washington Post, p. D1, D2.
"In his book, 'KGB - The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents,' [John] Barron documents the case of a French military attache, Col. Louis Guibaud, who committed suicide in 1962 after an affair with a Soviet women. Confronted with the evidence by the KGB, and offered the choice of secret collaboration or public disgrace, the colonel preferred to shoot himself. A similar dilemma confronted Jeremy Wolfenden, a British journalist in Moscow in the Early 1960s, whose homosexuality made him a KGB tarket.
'In these situations, the way out is often fraught with danger,' says Knightley, who has written about the Wolfenden case. 'If you go back and tell your own side that you have been framed, they will frequently try to recruit you as a double agent. That's what happened to Wolfenden and eventually it drove him to suicide." (p. D1-D2)
This article gives several other examples of prominent Western diplomats falling prey to one version or another of this ploy.
***
This next quote starts off with John Barron speaking:
"'What people fail to recognize is that operations like these involve much more than simply a boy-girl relationship. It's not a situation in which the lone westerner is confronted by the lone Russian temptress. In reality, it's one isolated individual against a massive, very experienced apparatus. All the circumstances are controlled by the KGB to maneuver the victim to a desired end. Sexual enticement, and the lure of a fulfilling relationship, is just a first step across the threshold. But once it is taken, retreat can be very difficult.'" (p. D2)
And finally:
"The evidence suggests that Soviet attempts to frame westerners living in Moscow are as likely to occur at times of political thaw and detente as during periods of cold war. Like other sectors of Soviet society, the KGB operates as if it had a 'plan' to fulfill, preferably overfulfill. It sometimes seems as if the secret service apparatus is obliged to 'produce' a certain number of victims, whether or not they can be put to any good use." (p. D2)
I think I was a victim of this tactic, and I think I have enough evidence to be pretty straightforward on that one. It started in 1990 though (although if they were aware of my friendship with the emigrant in the mid 1980s, that might have tipped them off as to how to get to me), and we're only in 1985. We still have Vienna to cover, so stay tuned, there's lots of excitement to come. That is, it's probably exciting from your end of things, but, like I said, I'm ready for cross-country skiing, because my life's been too "exciting".
~ Meg
I'm not really picking these in any order but just flipping through them to see if there is anything potentially relevant to my situation. It's been a long time since I last read these, and I've worked on other project since collecting these, so it's a review for me too.
The next one is a book chapter.
Bittman, Ladislav. (1981). Soviet Bloc 'Disinformation' and other 'Active Measures'. In Pfaltzgraff, Jr., R.L., Ra'anan, U., & Milberd, E. (Eds.) Intelligence Policy and National Security. Hong Kong: MacMillan, p. 212-228.
***
This first quote is in the section titled "Theory and Practice of Special Operations."
"Special operations are a kind of a game where the players belong to one of three basic categories: (a) The Operator - author and conductor of the operation; (b) The Adversary - this can be a foreign state as a whole, its ruling authorities, or even individual citizens. From the standpoint of communist intelligence, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are most often cast in the adversary role; (3) The Unwitting Agent - a game player who without being aware of his true role, is exploited by the Operator as a means of attacking the Adversary. An Unwitting Agent also can wind up being the target of countermeasures taken by an Adversary, who mistakes him for the real Operator... The role of Adversary and Unwitting Agent can be played also by governmental agencies, institutions, or even individual persons within a given country.
Basic Game-Plan Versions
(1) The Operator strikes at an Adversary indirectly, through an Unwitting Agent. The Operator gears his efforts toward influencing the actions of the Unwitting Agent who voluntarily, though unaware, takes on the role of (indirect) Operator and strikes at the Adversary on his own initiative, even at the risk of becoming the target of countermeasures by the Adversary.
