447. Military Chaplaincy, Pt. 54 (Summers, Jr., pt. 1)

Summers, Jr., Harry G. (1990, Spring). The chaplain as moral touchstone. Military Chaplains' Review, 3-8.

***

Summers opens his article with a discussion around Tinder's essay "Can we be good without God.  This quote is part of that discussion:

Professor argues that "the notion that we can be related to God and not to the world - that we can practice a spirituality that is not political - is in conflict with the Christian [and the Judeo and the Islamic] understand of God."

"And if spirituality is porperly political," he goes on to say, "the converse is also true, however distant it may be from prevailing assumptions: politics is properly spiritual... " (p. 3)

This is and is not in conflict with what the mission in Vienna seemed - in practice - to believe.  It IS in conflict because they would say that all our good without God is as filthy rags (Isaiah 64:6).  They were theologians, after all.

On the other hand, they clearly did agree with it because they acted as though they believed in an ends justifies the means philosophy, which opens the door to all kinds of things, including this one.  By including not one, but two U.S. military reserve chaplains to comprise the entire human resource department, they made it clear that they were very comfortable relating to the world, in the form of the U.S. government.

***

"Important as the ministry to the individual soldier is, and it is very important, the Chaplain's Corps serves the nation in an even more profound way as well - as the moral touchstone which bridges the military's spiritual and political dimensions.  The very motto of the Army Chaplains Corps, "Pro Deo et Patria," captures Tinder's arguments precisely." (p. 5)

The motto is in Latin and means something like For God and Country.  I think the Vienna mission could have gotten caught up in that motto.  At the very least they wouldn't have minded support for it, I don't think, if someone was prone to be political that way, as long as the country was the U.S., of course.  We did have people from other western countries, but their nations, as far I ever knew were never represented by way of holidays and the like.  

Around the time of U.S. national voting they did help us get absentee ballots or tell us where to get them.  Also, there was an American school that every year had a July 4th celebration so people often went there if they were in town.  So there were political things like that, for sure.  The kind of thing that just reminds you of your roots, but then if you didn't do these things then you felt badly too, so it was a control thing too.  Like maybe I really didn't want to go to the 4th of July party, but if I didn't go with everyone then I'd have to explain my other interests and it would get dicey.  So then it was almost expected of me to go.  This is just an example of the kind of thing that might happen, because that's what I lived with.

***

Not the least of the fundamental limitations "inherent or implied" in America's political purposes are those imposed by the three character traits which have traditionally shaped American forein policy: noninterventionism, pragmatism and idealism. (p. 4)

Well, I've been saying since day one, and I thought this even while I was living in Vienna that the mission was pragmatic and that it lived by the principles the ends justifies the means.  That's what allowed them to lead such deceitful lives, what they felt they had to do to carry out their ministry.  And I disagreed with them, which is why I was "standing up on the inside" until the very end and am still to this day standing up on the inside.  But now that I'm out of Vienna I am also standing up on the outside as well.  I'm just plain standing up.  So what I'm trying to say is that I disagree with them and I did then and I still to this day do, but I had to disagree surruptitiously then, but not any more. 

So that's them.  As for me, I'm an idealist.  I think I thought I was an idealist before this, but it really hit home when I was taking a philosophy of education course Fall 1990 (I just double-checked on my college transcript), that I am an idealist.  For me the ideals are Scripture or the ideas expressed therein.  But I have picked up things along the way that have been added to it, I think.  I don't suppose you could say that absolutely everything I have as an ideal is 100% from Scripture.  I do try to to have that as my main reference, though and hopefully the other things at least don't contradict Scripture.  When I was in that class I learned that there aren't many people who are idealist any more because it's not practical.  Almost the whole class were realists.  Maybe there were 1 or 2 other idealists with me, and a couple other different philosophies.

So you can imagine how distraught I might have been to come in Vienna as an idealist and to find that they were pragmatists and they fully expected me to be one too and that appeared to be one of the criteria for becoming a member in good standing.  Needless to say, my idealist sensibilities were offended beyond what you can imagine and compromise was simply out of the question.  Not the kind of compromise they seemed to be asking.

***

Chaplains are uniquely suited to both serve as the commander's moral advisor to ensure that military actions are in consonance with America's sense of right and wrong, and to create a climate of morality to ensure against war degenerating into the Hobbesian world of brigandage and barbarism.

To those who think such counsel unnecessary, consider the August 1965 incident at Cam Ne filmed by Morley Safer of CBS News. As Vietnamese women with terrified children clutching at their skirts wailed in the foreground, U.S. Marines, Zippo lighters in hand, burned their homes to the ground.  Whatever miniscule tactical advantage was gained by that action was totally obershadowed by the enourmous strategic damage it inflicted on American public support. (p. 7)

I just lost a lot of faith in this author.  Do you see what happened here?  Is the chaplain's moral sensibilities faith-based?  Or is it wrapped up in the whims of the political moment?  Based on this text it certainly is not clear.  Besides, I don't necessary put a lot of faith in America's sense of right and wrong.  I was living in Seoul, S. Korea when 9/11 happened.  I came to my early morning class I was teaching and everything was very solemn and I didn't know what had happened because I hadn't had the TV on and so it was one of the Korean teachers that told me and right away I said as a knee-jerk reaction that "oh, no, we're at war again!" And I said we should take it to the International Criminal Court to try to find Bin Laden, but we wouldn't do that.  And sure enough it happened just as I said.

So now it seems as if the author is saying the chaplain (or maybe chaplaincy as a corps) has a role to minister to the commanders and have an affect on the military and how it functions, some of the decisions that are made, the morality of them.  I don't expect this is an explicit ministry in the same way as it is in other areas of the chaplain's duties, where he can preach, counsel, evangelize, etc.  So this, I expect would be a more indirect ministry, at least in most cases, most of the time.  So how does he bring his faith to this part of the ministry then?

Since the Vienna mission H.R. department staff had this special moral training as chaplains, they might have been able to use in in the Vienna mission to be a "moral touchstone" at the mission for ethical issues that might come up there, in order to address them and keep the mission on the right track.   You'd think that this might be something that could be useful and of benefit, especially since they were a Christian mission and as such they might have been interested in making sure they were on the straight and narrow.

But I'm afraid that this wasn't the case.  In fact, if anything, they just hated me (my treatment bears that out, so if they protest, just point to the way they treated me).  So they viewed themselves as having the last word as far as right and wrong was concerned (for anything while with the mission); disagreement was tantamount to mutiny.

The thing is that in these circumstances it was almost so bad that if a missionary was told to do something against their conscience, they'd do it.  But I wouldn't.  And I paid for it.  Other missionaries weren't willing to pay for it like I did.

***

Except for the short forays into Grenada and Panama, we have an Army with almost no combat experience.  And we have those, such as retired Army Colonel Hackworth, who are now preaching that in war morality is of little consequence, and on the battlefield "studs" and "warriors" make their own rules.... "...Without such standards, there is no basis for the existence of an Army in a civilized nation." (p. 8, the last sentence quoting Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry)

And this is similar to what these missions were saying - and probably still say in other types of "closed" countries - that we don't know how it is in these difficult countries, yada, yada.  All I know is I got answers from a bunch of angry paranoid missions when I wrote those letters trying to decide which mission to go with, and if any or a few of them worked with the Vienna mission, maybe with literature delivery or even on the Board or other ways, then I can understand.  When I lived in Russia the believers weren't paranoid like these missions were and I was in the heard of Siberia.  It was a few years later, but times don't change that quickly.  All I know is these missions had a problem.

I don't know who their God is, but I think they must worship a different God than I do, because my God doesn't lead to that kind of stuff and doesn't require that kind of thing.  In fact my God can't lie and that's one thing He can't do and so why would he be demanding it for ministry?  That doesn't make any sense?

Now some maybe at the mission might have looked at it like I was the one acting like a stud sort of acting on my own.  However, the only thing I was going on my own was doing things in Austria because I was told I would be a secretary.  I guess, I should not have agreed to be a secretary, because I did not want to be one, but they wanted to shove it down my throat.

