As it turns out, there is nothing more I want to say about the rest of the Smist book, so we'll just move on to another source.
I'm not really picking these in any order but just flipping through them to see if there is anything potentially relevant to my situation. It's been a long time since I last read these, and I've worked on other project since collecting these, so it's a review for me too.
The next one is a book chapter.
Bittman, Ladislav. (1981). Soviet Bloc 'Disinformation' and other 'Active Measures'. In Pfaltzgraff, Jr., R.L., Ra'anan, U., & Milberd, E. (Eds.) Intelligence Policy and National Security. Hong Kong: MacMillan, p. 212-228.
***
This first quote is in the section titled "Theory and Practice of Special Operations."
"Special operations are a kind of a game where the players belong to one of three basic categories: (a) The Operator - author and conductor of the operation; (b) The Adversary - this can be a foreign state as a whole, its ruling authorities, or even individual citizens. From the standpoint of communist intelligence, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are most often cast in the adversary role; (3) The Unwitting Agent - a game player who without being aware of his true role, is exploited by the Operator as a means of attacking the Adversary. An Unwitting Agent also can wind up being the target of countermeasures taken by an Adversary, who mistakes him for the real Operator... The role of Adversary and Unwitting Agent can be played also by governmental agencies, institutions, or even individual persons within a given country.
Basic Game-Plan Versions
(1) The Operator strikes at an Adversary indirectly, through an Unwitting Agent. The Operator gears his efforts toward influencing the actions of the Unwitting Agent who voluntarily, though unaware, takes on the role of (indirect) Operator and strikes at the Adversary on his own initiative, even at the risk of becoming the target of countermeasures by the Adversary.
(2) The Operator strikes at the Adversary, who defends himself, but in view of the lack of clear and concrete evidence to the contrary mistakes the Unwitting Agent for the real Operator. The Unwitting Agent thus becomes the target of countermeasures taken by the Adversary, takes action to defend himself, and this, in turn gives rise to the trading of charges and accusations between the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent, rebounding to the advantage of the Operator. The latter can include this eventuality in his basic operational plan, but he can also resort to this tactic on a contingency basis.
(3) The Operator strikes directly at the Adversary, who is unable or unwilling to interpret such an attack as a hostile act; rather, he perceives it as being essentially a consequence of his own shortcomings or regards it as an element of the natural course of events and does not categorise it as an attack per se.
(4) The Operator strikes simultaneously both directly at the Adversary and through the Unwitting Agent, assuming that his thrust will trigger another exchange of hostile moves between the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent. In order to use this version of the game-plan, the Operator has to be able to convince both the Adversary and the Unwitting Agent, or at least one of them, that the Unwitting Agent is the (real) Operator vis-a-vis the Adversary, and the Adversary is the (real) Operator vis-a-vis the Unwitting Agent." (p. 215-216)
Can you imagine living in a world like that? I mean, when I lived in Siberia I had a dickens of a time mastering walking on ice in my boots, but maneuvering around a "Game" as is described seems like it would make my walking on ice problem a piece of cake in comparison.
This passage, if it has any ramifications for my life would have to be in relation to who my dad was. There are enough questions about why things happened the way they did that if someone in intelligence came up to me today and explained how I was an Unwitting Agent I wouldn't be too surprised, but I don't know that I was. And just think, if there are times, as in variant 3 above, that Adversary-Nations don't even recognized attacks when they happen, how much more difficult it would be for little ol' me to make heads or tails of this kind of thing!
***
That's all for that source. And here's another brief one:
Eells, R. S. F. & Nehemkis, P. (1984). Corporate Intelligence: A Blueprint for Executive Decision Making. NY, NY: Macmillan.
i just want to cite one entry in the "Glossary of Espionage Terms" at the back of the book:
"Surveillance Hot and Cold: Cold surveillance is secretive and intended to go unnoticed by the target, whereas hot surveillance is open tailing or bugging of an individual for purposes of harassment or intimidation." (p. 242)
In Siberia at least part of the time my phone was bugged, I'm pretty sure. There would often be a clicking in the background that would come and go and sometimes I'd be in the middle of a conversation and would be cut off at strategic points in the conversation. I'll get into that more later, but it was well after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
***
And next, we're going in a completely different direction (are you dizzy yet from all the different directions I'm taking you?). This one's a newspaper article.
Dobbs, Michael. (1987. April 12). Sexpionage: Why We Can't Resist Those KGB Sirens. The Washington Post, p. D1, D2.
"In his book, 'KGB - The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents,' [John] Barron documents the case of a French military attache, Col. Louis Guibaud, who committed suicide in 1962 after an affair with a Soviet women. Confronted with the evidence by the KGB, and offered the choice of secret collaboration or public disgrace, the colonel preferred to shoot himself. A similar dilemma confronted Jeremy Wolfenden, a British journalist in Moscow in the Early 1960s, whose homosexuality made him a KGB tarket.
'In these situations, the way out is often fraught with danger,' says Knightley, who has written about the Wolfenden case. 'If you go back and tell your own side that you have been framed, they will frequently try to recruit you as a double agent. That's what happened to Wolfenden and eventually it drove him to suicide." (p. D1-D2)
This article gives several other examples of prominent Western diplomats falling prey to one version or another of this ploy.
***
This next quote starts off with John Barron speaking:
"'What people fail to recognize is that operations like these involve much more than simply a boy-girl relationship. It's not a situation in which the lone westerner is confronted by the lone Russian temptress. In reality, it's one isolated individual against a massive, very experienced apparatus. All the circumstances are controlled by the KGB to maneuver the victim to a desired end. Sexual enticement, and the lure of a fulfilling relationship, is just a first step across the threshold. But once it is taken, retreat can be very difficult.'" (p. D2)
And finally:
"The evidence suggests that Soviet attempts to frame westerners living in Moscow are as likely to occur at times of political thaw and detente as during periods of cold war. Like other sectors of Soviet society, the KGB operates as if it had a 'plan' to fulfill, preferably overfulfill. It sometimes seems as if the secret service apparatus is obliged to 'produce' a certain number of victims, whether or not they can be put to any good use." (p. D2)
I think I was a victim of this tactic, and I think I have enough evidence to be pretty straightforward on that one. It started in 1990 though (although if they were aware of my friendship with the emigrant in the mid 1980s, that might have tipped them off as to how to get to me), and we're only in 1985. We still have Vienna to cover, so stay tuned, there's lots of excitement to come. That is, it's probably exciting from your end of things, but, like I said, I'm ready for cross-country skiing, because my life's been too "exciting".
~ Meg