(2) The Operator strikes at the Adversary, who defends himself, but in view of the lack of clear and concrete evidence to the contrary mistakes the Unwitting Agent for the real Operator. The Unwitting Agent thus becomes the target of countermeasures taken by the Adversary, takes action to defend himself, and this, in turn gives rise to the trading of charges and accusations between the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent, rebounding to the advantage of the Operator. The latter can include this eventuality in his basic operational plan, but he can also resort to this tactic on a contingency basis.
(3) The Operator strikes directly at the Adversary, who is unable or unwilling to interpret such an attack as a hostile act; rather, he perceives it as being essentially a consequence of his own shortcomings or regards it as an element of the natural course of events and does not categorise it as an attack per se.
(4) The Operator strikes simultaneously both directly at the Adversary and through the Unwitting Agent, assuming that his thrust will trigger another exchange of hostile moves between the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent. In order to use this version of the game-plan, the Operator has to be able to convince both the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent, or at least one of them, that the Unwitting Agent is the (real) Operator vis-a-vis the Adversary, and the Adversary is the (real) Operator vis-a-vis the Unwitting Agent." (p. 215-216)
Can you imagine living in a world like that? I mean, when I lived in Siberia I had a dickens of a time mastering walking on ice in my boots, but maneuvering around a "Game" as is described seems like it would make my walking on ice problem a piece of cake in comparison.
This passage, if it has any ramifications for my life would have to be in relation to who my dad was. There are enough questions about why things happened the way they did that if someone in intelligence came up to me today and explained how I was an Unwitting Agent I wouldn't be too surprised, but I don't know that I was. And just think, if there are times, as in variant 3 above, that Adversary-Nations don't even recognized attacks when they happen, how much more difficult it would be for little ol' me to make heads or tails of this kind of thing!
***
That's all for that source. And here's another brief one:
Eells, R. S. F. & Nehemkis, P. (1984). Corporate Intelligence: A Blueprint for Executive Decision Making. NY, NY: Macmillan.
i just want to cite one entry in the "Glossary of Espionage Terms" at the back of the book:
"Surveillance Hot and Cold: Cold surveillance is secretive and intended to go unnoticed by the target, whereas hot surveillance is open tailing or bugging of an individual for purposes of harassment or intimidation." (p. 242)
In Siberia at least part of the time my phone was bugged, I'm pretty sure. There would often be a clicking in the background that would come and go and sometimes I'd be in the middle of a conversation and would be cut off at strategic points in the conversation. I'll get into that more later, but it was well after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
***
And next, we're going in a completely different direction (are you dizzy yet from all the different directions I'm taking you?). This one's a newspaper article.
Dobbs, Michael. (1987. April 12). Sexpionage: Why We Can't Resist Those KGB Sirens. The Washington Post, p. D1, D2.
"In his book, 'KGB - The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents,' [John] Barron documents the case of a French military attache, Col. Louis Guibaud, who committed suicide in 1962 after an affair with a Soviet women. Confronted with the evidence by the KGB, and offered the choice of secret collaboration or public disgrace, the colonel preferred to shoot himself. A similar dilemma confronted Jeremy Wolfenden, a British journalist in Moscow in the Early 1960s, whose homosexuality made him a KGB tarket.
'In these situations, the way out is often fraught with danger,' says Knightley, who has written about the Wolfenden case. 'If you go back and tell your own side that you have been framed, they will frequently try to recruit you as a double agent. That's what happened to Wolfenden and eventually it drove him to suicide." (p. D1-D2)
This article gives several other examples of prominent Western diplomats falling prey to one version or another of this ploy.