411. Military Chaplaincy, Pt. 29 ( Davidson (b), pt. 1)

This is the fist time I've commented on 2 articles by the same person in a file, but I think that chaplains are maybe a more limited finite number of specialists, especially when you figure the number of them who are prone to write articles, I suppose and the number who might wrote articles in areas I was interested in. 

This artield is:

Davidson, Donald L. (1986, Fall). Christian ethics and the military profession. Military Chaplains' Review, 8-25.

The tables in the back of the article comparing differences are interesting too and a great addition for this kind of thing.

***

"What has military professional ethics to do with Christian ethics and philosophical ethics? Often, because of differences in language and structure, these disciplines seem to represent three distinct and unrelated fields.  The differences are real, but they are not as incompatible as at first they may appear." (p. 8)

 I'm not exactly sure what this means, but it sounds as if he thinks that the differences between Christians and these other ethics is at least small enough to be something one can work and live with.  I'm not sure why he includes philosophical ethics in here, because philosophical ethics has been a part of church ethics (for the good or bad) at least since the 3rd century A.D., which is why you have Christian traditions that tend to either follow more idealist (Augustinian) or realistic (Thomas Aquinas) and then there were others of different traditions as well, but those are the two biggies, and they follow down to today, for example in Kierkegaard and Niebuhr (at least more recently, if not exactly right now today).  And these Christian philosophers could have brought in philosophy via the idealist or realist lense, or at least secular idealists and realists might have had a hook to hand their hat on via these Christian apologists.  So it'll be interesting to see what he does with philosophical ethics. Military ethics is clear and that would be what we need to see the real comparison with.

***

Figure 1

Ethics

A systematic reflection upon human actions, institutions, and [can't read one word] ...

• To determine how groups or individuals ought to act.
• To identify what things are right or wrong, good or bad.
• To evaluate more rasons and arguments given to justify actions.

Religious ethicists frequently will add a reference to the character and actions of God in relation to humanity.  Military ethics is "applied" ethics.  That is, the military generally adapts ethical definitions, values, and norms from its parent society to the special context of the military profession." (p. 9)

So the author uses the philosophical as the basis and the Christian and military as special cases?  I guess we'll see. 

***

"Military ethics may modify society's ethics because of its war mission.  The Army, for example, is not a democratic institution.  However, if the military diverges too much in its ethics, it can become estranged from the society it is to protect." (p. 10)

I don't see how it can help but have some influence "on the society it is to protect."  Some examples: The lives of the soldiers and their families will forever be affected, and that might include some extended families too so that even when they go back into society they will be changed people and they will carry the military spirit with them wherever they go.  And if they are injured in combat or come home with post traumatic stress syndrome they will affece people in a new and different way again.

Then of course, the bases affect the communities in which they live, whether in the USA or abroad, and I lived about 1/2 a mile from a base in Seoul, S. Korea and it was not long after at another base in Korea a U.S. military vehicle hit and killed to 14-year old girls.  Of course, th bases have economic affects on local communities and when bases are closed it can be quite traumatic for the community left behind. 

Then there's the Military Industrial Complex, which my father was a part of, and which feeds the military with its advanced military.  Of course, there are a myriad other companies that provide supplies and services for the military, like Halliburton's KBR.  And don't forget the HUGE toy industry which absolutely (along with mass media) sets the embers, stokes the flame and then feeds it with toys and electronic games of all kinds of imaginable war configuration imaginable, some so realistic it could probably spawn another post traumatic stress syndrome attack in a World War II veteran if any are still alive.

Sure, thee are aspects of life and certain echelons of life where you might not be so touched by military ethics as you would be in other areas or segments of society, but overall, I have a hard time believing that we're at great risk for the military ethic, no matter how much it diverges, becoming estranged from the society it is to protect.  Even Guantanamo, with its extended keeping of people that didn't belong there and its use of torture didn't estrange it from "the society it is to protect."

Let's face it, not only is the society in humongous trouble of being dead ethics wise, but the church too!  Anybody reading this who went to Sunday School as a child, even if they don't go to church now will know that Christians are supposed to be salt to the earth and lights to the world (Matt. 5:13-16).  And this passage also says that we can't be salt to the earth if we lose our saltiness.  What good is salt without it's saltiness?  And we shouldn't hide our lights under a bushel (e.g. a barrel).  What good is a light if no one can see it? 

So the thing is that I don't think the church is primarily about politics; it's ministry is really about bringing people into the Church, the Body of Christ, and building them up as Christians and growing the local Church into a healthy functioning part of bigger body, the Church around the world.  But we can take moral and ethical stands too.  The thing is, though, that we should understand that Satan is the Prince of the Power of the air (Eph. 2:2), so we should know that it is not unusual that a worldly (not Christian) government system should act in a not Christian way.  It's not like we should necessarily expect them to live according to Christian principles and Scripture.  They don't have the Holy Spirit and a new nature (along with the old sinful one, coexisting), so we are not right, I think to expect them to act as Christians.

That being said, however, there probably are/were Christians among them and if they did anything against God or Scripture or another person they will have to face God for it one day and the church where they attended or where they were/are a member should have been more attentive to these things. (Churches don't like to rock the boat, especially, I think if the person is a strong financial supporter of the church.  If you find a Scripture support for that ethic let me know.)

Also, however, Romans 2:14-16 indicates that there are those who don't know the law, I think mainly commentators say it refers to heathen who really have never heard the gospel, such as tribal people, but maybe even in our cities.  And among these people are some who because of the conscience God created us with instinctively do the right things.  And verse 16 makes it sound like some of these people could be saved.  I've even read stories about missionaries coming into tribes and when they share the story of Jesus for the first time the people will tell them that that's who they've been waiting for or worshiping, but they didn't kow the name or were waiting for someone to tell them about Him. 

But there are people who have rejected Christ too and somehow it seems like they act better than Christians, although that's so not how it's supposed to be.  It's a shame on the church that this is so, that we have failed so much in our faith that others outshine us - I mean, they seem to live more Christlike than we do.  Of course, we don't know the heart, and God does, and the fact that the person has rejected Christ does count for something as relates to standing with God, but out light and salt before men might be all but nonexistent.

I guess I diverged a little there.

***

 Figure 3 is of Structure of Ethics and has 3 branches: Metaethics, Normative Ethics, and Moral Policy.  I won't include the whole thing here, unless I end out decided I absolutely have to later on.

"Examples of fundamental values that have greatly influenced ethical systems in the past include pleasure (hedonism..), power (Nietzche), self (egosim), the state (nationalism), character or moral virtue (Aristotle), and God. Individuals or groups may hold more than one of these, but frequently one may become dominant and the source for evaluating the other values." (p. 11)

 I'm not really going to comment on this.  It's just here to follow his train of thought.

***

Figure 4

Typical formalist

Ethical rules

Respect human life.
Prevent injury to others.
Help others in need.
Tell the truth.
Keep promises and commitments.
Treat others fairly (justice).
Respect property of others.

In the 1960s Joseph Fletcher and others, reacting to the "legalism" of some formalists, emphasized the importance of the connect to ethical decisions. Fletcher's approach, called "situationalism, recuded all rules to one, the rule of love.  Right action, is doing the loving thing in the situation.  The context is an important continuation in ethical decisions.  This method, however, is incomplete, but may be the primary motive, as in the Great Commandments child like Jesus; or it may serve as a summary (higher order) principle similar to Kant's categorical imperative or Jesus' Golden Rule.  Love, however, is a very general concept.  By eliminating lower order [unclear word] (as Fletcher does, situation ethics provides very little guidance in ethical relations.  To be consistent, the situationalist still must use other principles (e.g., 'ends' or 'obligations') for judging which actions are right or loving.

The fact that Davidson took so much time and space on this approach to ethics makes me think that this is one approach to ethics that, despite it's weaknesses, he thinks is a serious contender in the mix.  At least it's hard to argue that love contradicts Christianity. 

The problem with it that I have, and that he doesn't exactly mention (although perhaps it would fit in his catchall sort of caveat towards the end) is the situationalism nature of this brand of ethics.  To me situational is a close cousin to relative, although situational at least has a hook to hang our hat on.  Here's what I mean.