***
This next quote starts off with John Barron speaking:
"'What people fail to recognize is that operations like these involve much more than simply a boy-girl relationship. It's not a situation in which the lone westerner is confronted by the lone Russian temptress. In reality, it's one isolated individual against a massive, very experienced apparatus. All the circumstances are controlled by the KGB to maneuver the victim to a desired end. Sexual enticement, and the lure of a fulfilling relationship, is just a first step across the threshold. But once it is taken, retreat can be very difficult.'" (p. D2)
And finally:
"The evidence suggests that Soviet attempts to frame westerners living in Moscow are as likely to occur at times of political thaw and detente as during periods of cold war. Like other sectors of Soviet society, the KGB operates as if it had a 'plan' to fulfill, preferably overfulfill. It sometimes seems as if the secret service apparatus is obliged to 'produce' a certain number of victims, whether or not they can be put to any good use." (p. D2)
I think I was a victim of this tactic, and I think I have enough evidence to be pretty straightforward on that one. It started in 1990 though (although if they were aware of my friendship with the emigrant in the mid 1980s, that might have tipped them off as to how to get to me), and we're only in 1985. We still have Vienna to cover, so stay tuned, there's lots of excitement to come. That is, it's probably exciting from your end of things, but, like I said, I'm ready for cross-country skiing, because my life's been too "exciting".
~ Meg
61. Espionage (CIA, KGB, FBI) File, Pt. 4 (Smist, pt. 1) (Was: Spy File, Part IV)
I'm only going to be able to start on this one now, as it's sections from a book:
Smist, Jr., F. J. (1994). Congress Oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community.
We're starting at chapter 6 "Congress and Intelligence, 1985-92: The Era of David Boren and Dave McCurdy."
***
"The Reagan administration had an inordinate amount of faith in covert actions. They loved them. [DCI] Casey loved them. The DCI does not control the intelligence community. The DCI controls little of the budget. The DCI is second fiddle to the secretary of defense. But the DCI does control covert action and Casey loved covert action. The advantage of covert action is that the action can be done without the approval of Congress. A covert action 'finding' doesn't need the approval of Congress. This is the big attraction of covert action to the executive branch." (p. 257-258. This is a quote from Lee Hamilton, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee in 1985-1986. Brackets are in the original in this case)
"... [T]he Reagan administration actively sought to both undermine and destroy the accountability standards built up so carefully and painstakingly by congressional intelligence overseers since 1976." (p. 263)
This is the same Reagan as started SDI.
"Despite President Reagan's soothing words [in response to the Tower commission report], the failure to keep adequate records was not inadvertent.
The Reagan administration played fast and loose with the requirements for covert action findings." (p. 263)
I'm not suggesting anything specific here, but it does sort of at least give an idea of what was going on here, the context during this time period.
***
And here's another area of context perhaps relevant to the time frame of my life experiences:
"After the Iran-Contra investigations were completed, Oliver North spoke out publicly for the first time when he delivered the commencement address at Liberty University on May 2, 1989. Liberty University's founder, the Reverend Jerry Falwell [of Moral Majority fame], introduced the already indicted North by comparing him to Jesus Christ: 'We serve a savior who was indicted and crucified.' Picking up on this theme, North responded: 'Those accusations [charges that he lied to Congress, etc.] are not a brand - they are an honor. God willing, with your prayers and support, we will prevail, even in Washington.' North also lashed out at the Congress in Nicaragua. North stated: 'We must not just choose the right president in 1988; we need a better Congress.'" (p. 267; brackets in the original)
If you are old enough to remember the days of the Moral Majority's ascent to influence in American political life, it might not be so incredible to imagine that this kind of thinking also permeated East European missions, which that article from my pre-Vienna orientation week exemplifies, too. It sounds like Jerry Falwell thought it was okay to lie or otherwise do the things Oliver North did if it was for the sake of the far right-wing cause. That's not dissimilar to my experience of the apparent ends-justifies-the-means modus operandi I found in East European missions.
Also, I would say again that at this point I was still relatively a-political in my persuasions. Even after returning home from Vienna I still didn't have strong political views as far as right or left is concerned. However, in Bible school I had taken a class on current religious issues, which covered in a fair amount of depth several sort of movements or thrust happening in America at that time, and one of the issues we covered was the Moral Majority, and my professor didn't like what that was doing to the Church. I thought that was a refreshing view, although I don't know how many of his colleagues agreed with him there at the Bible school. But even so, there was no indication that he was necessarily left wing, although he undoubtedly had more political opinions than I did at the time.