Situational ethics:  I'll do anything as long as it's loving.

Cultural relativity: All cultures are relative.  They're all just different; there's not right or wrong as far as cultures go. They have to judged by they're own yard sticks, not by some external extracultural ideal.

I'll reserve further judgement for now.  I don't want to get ahead of things.

***

"Christian Metaethics

In summary, these three concepts form the methaethical fouhndations for Christian ethics: (1) God is the supreme value-center, the source of ethical knowledge, or rightness and godness; (2) Christian ethics always consists of a triadic relationship which includes God, self, and others; and (3) God's commandments provide required conditions for meaningful community existence.  These three features are evident in the covenantal nature and ethical content of the Ten Commandments.  They are also integral to that which Jesus, Paul and an unknown Jewish rabbi in the New Testament called the Greatest Commandments:

"Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.  This is the first and greatest commandment.  And the second is like it: Love your neighbor as yourself.  All the Law and the prophets hang on these two commandments." Matthew 22:37-39 (p. 16)

These are broad ethical guidelines that probably just about every Christian could rally around.

***

Military Methaethics [sic]

The potential exists for great differences between military ethics and Christian ethics because of significant divergence in metaethical foundations.. The highest value for the Christian is God and to Him is due the believer's ultimate loyalty.  For the military, however, the highest 'official' value is the state, as established in the Constitution, administered by the President, and legislated by the Congress." (p. 16-17)

I already discussed recently in another post about how the miliary makes the chaplain take, as part of his oath of duty, promise to make service to the country primacy of place in his life. So now it'll be interesting to see how he might wheedle his way out of that one. You make that oath and then there have got to be times of conflict because the boss is going to want you to make good on your promise. You can't necessarily expect to try to just close your eyes and pretend it will go away or something. And the military has you a good part of 24/7. That's what I wasn't going give the mission when they looked too worldly and very potentially mixed up in things I didn't approve in and I wasn't going to stand by and pretend I did approve of them, so I would rather have not known about them and stay on the periphery, as much as it hurt. I came to be part of a mission, not a political establishment. If I wanted to be part of a political establishment, I would have accepted the offer to study at the Monterey Institute for International Studies instead of going to Bible school, which I instead opted for.

***

"Fortunately for military personnel and our nation, there has been a coherence between development of the American character and the Christian tradition... As these developments reflect, there is a general compatibility between duties to God and duties to the nation; but this could change... It is important, therefore, for Christian military professionals to work for consistency between national ethics, military ethics, and Christian ethics despite these metaethical differences." (p. 17)

This doesn't really tell me anything at all. It's hard to know what do comment on because of the sweeping generalities here. 

***

This next section is a watershed one.

"What approach does Christian ethics take [ineligible word] it use an 'ends' or 'obligations' procedure?

The majority of Christian ethicists would probably agree with the following observation by George Forell: Christianity assesses that in all important ethical decisions the motive is the significant feature... In this sense Christian ethics is formalistic rather than teleological.' Beach and Niebuhr consider Christian ethics a formalist system: 'It is more concerned with the question: What is right? whan with the question: What is man's chief good? It does not begin by setting ideals before men but by reminding them of their duties."...

... These teleological scriptures generally fall within what we described earlier as an ethic of virtue.  Also it is clear from these passages that the goal is not personal self-realization, but becoming what God wants, of being like Christ (Galatians 2:20; Romans 12:1-2).

Though teleological elements are present in Scripture, the Bible rejects egoism.  The central issue in Jesus' temptation (Matthew 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13) was whether he should use his unique powers for personal gain and in the pursuit of self-interest.

Scripture also seems to reject a utilitarian approach to ethics.  I [illegible word] found no passages in which the ends justify the means; that is, when the rightness of an action was determined solely by the consequences of that action.  As Beach and Niebuhr suggest, the primary ethical approach reflected in Scripture is formalism." (p. 18-19)

So the real clincher here for me, especially, is that last paragraph, which supports what I've been saying about the Vienna mission and how what I've been calling pragmatism (a special form of pragmatism, but also called other things, like utilitarianism, I just have wanted to be consistent and call it the same thing all the time), has, accodrding to Davidson, no biblical support, which is exactly what I've been saying from day 1!  And there were like some 40 theologians there at the mission who either hadn't realized the utilitarian (pragmatic) aspect of the mission or didn't know ethics well enough or were so sucked into the mission that they were beyond being a "prophet" to the mission (or a whistleblower in a more dramatic form).  And I was "just" a secretary and I saw it with my eyes closed.  Even while I was there I knew it; this was one of the things I knew while I was there, that I was cognizant of in my second secretive self that I wouldn't let anyone see because they scared the bajeebers out of me.  So here you have it, and it didn't come from me: utilitarianism, pragmatism, whatever you want to call it, it's the ends justifies the means type of thinking is NOT biblical.  And the Vienna mission lived by that principle.  And that was part of their underworld of the security and maybe the compromise with working with groups they ought not to have worked with.  And by the way, I don't suppose the military chaplains/H.R. staff might have read this article; it came out about 6 months or so before I came to join the mission in Vienna.

As for the other stuff, I can't imagine the military being too excited about a bunch of their soldiers becoming Christ like.  The table of biblical norms in the back include the fruit of the spirit, which I've discussed before here as including such things as meekness and humility, which I'd be surprised if the military would fully appreciate.

***

"Military Normative Ethics

Because of its nature and mission, the military is a rule-ordered society... These characteristics incline the military toward a formalist or 'duty' approach to ethics where right and wrong and good and bad are defined by governing documents and the hierarchy and then pushed down through the system.  The soldier's duty is to obey lawful and ethical orders and standards.  The military's need for unit teamwork, cohesion, and esprit requires common rules, like those of a covenant, which promote duties of the members to each other.  Military ethics shares  with Christian ethics disposition toward an 'obligation' or formalistic ethic.

The military, however, it also a mission or task oriented society...Thus, although by nature and structure the military is a formalist organization, its method of operating may promote utilitarian calculation which could lead to a disregard for important ethical principles and standards." (p. 20-21)

In this discussion the author is trying to look at these different ethical traditions and how they might work in the military context specifically.  The military normative ethics is specific to the military setting, so that comes with the bargain.  The others are brought in as possible contributions to the context, particularly for Christians trying to function in the military setting.  So these would be ethical traditions not indigenous per se to the military setting, but attempting to make some kind of a happy marriage there, or at least a reasonable co-existence. 

The chaplain is fortunate to be in a formal position of ethical counselor to his captain, and we've seen that this is in the chaplain handbook, for example, so it's a formal policy that this is so, although some captains might utilize it more than others.  So with this advantage it's possible that this could be an opening for Christian ethics in the military, but then you have the issue of Church and State separation and you have all kinds of religions and non-religions (atheists, agnostics, etc.) in the army, so this might not be something you'd want to exploit unfairly. 

So then you're left with the individual trying to make his way in the army figuring out how to be regarding ethical issues.  The average soldier, especially without higher education, probably will just go with the flow and not otherwise think about it.  So then it's the chaplain's job to introduce ethical issues to them, as appropriate. 

I think that it's possible to meld the two or find a way to walk a tight rope between them or pick and choose in a way that seems to work for everyone.  The thing is that we all pick up things from the world, only we don't realize it because we're blind to our own biases.  These biases from the civilian world could easily be just as bad if not worse than those of the soldier in the military.  So I'm inclined here to think that this is a case where we need to make sure there isn't a beam in our own eye before looking for the speck in the soldier's (Matt. 7:2-4)

***

"Conclusion

As a result, at least in part, of their common heritage in Judeo-Christian ethics, American military ethics and Christian ethics are greatly compatible.  Both consider ethical principles and virtues to [ineligible word] the moral imperative, rather than simply preferences or customes...

The point where Christian ethics and military ethics have the greatest potential for conflict is in the metaethical category of fundamental values.  Indeed, profound divergence in this area could lead to very different principles and practices for Christians and soldiers. The value-center of Christians can only be the God who is revealed in Jesus Christ.  The highest 'official' value in the military professional ethics is the state.  If the demands of these to value-centers [ilegible word] the Christian soldier faces an ethical dilemma.  In the end, the Christian whether soldier or civilian, must choose to obey God rather than men. (Acts 5:29)" (p. 21)

Commenting on the first paragraph, I'd just like to say that the values are different and if individuals follow those different values will end out as quite different types of people ans so I think that to say that the military values don't conflict with Christianity's, in principle that might be so, but the fact that they're all different enough makes me hesitate.  You're not going to find a church with those values; a cult, maybe, but not a church.  To give you an idea of what I mean, the Military Ethical Values table includes such things as selfles service, courage (physical & moral), dedication, discipline, etc.) as well as the code of conduct, which includes, for example, this statement: "5. If captured, I will remain loyal to my country, not aid enemy."

The second paragraph refers to the fact that the military demands primacy of place from the soldier and officer.  This, as Davidson rightly acknowledges, is a likely place where problems could lie.  The thing is that if the military is the end all, then if there is a conflict between the miltary's ethics and Christian ethics, then the military's ethics will always win out and the soldier will always obey them, at least from an ethical standpoint.  (There could be other reasons than ethics for disobedience.)  So this is very sweet for the military, of course. 

But for the Christian it is problematic, to say the least.  In fact, to do this is to start on the slippery slope to becoming what we call a carnal Christian.  It doesn't really take much to become carnal and it's one step and then another step and then another and before you know it there you are, you've completely lost your saltiness and your light is under a bushel and if anyone looked at you they'd have no idea you were a Christian at all.  That's the way it goes.

So it's a problem for Christians.  But not all Christians see it that way.  But then, too, they might see a lot of other Christians around them, maybe in the military, maybe civilian, who also have taken little steps and they're not quote the saltiness and light maybe they should be, so he thinks after all that this is normal and that "everyone does it," so he agrees to let the Army have supremacy over God.  And if you're in the Vienna mission, you do the same thing, because ou see that all these other missionaries and theologians have done the same thing before you, so you see that it must be okay and they must know something you don't, so you trust them and let the mission have supremacy in your life, and God second place.  God has to have second place because you have to agree to reserve all judgements against the mission.  So they alone are above critique, sort of like God. 

***

That's it for this article.

345. Organizational Behavior, Pt. 69 (Schneider, pt. 1)

I just got a notice from my Internet/Cable/Landline Phone provider notifying me that recently someone else was granted permission to pay my bills.  Well hooray!  Who wouldn't mind that?

Well, the thing is, that in this case I think they mean that now I was granted the right to pay my own bills because they still have may name spelled wrong and they thing that I'm this other person with the name spelled the other way.  This is causing me all kinds of grief and I've spent hours and hours trying to gain access to the Internet. Now I have it, with the wrong name, but it bugs me to have that wrong name.  And I can't change my user name, so if I were to send people an e-mail from that account everyone would point out that my name is spelled wrong... I have to actually physically go to one of their offices, undoubtedly with i.d. to prove that I am who I say I am with the correct spelling.  What a mess.  As if I didn't have anything else to do with my time.

***

Anyway, you'll be glad to hear I did well in physical therapy today, but now well enough to be released.  I'm supposed to get a new script from my neurologist.  We're working on torso and arms, mostly one day and legs and balance more the next, although I do the treadmill 10 minutes every day.  Today at the end she wanted me to do an exercise where I was supposed to be kneeling, but I can't kneel well, because my right knee has a killer spot where my rheumatoid arthritis has set up shop big time, so I can't even kneel on a very soft pillow on that knee without sharp pangs.  But she quickly came up with an alternate exercise for the same purpose.

The other big news is that I spent about $500 on supplements and over the counter medicines that I take.  The supplements I get at Vitamin Shoppe and I try to stock up during their semi-annual store brand sale.  It really saves me money and helps me know how to budget better than just having to wait for some ad hoc sale and not knowing how much you'll end out spending.  This way I pretty much know and it's a good deal.  It's a lot of money, but the ones I take really do help and I know that when I've run out of certain ones I can really tell, so they help me be functional.

***

This next text is:

Schneider, Benjamin. (1975). Organizational climates: an essay. Personnel Psychology, 4, 447-479.

***

The first quote is in the first section after the introduction, "The Nature and Function of Climate Perceptions."

"Much climate research has been accomplished on the basis of some infrequently specified assumptions.  These assumptions may be stated as follows: (1) humans attempt to apprehend order in their environment and to create order through thought; (2) humans apprehend and/or attempt to create order in their environment so they can effectively adapt their behavior to their work environment.  Broadly speaking, the first assumption is associated with the Gestalt school of psychology while the second assumption is representatative of the kinds of questions associated with the school of Functionalism." (p. 447)

I'm not going to address the two schools of thought yet, because that's addressed more later in the article, so I'm sure I'll pick another text to comment on in that regard.  So I'll just limit my comments to the first half of the text here, but I wanted to include the whole paragraph so you'd see where we're going here.

Let's say that I'm the human plopped in the new context needing to apprehend.  Coming to the Vienna mission I most definitely did try to do #1, but I often found it incredibly difficult.  At some point I just sort of quit trying and just sort of stuck to what I knew and what I was supposed to do.  The things was that, in my opinion, to outsiders, things could look chaotic, but to those who understand what's going on it's not chaotic.  That was a security trait in my opinion.  Since I was not completely trusted (at certain times more than others maybe though), I might have been treated somewhat like an outsider.

I think I did this also, but maybe somewhat less than the first one, because I got stuck on the first one.  It was difficult for me to to the second one with the first one weas so messed up.  My attempts to create order in my workplace were pretty minor, I think, and only involved my work space.

***

The next section: "Gestalt Psychology"

"The major contribution of Gestalt psychology was its emphasis on the organization of perceptions; the whole bing something special and not definable by its simple examination or some of the parts..." (p. 448)

 In folk parlance, this is otherwise defined as "the whole is greater than the parts."

It is no wonder that I might have bent more towards the first way to apprehend the Vienna mission, because I tend to prefer taking on major issues with the big picture first, and then moving in towards the details.  So, I suppose that might look a bit like taking a Gestalt take.  The only thing, is that, for me, the Gestalt is not the end all, but I just prefer starting with the big picture and then once I feel reasonably confident with that then I'll start filling in the details, like painting broad brush first and then details after.

As far as the my experience with the Vienna mission was concerned, I think there were a few times while I was with them that I felt like I sort of understood them and could fill in enough details to start to feel a little bit more comfortable with them, although that doesn't mean I ever agreed with the things I've discussed here that I disagreed with them about.  These were times, though, that they gave me interesting work to do, so those issues sort of got put on the back burner.  But those assignments were always temporary and I'd go back to my regular work and nothing would change.  Maybe they thought I'd change or something, I don't know.  Maybe they didn't know what to make of me.  So, if I generally like to try to start with the big picture and then fill in the details, in the Vienna mission, I had a hard time figuring out the big picture enough to fill in the details.

I should explain something here.  That sounds a little funny and you might be thinking, "Then how can you write this?!"  The thing is, that the stuff I'm writing is not the kind of information that would help me actually survive in the organization.  That's the kind of information I needed.  The kind of information I'm writing about here in this blog is more the kind of stuff that I really disagree with - because that's what stuck with me and why I had so much trouble submitting and why I didn't want to be open and vulnerable.  (I know my limitations and I'm not that stupid.)  So I needed a specific kind of details that would help me function in that environment and I didn't find it; maybe it didn't exist.  Or maybe the details I found worked just great for that purpose for other people but with my conscious and thinking processes they didn't work that way. 

***

The author has gone on in some detail to discuss apprehending meaningfulness and behaving meaningfulness as the two major parts of Gestalt psychology and ends with this:

"...[W]e may conclude that people (a) apprehend order in their work worlds based on perceived and inferred cues, and (b) behave in ways that fit the order they apprehend." (p. 451)

I've discussed (a) quite a bit, but I might add that I think that there might have been perhaps more social engineered cues in the Vienna mission because of the whole security system, which was a lot more than they like to let on because it's even a protection to have people not know and, besides, they're masters of deception anyway, so it'll be a cinch to deny it.