By the time I went to Vienna as a full-time missionary I had read and studied enough to not believe in Communism and also dislike how they treated believers. I don't think I agreed with liberation theology either, but I wasn't as vehement about that as I was about being against Communism. I might say more about this later, just to assuage any fears that in being anti-Moral Majority I went way over the other direction.
***
I haven't even finished this chapter, but I did finish what I want to get out of this section of the chapter, and I have to go to my doctor appointment now, so I'll pick up on this later.
~ Meg
Smist, Jr., F. J. (1994). Congress Oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community.
We're starting at chapter 6 "Congress and Intelligence, 1985-92: The Era of David Boren and Dave McCurdy."
***
"The Reagan administration had an inordinate amount of faith in covert actions. They loved them. [DCI] Casey loved them. The DCI does not control the intelligence community. The DCI controls little of the budget. The DCI is second fiddle to the secretary of defense. But the DCI does control covert action and Casey loved covert action. The advantage of covert action is that the action can be done without the approval of Congress. A covert action 'finding' doesn't need the approval of Congress. This is the big attraction of covert action to the executive branch." (p. 257-258. This is a quote from Lee Hamilton, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee in 1985-1986. Brackets are in the original in this case)
"... [T]he Reagan administration actively sought to both undermine and destroy the accountability standards built up so carefully and painstakingly by congressional intelligence overseers since 1976." (p. 263)
This is the same Reagan as started SDI.
"Despite President Reagan's soothing words [in response to the Tower commission report], the failure to keep adequate records was not inadvertent.
The Reagan administration played fast and loose with the requirements for covert action findings." (p. 263)
I'm not suggesting anything specific here, but it does sort of at least give an idea of what was going on here, the context during this time period.
***
And here's another area of context perhaps relevant to the time frame of my life experiences:
"After the Iran-Contra investigations were completed, Oliver North spoke out publicly for the first time when he delivered the commencement address at Liberty University on May 2, 1989. Liberty University's founder, the Reverend Jerry Falwell [of Moral Majority fame], introduced the already indicted North by comparing him to Jesus Christ: 'We serve a savior who was indicted and crucified.' Picking up on this theme, North responded: 'Those accusations [charges that he lied to Congress, etc.] are not a brand - they are an honor. God willing, with your prayers and support, we will prevail, even in Washington.' North also lashed out at the Congress in Nicaragua. North stated: 'We must not just choose the right president in 1988; we need a better Congress.'" (p. 267; brackets in the original)
If you are old enough to remember the days of the Moral Majority's ascent to influence in American political life, it might not be so incredible to imagine that this kind of thinking also permeated East European missions, which that article from my pre-Vienna orientation week exemplifies, too. It sounds like Jerry Falwell thought it was okay to lie or otherwise do the things Oliver North did if it was for the sake of the far right-wing cause. That's not dissimilar to my experience of the apparent ends-justifies-the-means modus operandi I found in East European missions.
Also, I would say again that at this point I was still relatively a-political in my persuasions. Even after returning home from Vienna I still didn't have strong political views as far as right or left is concerned. However, in Bible school I had taken a class on current religious issues, which covered in a fair amount of depth several sort of movements or thrust happening in America at that time, and one of the issues we covered was the Moral Majority, and my professor didn't like what that was doing to the Church. I thought that was a refreshing view, although I don't know how many of his colleagues agreed with him there at the Bible school. But even so, there was no indication that he was necessarily left wing, although he undoubtedly had more political opinions than I did at the time.
By the time I went to Vienna as a full-time missionary I had read and studied enough to not believe in Communism and also dislike how they treated believers. I don't think I agreed with liberation theology either, but I wasn't as vehement about that as I was about being against Communism. I might say more about this later, just to assuage any fears that in being anti-Moral Majority I went way over the other direction.