I think (b) is mostly relevant during the socialization process.  I think that this could also be true if someone moves to a new position in the mission as well.  Missionaries internalize the values and norms and they learn from each other as they go along as well.  More seasoned missionaries give tips and mentor newer missionaries.  I might have been the only one to have been so contrary, I don't know.  I never did anything wrong, though.  It's just that I didn't break down and completely submit.  I insisted on keeping my free will.  I think that's the only thing I did wrong, basically.  So that's why I say I only give that kind of submission to God.  Nevertheless,
I guess I didn't behave according to their order, if that's a part of their order.  But that's not a part of God's order, so I'm not sorry.

***

The next section is "Functionalism" so we'll discuss that next time.

267. Reprieve: Family Time-Out

It's hard to know sometimes what to write here about "private" family issues. The thing is, as in all such issues of "privacy" (including regarding internal workings of the Vienna mission), it's not always easy trying to determine...

1. what ethically / biblically / legally should (or should not) be "private";
2. what the effects might be of not keeping any particular thing "private" (including a) how others involved might respond; b) how innocent bystanders might be affected; c) how I might be affected (and I may or may not fit into b) in any particular issue);
   
3. what my intentions might be of revealing something that at least some people consider should be ethically / biblically private;
4. if the ethical / biblical mandate argues against something being / remaining private, what the best way is to reveal the heretofore private issue; and/or
   
5. the relevance of the private issue to my autobiography, which is what this blog is all about.
   

Regarding #1 above, if biblical mandate argues against something being/remaining private, such as in the case where sin is involved, I really should reveal it, and not doing so might even make me an accomplice, or at the very least an enabler. Ethical mandate is contingent upon what the ethical framework might be for determining whether something should or should not be kept private, and even the understanding of the biblical mandate could be subject to somewhat different interpretations of Scripture. However, biblical mandate should be based only on Scripture to be truly biblical, and any determination relying on extra-biblical sources and mandates would not be fundamentally biblical in nature. Legal mandate might be subject to how one views the Scriptural legitimacy of a legal determination. That is, if one believes that government mandates regarding family issues are unbiblical interference in the family, then one would therefore not recognize the legitimacy of legal mandates regarding family issues, in which case one is left with the biblical mandate and/or other ethical mandate(s), which, presumably, should not contradict the determination that the legal mandate is illegitimate.

Regarding the second issue, if one holds pragmatism (ends justifies the means and/or group consensus of right and wrong being the final yard stick) as having ultimate authority in determining what should or should not be revealed, than this concern would be the overriding issue in deciding whether a private concern should be revealed or not. If something other than pragmatism is accepted as the final moral measure, than #2 should not be a primary concern.

As to #3, my intentions would only be of issue if the basic value structure which allows for the maintenance or non-maintenance of secrecy makes my intentions a matter of concern. If it is determined that my intentions are an issue, this would likely be so out of concern for a) my moral, spiritual or psychological condition out of concern for me; b) my moral, spiritual or psychological condition because of concern for the affect intentions might play on how I carry out any revelation or non-revelation of a heretofore private issue; and/or c) the validity of my assertion regarding the heretofore private issue.

Point a) here seems irrelevant if taken purely and simply as a concern for my condition, as this says nothing about the heretofore private issue. (This isn't to say this concern might not be important on other grounds, but not vis a vis whether a heretofore private issue is rightfully private and/or should be revealed).

B) would be of concern for some methods of reasoning, as there could be determinations regarding better or less good ways of revealing or not revealing something something by which I might be judged, and this might include judgment of my intentions. However, this does not address the issue of whether something should or should not be revealed, just how it should or should not be revealed. In this light, then, I might be chided for revealing or not revealing something in the wrong way, but that would not discredit the revelation or non-revelation itself. For example, I might reveal something in a way someone views as wrong, while still recognizing that I was right in revealing the issue in general; I just did it in the wrong way, in such a case. This issue, I think, is separate from the the heretofore private issue itself and also the basic determination of whether or not something should or should not be revealed. Whether or not I reveal something in the right way or not, however, has nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of the issue itself. So, for example, if someone is involved in child abuse, and I reveal it incorrectly, my revealing such a situation in a "wrong" way says nothing about whether the child abuse itself is right or wrong and should not be used as a way to detract from the wrongness of the child abuse.

Option C) above could well be combined with B), but could also be completely separate from B). In the case that it is completely separate from B), there would be no actual concern for me at all, but only for the heretofore private issue and perhaps those individuals that it involves. That is, in this case a determination concerning the correctness or incorrectness of my intentions includes no consideration for my moral or spiritual well-being.

The fourth issue would affect #3 as described above, but here the focus is on the yardstick for determining rightness or wrongness / better or worse approaches to revealing or not revealing heretofore private issues. In other words, this point pushes us to establish guidelines, apart from what I might or might not actually do. Presumably, this could come chronologically before some of the above issues, but not necessarily. That is, one might not think through this aspect of the dilemma, and just come to conclusions more or less by the seat of one's pants - that is, as a sort of knee-jerk reaction. In this case, it is quite possible (or even likely) that attributing all these moralistic aspects of the process (of determining what and how to reveal or not reveal something) to real-life contexts might be assigning more intentionality to the parties involved than is actually the case. This would not mean that there is necessarily no logic in such cases, but rather than any logic is quite likely less conscious than I'm assuming here. I don't think this fact (that reasoning might be more unconscious than otherwise), negates the above discussions, however, because these kinds of considerations could still be relevant, just less consciously so.

Finally, there is the issue (#5) as to whether, from a literature standpoint, the heretofore private issue is relevant to my autobiography. I think the family issues are generally relevant in as much as family is a big part of my life, in various ways. As such, it comprises a big part of who I am and also my concerns and, to a certain extent, how I might be the way I am. Some things about who I am might be difficult to understand apart from family, but also, when I eventually arrive at the present in my autobiographical chronology, it might be difficult to understand why and how certain things happen without understanding private family issues. Whether or not this is enough to justify revealing these issues here in this blog is subject to the other considerations (1 through 4). The thing for me that is so difficult is that so much of my life seems to have been subject to this secrecy rule that if I were to refrain from discussing private things altogether the reader would basically have an understanding of my life that everyone else (not myself) frames for me as they desire for their own ends, and my understanding gets completely lost in the shuffle. In such a case it seems like I would have to turn this blog into a biography, rather than an autobiography, because my own views of my life would be buried and ignored. In this case, where does one draw the line in knowing what to reveal (let alone how to reveal things)? It seems that there is always some justification or another for maintaining secrecy, which always argues against revealing heretofore private things. That is, it seems that most everyone in my life appears to be dead set on framing my life (or certain aspects of it) in their terms, which is contingent upon the maintenance of secrecy, that is keeping heretofore secret things secrets. Where, then does my perspective fit in? It doesn't. In this way my perspective, pure and simple, is wrong, illegitimate, or otherwise immoral in one way or another, according to all my detractors, some of whom are otherwise relationally quite close to me.

And there you have my dilemma(s) in a nutshell.

***

I'm sorry if I've missed something here, and I should say that I'm not really a philosopher by training, but I hope I'm making some sense here.

***

So why am I going through all the trouble to discuss this here? I'm doing this because I want you to understand some of the issues I'm grappling with in trying to decide what to write here and what not to write... or how to write something. Right now the big issue is regarding present-day interpersonal relations and the like, because of recent events in my life. So I want you to see that when I write something here, especially something of more current concern, I'm not writing it heedlessly or without at least some thought. In turn, I hope the reader will likewise keep in mind some of these concerns I've discussed in this post when assigning moral determinations related to what I post here.

Also, while I do have some protection of anonymity here, there are a few people who know who I am. And although I could decide at a later date to change or delete any particular comment or post, as anyone who knows how the Internet works, such later change or deletion is not necessarily a fool-proof option. That is, even if I make changes, the earlier version of this blog or a particular post could well be cached somewhere else on the Internet.

The other immediate reason for writing this post is that there are several issues currently that are distracting me and might fall within this "family secrets" category. So I'm trying to decide what to do about these things in real life and also vis a vis this blog.

250. Reprieve: Freire & Buber

A few years ago I did a bit of studying comparing Martin Buber and Paolo Freire, both of whom have something to say about education. Part of what I found was regarding their use of pronouns, which has stuck with me, in both cases, as being a useful reminder in how to relate to other people. I was reminded of this in one of my recent posts, in which I said that the mission basically treated its members as objects without self-determination; certainly, I felt that way at least.

I won't go into a lot of detail here about this, except to draw it to your attention and apply it a bit to the Vienna mission.

Freire is concerned with hierarchical relationships and this comes out in his philosophical use of pronouns. For him, having an I-thou relationship indicates hierarchy and, as such, is bad or wrong. In contrast, an I-I relationship is more egalitarian and good or right. His frame of reference is the great disparity of wealth and poverty in Brazil in the 20th century.

Buber, on the other hand, is troubled by I-it relationships, wherein someone relates to the other as an object (like how I described the mission as treating its members) and as such is bad or wrong. On the other hand 'wordless unity' describes a valuation of the other person as a person, which includes an attempt to understand them and accept their position, while at the same time not necessarily agreeing with them (which might indicate treating oneself as an 'it'). Buber's frame of reference was the atrocities of Hitler's prison camps as a Jewish internee.

I think that what these two men have to say have is important. But I wouldn't say either serves as an exact template for my views on how people should be treated and related to.

Regarding Buber's understanding, I think that people should always be related to as "I's", although I think that there are times when I don't think it's enough to just allow the other person to have their views. (I haven't studied this in a while, so I could be overimplifying Buber's philosophy, however.) I'll just deal with the Christian to Christian and Christian to non-Christian relationships in my comments here. I think that there is good biblical backing for me in my understanding that the unbeliever must be allowed to make their own decision regarding Christ, for example, and also Christians would otherwise not believe they should be held to the same standards as Christians, anyway (although a lot of non-Christians act more Christ-like than some Christians). So this relationship would more or less mirror Buber's I-I relationship. However, Christian's are to hold each other accountable in a way not so with non-Christians, and, as such, can not accept the position that we should just accept another believer's position at face value. That is, we are supposed to compare it (and their actions) to Scripture and admonish one another in love (Colossians 3:16), where needed.

Regarding Freire's view, I think that there is some truth to this in how the Bible says we are to relate to one another both Christian to Christian and also Christian to non-Christian. That is (regarding the Christian to Christian relationship), we are not to view ourselves as higher than others (Romans 12:3) and we are to recognize our need for one another (I. Corinthians 12:14-26). Even in our relationship with unbelievers the "pride comes before a fall" (Proverbs 11:2) rule still applies. However, Christians are to give deference to church leaders (e.g., I Peter 5:5) and secular authorities (e.g., I Peter 2:15-25), although that deference is not unconditional, but is subject to any Scriptural limitations that might apply. (Also, note that the I Peter 5:5 does not say to obey in the case of being asked to do something that might be sin, just to obey whether your boss is kind or not.)

So, in general terms (with exceptions, as noted above), Christian relations should be as such:

Christian to Christian relations should be mostly one of mutual respect (Buber's "wordless unity") and valuation (Freire's I-thou). Exceptions are holding one another accountable (differs from Buber) and recognizing differences of responsibility (but subject to Scriptural scrutiny) (differs from Freire).

Christian to non-Christian relations should also be one mutual respect (Buber's "wordless unity") and valuation (Freire's I-thou). the exception is recognizing differences of responsibility (but subject to Scriptural scrutiny) (differs from Freire).

This is how I experienced the Vienna mission, in contrast:

Vis a vis Freire: I was viewed as a "thou" (in hierarchical terms) at the very bottom of the all-encompassing and very demanding hierarchy.

Vis a vis Buber: I was viewed as an "it" with virtually no say in anything, and anything and everything that I did say could be used by the mission to undermine my "I"-ness. So I was an it being acted upon by the mission with no self-determination voice, no voice at the table at all.

I'm not sure how others experienced the mission, but that's how I experienced it. I was, in short, an inconsequential object to the mission. At least that's how they treated me.

233. Pre-Vienna Comments 5

I think that a stand-alone discussion of the issue of values is warranted in the lead-up to the chronological narration of my Vienna days.

To start off, I'm going to start off with something I learned about in my Adult Education coursework, and that is Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development. Now I know that there is disagreement about certain aspects of Kohlberg's theory, but well accepted enough that I think it should serve as a good jumping off point. Kohlberg developed this theory by interviewing teenage boys (see the above link for more details) and later extended it to include interviews of subjects of different demographics. He posed the following question and then asked the interviewee what he or she would do in this situation:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $ 1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug-for his wife. Should the husband have done that? (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19)

Through this process he determined that people generally follow this sequence of moral development:

Level 1: Preconventional morality
Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation
> Example: Obeying the mission authorities because of being afraid of being demoted otherwise (and the mission knows what's best and so has the right to demote you if you don't obey).
Stage 2: Individualism and exchange
> Example: Obeying the mission authorities because of being afraid of being demoted otherwise (although you know there are other standards than that used by the mission to determine right or wrong)

Level 2: Conventional morality
Stage 3: Good interpersonal relations
> Example: Obeying the mission because you don't want to raise a stink.
Stage 4: Maintaining the social order
>Example: Obeying the mission because chaos would ensue if everyone were to live by their own individual values.

Level 3: Postconventional morality
Stage 5: Social contract and individual rights
> Example: Obeying the mission because you believe it treats its members well.
Stage 6: Universal principles
> Example: Obeying the mission because it functions biblically.

Now here are my propositions in regards to how Kohlberg's theory fit the Vienna mission (when I was there):

1. The mission wanted newcomers to start out with a Stage 1 orientation to it, which would be blind obedience irregardless of any other standard.
2. It was probably possible to enter the mission with a Stage 2 orientation as long as one was willing to relinquish comparisons with other potential morality schemes other than those proffered by the mission (for its members to adhere to).
3. Once one passed that test, one had begun the process of internalizing the mission's moral structure.
4. In addition, once one passed that test one could turn one's focus to the group, which act was encouraged by the group treating the newcomer well as s/he progressed. The newcomer is now in Stage 3.
   
5. As one interacted with the group and internalized more and more of the group's value structure, the individual would begin to give more importance to maintaining the social order (and at the same time start playing more of a control function). This is stage 4.
6. Ultimately, the individual comes to believe that the mission treats its members well, thus validating the normative beliefs and values of the organization. This is Stage 5.

In this context, as I'm suggesting here, is stage 6 possible? The thing is that this whole way along the group has served as a reference for itself and managed to define what is just and true and right and good, and to reach stage 6 you have to have something outside the mission that serves as a guide. If that were to be Scripture, the mission would only accept Scripture as the norm on the group's terms, and we'd probably be talking in terms of ecclesiology - the theology of the church - as being the most relevant. I've already, in earlier posts, presented some biblical mandates the mission contradicted; what would they do with these things? In any case, in my experience of the mission, it could not tolerate anything that might oppose it or otherwise bring its authority into question or undermine its value structure.

So stage 6 is bothersome and maybe some hardcore philosophers or theologians or psychologists could help me out here.

But the other thing that really, really, really bothers/bothered me is how the relationship with the mission starts. Why in heaven's name does one have to start all the way at square one? [Or was I the only one the mission seemed to require this of? Which would open a whole other can of worms if answered in the affirmative.]

And, surely you'd expect a bunch of theologians to have reached a higher level of moral maturity than Stage 1 by the time they came to work for the mission, right? Or am I missing something here? My expectation is that these theologian/missionaries (which comprised the bulk of the staff, including the administration) were otherwise way up on levels 5 or 6.

So they come to the mission, supposedly, at those advanced levels and seem to willingly agree to take a level 1 stance before the mission upon arrival in Vienna. Am I the only one bothered by this? Isn't anyone else concerned or even just a tad bit curious about how this can be?