***
I haven't even finished this chapter, but I did finish what I want to get out of this section of the chapter, and I have to go to my doctor appointment now, so I'll pick up on this later.
~ Meg
60. Espionage (CIA, KGB, FBI) File, Pt. 3 (Dudney, pt. 1/Adams, pt. 1) (Was: Spy File, Part III)
I'm going to gradually whittle away at the material in this file between doing other things. I just portioned out my 10-day supply of hot cereal packets and did some other puttering around.
Also, I just took my temperature and it's 99.3. My temperature is up and down like a yo-yo and this is very early in the day for me to be registering a fever, at least by recent trends. (Yesterday I didn't have a fever, but Saturday it was 99.5... go figure.) I would usually take an Aleve upon reaching a fever of 99.3, but since I see the allergy doctor this afternoon, I want him to see me having a fever. Sometimes if you go to the doctor and they can't get any abnormal readings they think you're getting better; at least that's my experience, although I don't think this is true for all doctors, even all of my doctors. I'll take some Aleve with me though to that appointment so that I can take it afterwards.
**
This next article is also from U.S. News & World Report:
Dudney, Robert. (1979, Dec. 10). America: World's No. 1 Spy Target. U.S. News & World Report, p. 36-40.
***
"In unprecedented numbers agents are infiltrating the U.S. - disguised as diplomats, students, even refugees..." (p. 36)
Didn't I tell you there were KGB among the Soviet emigrants? If you didn't believe me, maybe you'll believe U.S. News & World Report!
***
"'Never,' says an authoritative intelligence source, 'have we had foreign operatives coming into this country in such numbers. It's a totally new phenomenon.'
The principal target of agents from Communist nations has been classified information of a political nature. But the emphasis lately has shifted to secrets of the U.S. military-scientific establishment - especially its increasingly sophisticated satellite technology and communications systems." (p. 36)
I'm not sure when dad began work on Boeing's communication's satellites, but I know that while I was an undergraduate he was working in this area. This article was published while I was in my sophomore year of college. When he made his business trips to Sweden and France it was in this connection, and so his visit to me in Germany in the fall of 1981 was following a business trip to Sweden for his communications satellite-related work. Reagan didn't officially start the Strategic Defense Initiative until March 23, 1983, so this predated that work.
Also, you will note that Soviet intelligence efforts, according to this article, were shifting more to focusing on exactly what my dad was working on. This article gives specific examples of this shift in focus.
***
"Soviet-bloc agents are also concentrating increasingly on the theft of industrial secrets. Recent advances in computers, lasers, microelectronics and production techniques - areas where Communist economics lag far behind the West - are particularly valuable." (p. 36)
To the average person reading this, it probably is only of vague passing interest. But to someone living in a world not of her choosing, this information is personal. I mean myself, of course. Again, I'm sure Boeing's work wasn't overlooked by the Soviets in this shift of focus, especially since they weren't some obscure little factory operating out of a warehouse or something.
***
"A phenomenal growth has been detected in the cadre of Russia's KGB officers residing in the United States. More than 500 have been identified at official missions in Washington, D.C., New York and San Francisco, twice the figure of 10 years ago." (p. 37)
I wonder how many KGB were in the San Francisco Soviet consulate in 1990... the year Anatolii & Galina Grischenko were in Seattle for Anatolii's cancer treatment? (I wrote about this incident in my life in an earlier post. Eventually I'll get around to making links between postings like this, but I don't want to stop to do that now.)
***
"The FBI reportedly has discovered Soviet agents among Jewish emigres leaving Russia. Several have been 'doubled,' or persuaded to work as counterspies." (p. 38)
Again... see, I told you? Now do you believe me that it's possible that I first got on the Soviet's radar when I was working with Soviet Jewish emigres? In any cause, you should admit that it's a plausible theory, even if you're not yet convinced that I've actually proved it beyond the shadow of a doubt.