What went wrong? It seems to me that there had to be something really strange going on if I'm at all right in this description of affairs. Because it seems very strange to me that around 50 theologians could do this, and apparently do it willingly. Of course, if they were afraid of experiencing anything like what I did maybe it wasn't so willingly, either. Or, as I said before, maybe I was the only one this seemed to fit.

***

Now let's look at some moral, ethical and axiological theories and see how the mission stacks up from that approach.

Consequentialism: One judges 'rightness' by the consequence of an act.
> Example: How the mission carries out is work is good because the consequences of it are good.

Rights theory: A right for you to do X implies a correlative duty on others to not interfere with your performance of X.
> Example: The mission has a right to carry out its work (in part because the consequences are good, see "consequentialism" above), so you don't have a right to stop us or otherwise interfere with our carrying out of our duties.

Virtue ethics: Focuses on the character of the person, rather than the action.
> Example: The mission is good because it is a Christian mission and so its actions are likewise good.

Deontological theory: What matters is that an action conforms to an external norm.
> Example: The mission's actions are good because they conform to biblical mandates.


So how might these be applied to the Vienna mission context (as I knew it from 1987 to 1989)? Here are some possibilities of where ethical concerns might be especially pertinent:

1. how the mission portrays itself to various outsiders (e.g., supporters back home, local Austrians, believers in Eastern Europe, etc.);

2. how the mission assimilates new members;

3. how the mission carries out its ministry;

4. how the mission functions in general (e.g., its culture, organizational structure, etc.)

Here's my take on it (based on my experiences and observations with the mission from 1987 to 1989):

The mission used "virtue ethics" in its relations with supporters back home, but used "rights theory" to justify its demands regarding newcomer assimilation. The content of its teaching and textbooks reflected a "deontological" perspective, but it used "consequentialism" to justify how it carried out its ministry. The details of various administrative aspects of its work would probably have involved a mishmash of different ethical positions, depending on the specific task.

In other words, the mission's teaching involved a "do as I say, but not as I do" element and the mission presented itself deceptively (i.e., other than it really was in its day in day out functioning) to supporters back home.

Now I may be naive, but I do know that the Vienna mission was far from the only organization (even conservative Christian mission organization) that this could be said about. But I think the difference in this case is the pervasiveness of the inconsistencies, the level of intentionality of the inconsistencies, and the size of the gap these inconsistencies represent between what actually was going on inside the mission and what was presented to others.

***

Supposedly, then, these morally advanced theologians go back to Stage 1 to enter the mission and then continue on up to Stage 5 (or maybe 6 if that's possible) all the while internalizing more and more of the mission's values and norms, so that then they also become part of this whole ethical process, including working to preserve the organization.

Now, I should say that if my experience was very dramatically different from everyone else's in the mission (which, as I said before, would open a whole other can of worms), then my description here of the mission is all wet, but the mission somehow was able to interact with me in a way that gave me this understanding of its nature, values, and how it operated.

And as for myself, I think I entered at Stage 2 and stayed at Stage 2 for the duration of my time with the mission. The mission might have thought I'd gotten to Stage 3 or maybe Stage 4 for a while (about three-quarters of the way through my term with them). If they thought that way, it would mean they probably misinterpreted my taking social initiative, not realizing that I was doing this irregardless of what they thought was "best" for the group, but rather just because I was living by the same standards as I had before I arrived in the mission, which included a general desire to reach out to others and be a positive presence in general. So I think I was doing it because of individuals that I wanted to invite over to get to know more or just spread a little kindness around or the like; but I did not do these things for some mission-centric motivation per se.

I think the only viable options for me would have been Stage 2 or Stage 6. As an idealist after the manner of St. Augustine, Stage 6 would have been my normal position, but that would have been completely untenable for the Vienna mission. So for purposes of my relationship with them, I set aside the "universal principles" that I would normally hold to. However, I could NOT deny that such principles existed or that they were actually preferable even. So that leaves Stage 2 or 6, because Stages 3, 4 and 5 are based on something other than an external normative ideal. At least with stage 2 I could still hold on to the acknowledgement that another ideal besides what the mission offered existed. There was no way I was going to go so far as to completely let go of that other ideal. Also, I think that even in Stage 2 if the mission asked anything that too clearly contradicted the other normative ideal, I wouldn't go along with such a demand.

So then, I suppose one could argue that I was really in Stage 6, but I don't think so because even though I might normally function in Stage 6 (which isn't to say that I always abide by it perfectly - that is, I do sin from time to time), if I were really functioning in Stage 6 I would have taken more offense by the things that bothered me in the mission. After all, even though I didn't understand a lot that was going on at the time I understood enough to know to resist it and also taken a stand if I'd been so inclined. In this way, there might have been a discrepancy between my thoughts and my actions, in as much as my conscience was thinking Stage 6 (which is how I determined the mission was wrong), but I acted out Stage 2. In this case, it could even be said that I sinned, in as much as "whatsoever is not of faith is sin" and I perhaps acted against my better judgement. At any rate, you couldn't say I followed in Bonhoeffer's footsteps in this situation, because if I had I would have stood up for what I knew to be right despite any potential cost to me. And I didn't do that.

The other thing I would just mention here in passing is that I hope you can see through this kind of insight into my psyche that I might not have been a very easy target for the KGB to recruit any more than I was an easy victim (if you will) of the mission.

177. Socialization File, Pt. 60 (Buchanan, pt. 3)

When I said I was naive (in the last post), I didn't mean to imply that I wasn't equally naive about everything. I think it's pretty safe to say that I was very naive about anything military-related. Part of that was because I just wasn't interested in those things. So when I eventually developed somewhat of an interest in historical things, neither military nor political history were among the areas of history I was interested in. Rather, I was interested in social history, the history of how people lived and their cultures, and also the history of ideas. Even so, although I have done some reading over the years on various historical issues and times, I wouldn't say it's been an overriding interest of mine, even in the social history and history of ideas realms.

So this lack of knowledge and interest in anything military provided the appropriate void needed to support and intensify my naivety in anything military-related that might have had an effect on my life. I still am not interested in this subject, except as it might affect me, and greatly resent that military-related concerns (i.e., via my relationship to my dad) might have had any effect on my life. That response, of course, is also naive. I think that I'm a citizen of the USA and have the same rights as anyone in this country and I never took on a position (like being employed by the CIA) that might have resulted in an abdication of certain rights by virtue of the demands of my job description. No, if there was any abdication of my rights it was done by dad by virtue of his job. (Although I don't think he ever wanted or intended me to be affected that way; it's just that I picked a profession that probably resulted in this happening to me.)

So I was and am very naive regarding military and national security issues (although somewhat less now than I used to be). I don't think I was as naive regarding mission work in Warsaw Pact countries, but there was a certain amount of naivety. Regarding the missions working in that part of the world I was fairly naive in my thinking that they were more pristine and godly (i.e., biblically based) than they actually were. I didn't think that they had become so corrupted by the milieu in which they worked; but I think I was very wrong about this. On the other hand, I don't think I was so naive about the actual mission field itself, meaning that I think I had a reasonably accurate grasp of the risks and concerns of Christian work there and what it was like for the Christians living in these countries. Of course, I didn't take into account possible interference because of dad's work, however. But I still think I'm right that the mission in Vienna went too far in becoming obsessed with security issues to the point of taking on a nature that seemed quite unchristianlike.

So I had selective naivety about military things, my rights, dad's work, and East European mission organizations. It's when I was forced to face head-on the naivety of my thinking (via traumatic personal experiences), that I underwent serious soul searching and reconsideration of some of my values and outlook on life. I have also often been naive regarding relations with men, meaning I have sometimes been too quick to believe men or otherwise not show as much discretion as I should have.

***

Returning to my adult education background, perhaps Jack Mezirow's learning cycle fits how my values and beliefs changed during these "head-on" crisis events in my life. Here is a list of the progression he theorizes adults go through in learning:

"1. A disorienting dilemma
2. Self-examination
3. Critical assessment and a sense of alienation
4. Relating discontent to the experiences of others
5. Exploring options for new ways of acting
6. Building confidence in new ways of behaving
7. Planning a course of action
8. Acquiring knowledge in order to implement plans
9. Experimenting with new roles
10. Reintegration into society"

(This is list is taken from Jarvis, P. (1995). Adult & Continuing Education: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, p. 94-95.)