***
This next source is the chapter of a book.
Adams, J. (1994). The New Spies. London, Hutchinson, Chapter 8, "Same Old Stuff."
This chapter tells about Michael Souther, an American spy and defector to the USSR.
"When is certain is that by the middle of 1986, Souther had raised the suspicions of the FBI. Investigators had interviewed him once, but could find no hard evidence. Clearly spooked, he bought a one-way ticket to Rome and disappeared, reappearing two years later at a press conference in Moscow to denounce the United States and claim he was being persecuted by the FBI." (p. 116).
Now I know I'm getting ahead of myself, and there's a lot you don't know yet about my experiences, but I could relate, at least in part to Souther. I wasn't a spy, for either the US or USSR, although it's possible that useful information was gleaned through me - but not anything even close to military secrets, of which I knew virtually nothing - including much about my dad's work. In fact, I think I'm safe in saying that of my whole family (dad, mom, two brothers and me) I knew the absolute least about dad's work. And I wasn't at all interested in the military aspects of it, for sure. I think I thought of that sphere along the lines of an extension of men's apparent need to flaunt their strength, and that was never anything I was terribly impressed by or interested in. There were other traits that I found more attractive in men, but not that one.
Also, you'll note the chronology here - 1986 for Souther's disappearance and 2 years later for his reappearance at the press conference. I 1986 I was accepted to work in Vienna and I began deputation, which lasted until I arrived in Vienna in June of 1987.
***
"...[T]he Souther affair was the opening salvo in what has become a new phase in the war between Russia and Western intelligence." (p. 117).
If that is the case, then I wonder what all these spy things did for how U.S. intelligence approached my dad and, by extension, me? Did this increase their scrutiny and concern? I'm not saying I know the answers to these, but I find it possible that there could have been a ripple affect that eventually came down to me.
***
That's all for that text, and I'm going to leave off again. This spy topic has been affecting my fibromyalgia a bit, where the other subjects were getting easier in that regard, almost like a release or catharsis to be able to tell my story (even if no one is listening as I write this). But I guess this new topic is hitting a new nerve that is more stressful for me.
I've got to start thinking about lunch though before going to my doctor's appointment.
~ Meg
Also, I just took my temperature and it's 99.3. My temperature is up and down like a yo-yo and this is very early in the day for me to be registering a fever, at least by recent trends. (Yesterday I didn't have a fever, but Saturday it was 99.5... go figure.) I would usually take an Aleve upon reaching a fever of 99.3, but since I see the allergy doctor this afternoon, I want him to see me having a fever. Sometimes if you go to the doctor and they can't get any abnormal readings they think you're getting better; at least that's my experience, although I don't think this is true for all doctors, even all of my doctors. I'll take some Aleve with me though to that appointment so that I can take it afterwards.
**
This next article is also from U.S. News & World Report:
Dudney, Robert. (1979, Dec. 10). America: World's No. 1 Spy Target. U.S. News & World Report, p. 36-40.
***
"In unprecedented numbers agents are infiltrating the U.S. - disguised as diplomats, students, even refugees..." (p. 36)
Didn't I tell you there were KGB among the Soviet emigrants? If you didn't believe me, maybe you'll believe U.S. News & World Report!
***
"'Never,' says an authoritative intelligence source, 'have we had foreign operatives coming into this country in such numbers. It's a totally new phenomenon.'
The principal target of agents from Communist nations has been classified information of a political nature. But the emphasis lately has shifted to secrets of the U.S. military-scientific establishment - especially its increasingly sophisticated satellite technology and communications systems." (p. 36)
I'm not sure when dad began work on Boeing's communication's satellites, but I know that while I was an undergraduate he was working in this area. This article was published while I was in my sophomore year of college. When he made his business trips to Sweden and France it was in this connection, and so his visit to me in Germany in the fall of 1981 was following a business trip to Sweden for his communications satellite-related work. Reagan didn't officially start the Strategic Defense Initiative until March 23, 1983, so this predated that work.
Also, you will note that Soviet intelligence efforts, according to this article, were shifting more to focusing on exactly what my dad was working on. This article gives specific examples of this shift in focus.
***
"Soviet-bloc agents are also concentrating increasingly on the theft of industrial secrets. Recent advances in computers, lasers, microelectronics and production techniques - areas where Communist economics lag far behind the West - are particularly valuable." (p. 36)
To the average person reading this, it probably is only of vague passing interest. But to someone living in a world not of her choosing, this information is personal. I mean myself, of course. Again, I'm sure Boeing's work wasn't overlooked by the Soviets in this shift of focus, especially since they weren't some obscure little factory operating out of a warehouse or something.
***
"A phenomenal growth has been detected in the cadre of Russia's KGB officers residing in the United States. More than 500 have been identified at official missions in Washington, D.C., New York and San Francisco, twice the figure of 10 years ago." (p. 37)
I wonder how many KGB were in the San Francisco Soviet consulate in 1990... the year Anatolii & Galina Grischenko were in Seattle for Anatolii's cancer treatment? (I wrote about this incident in my life in an earlier post. Eventually I'll get around to making links between postings like this, but I don't want to stop to do that now.)
***
"The FBI reportedly has discovered Soviet agents among Jewish emigres leaving Russia. Several have been 'doubled,' or persuaded to work as counterspies." (p. 38)
Again... see, I told you? Now do you believe me that it's possible that I first got on the Soviet's radar when I was working with Soviet Jewish emigres? In any cause, you should admit that it's a plausible theory, even if you're not yet convinced that I've actually proved it beyond the shadow of a doubt.
***
This next source is the chapter of a book.
Adams, J. (1994). The New Spies. London, Hutchinson, Chapter 8, "Same Old Stuff."
This chapter tells about Michael Souther, an American spy and defector to the USSR.
"When is certain is that by the middle of 1986, Souther had raised the suspicions of the FBI. Investigators had interviewed him once, but could find no hard evidence. Clearly spooked, he bought a one-way ticket to Rome and disappeared, reappearing two years later at a press conference in Moscow to denounce the United States and claim he was being persecuted by the FBI." (p. 116).
Now I know I'm getting ahead of myself, and there's a lot you don't know yet about my experiences, but I could relate, at least in part to Souther. I wasn't a spy, for either the US or USSR, although it's possible that useful information was gleaned through me - but not anything even close to military secrets, of which I knew virtually nothing - including much about my dad's work. In fact, I think I'm safe in saying that of my whole family (dad, mom, two brothers and me) I knew the absolute least about dad's work. And I wasn't at all interested in the military aspects of it, for sure. I think I thought of that sphere along the lines of an extension of men's apparent need to flaunt their strength, and that was never anything I was terribly impressed by or interested in. There were other traits that I found more attractive in men, but not that one.
Also, you'll note the chronology here - 1986 for Souther's disappearance and 2 years later for his reappearance at the press conference. I 1986 I was accepted to work in Vienna and I began deputation, which lasted until I arrived in Vienna in June of 1987.
***
"...[T]he Souther affair was the opening salvo in what has become a new phase in the war between Russia and Western intelligence." (p. 117).
If that is the case, then I wonder what all these spy things did for how U.S. intelligence approached my dad and, by extension, me? Did this increase their scrutiny and concern? I'm not saying I know the answers to these, but I find it possible that there could have been a ripple affect that eventually came down to me.
***
That's all for that text, and I'm going to leave off again. This spy topic has been affecting my fibromyalgia a bit, where the other subjects were getting easier in that regard, almost like a release or catharsis to be able to tell my story (even if no one is listening as I write this). But I guess this new topic is hitting a new nerve that is more stressful for me.
I've got to start thinking about lunch though before going to my doctor's appointment.
~ Meg
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