The steps that would have been difficult for me in many of these situations were numbers 4 and 10. Number 4 was difficult because there usually wasn't anyone readily available for me to connect with in this way (i.e., my experiences seemed to be somewhat unique). And number 10 was difficult in that I tended to end out with learning that didn't fit easily into society, and the more of these kinds of results I had the more difficult it because to reintegrate into society. What I mean is that I might go through one of these crisis learning cycles and end out with conclusions that weren't necessarily popular. Then I'd go through another of these cycles and end out with another less popular conclusion, and so in this way the circle of people I thought I could relate to shrunk with each of these cycles. But other than numbers 4 and 10 this is a pretty good model for the soul searching and meaning seeking I went through at various intersections of my life.

Also, it might be helpful to mention that how I went through this process illustrates how I am basically an idealist by way of philosophical orientation. I think that this quote (from The Catholic Encyclopdia) from St. Augustine, pretty well fits how I see things too:

"In this sense St. Augustine developed the Platonic teaching, and in his philosophy is idealism in the genuine meaning of the term. From him comes the definition of ideas which Christian philosophy has since retained: "Ideas are certain original forms of things, their archetypes, permanent and incommunicable, which are contained in the Divine intelligence. And though they neither begin to be nor cease, yet upon them are patterned the manifold things of the world that come into being and pass away. Upon these ideas only the rational soul can fix its gaze, endowed as it is with the faculty which is its peculiar excellence, i.e. mind and reason [mente ac ratione], a power, as it were, of intellectual vision; and for such intuition that soul only is qualified which is pure and holy, i.e., whose eye is normal, clear, and well adjusted to the things which it would fain behold" (De diversis quaest., Q. xlvi, in P.L., XL, 30)"

In addition, I believe that the Bible is the clearest and most direct way God reveals these "ideas", although Scripture says that they can also be seen in creation (nature) and in His people (Christians). [The latter source, it should be said however, is be tainted by willful disobedience to God, since Christians can still sin.]

Because of this mindset, it may have been my experiences that led to the crises, but it was generally Scripture, rather than the world around me, that played the leading role in how I resolved the crisis. It would be misleading to say that it played as overriding a role in this process as it should have for an ideological purist. But I think it's safe to say that this Augustinian idealism describes how I view life in general. Perhaps this philosophical perspective might have even been another Greek tragedy-style character flaw, as it would have prevented me, for example, from letting the mission have the extensive authority in my life that it seemed to want (and that it presumably got from everyone else).

I think I'd been made aware of this philosophical bent in an undergraduate philosophy class, but it was not until a graduate course in philosophy of adult education that I began to think more about the implications of this perspective and also learned that it was not a common stance any more. I think I was the only one in the class who was self-identified as an idealist and the professor reinforced that by stating that few considered themselves idealists now (that was 1990).

***

Returning to the text under discussion... Buchanan now starts to explain the study itself. Out of 500 questionnaires sent out to employees of 3 large corporations and 5 large U.S. federal agencies, 279 were returned. The respondents were divided into the 3 groups in the introduction: 1st year managers, 2nd through 4th year managers, and 5th year and beyond managers. Questions were developed to reflect the commitment factors predicted to be the most important for each group.

The experience measures consisted of 13 scales, each with 4 or 5 items in them (Cronbach's alpha is provided, but I'm omitting it for the sake of brevity (!):

"(1) Role clarity... Has the organization made it clear to me what I am expected to do?

(2) Peer group cohesion... Are the people with whom I work friendly and close-knit or aloof and distant?

(3) Group attitudes toward organization... Do the people I work with express mostly positive or mostly negative attitudes toward the organization?

(4) Expectations realization... Have I found what I expected to find since coming to work for this organization?

(5) Reality shock... Am I disappointed as a result of the contrast between what I expected and what I found?

(6) First-year job challenge... Was the work I was given to do during my first year challenging and interesting or routine and dull?

(7) Loyalty conflicts... Has the organization tried to influence me to adopt values or practices I find personally repugnant?

(8) Personal importance... Is it generally accepted by those who matter that my work is important to the organization?

(9) Self-image reinforcement... Do people accept me for what I am here? Do I feel free to be myself?

(10) Fear of failure... How often am I reminded that my job and chances for promotion depend on how well I perform?

(11) Organizational commitment norms... Are managers like myself expected to be personally committed to the organization?

(12) Work commitment norms... Are managers like myself expected to have a strong personal commitment to the work they do?

(13) Organizational dependability... Has the organization always done the things it said it would do for me?" (p. 539-540)

I've dealt already with a lot of these, but I'll just briefly state my answer to each of these 13 experience scale questions.

1. Role clarity. My role was not clear at all in Vienna. That is, even at times when the work itself was laid out clearly, I knew I was being watched not so much for my work but other (mostly unspoken things) that were expected of me.

2. Peer group cohesion. That would have to be the secretaries. There weren't a lot of secretaries and we were a bit of a motley bunch in many ways. Two were professional executive secretaries (from pre-mission days), one came fresh out of high school, and then there was me. Before this I'd been referring to the secretaries (as a reference group) all lumped together, but this question does bring out a different kink in that aspect of my experience. One of the secretaries (my boss's boss's secretary) was the most far along in the socialization process, the other professional secretary is the one from Alaska and she had arrived on the scene just a few months before me and, I think, took a while to really become fully socialized and integrated, or so it seemed to me. My boss's boss's secretary seemed to be the main go-to person as far as role models and taking responsibility for guiding me along as a secretary was concerned.

3. Group attitudes toward organization. Everyone had an extremely positive attitude, almost to a fault, about the organization, which goes along with what I mean about dissent not being tolerated and almost a sort of a brainwashed feeling about it. The secretary from Alaska, during her struggles to adapt wasn't like that, until she became socialized into the mission.

4. Expectations realization. No, I had not found what I had expected to find before coming to Vienna. At this point I'm not going to say any more about this; I've already said a lot about it elsewhere, and more details will come out in the chronology.

5. Reality shock. If I need to answer this, then this must be about the first post you've read in this blog. I was supremely, excessively and mindbogglingly disappointed as a result of the contrast between what I expected and what I found when I arrived in Vienna.

6. First-year job challenge. My work was routine and dull.

7. Loyalty conflicts. Yes, it did, except the wording of the question does not adequately reflect the forcefulness used in the organization's attempts to get me to to adopt values and practices I found repugnant. Repugnant is a good word, however.

8. Personal importance. This is another useful question that might bring out something a bit new. The mission leaders, to a fault, including in a post card to me some 6 months after I'd left the mission told me not infrequently how my work was so important to the mission. But for the most part I wasn't doing diddly squat! I mean, how important can it be to the mission, for example, that I'm spending a couple months reading software manuals that I didn't need to read because I couldn't have taken a class to learn the software before I got there even, and at least they could give me something else that looked more remotely useful. I might have been a secretary, but I wasn't stupid. The divide between what I was doing at any given time and the contrived flattery could have put the Grand Canyon to shame.

9. Self-image reinforcement. No and no! The Vienna mission seemed to not know me, or if they did I couldn't tell, and probably no one else could either. And I didn't feel free to be myself because the mission was dead set on its image of me becoming reality and that seemed to be nonnegotiable. I felt pretty much like there wasn't much that the mission liked about me because it was so set on changing practically everything about me. At least that's how I felt. This probably contributed to my difficult time the year after I left Vienna.

10. Fear of failure. This is all wrong. My experience in Vienna was that, after about 5 months there, my job was tenuous and contingent, but the contingency was most adamantly NOT having anything to do with "how well I perform." Rather, it was more contingent to something akin to an "attitude adjustment", meaning (as far as I'm concerned) selling my soul to them. It eventually felt like mind control, like they wanted to know why I did thus and so and what I was thinking when I did such and such, and until they got a grasp on my mental processes they weren't going to be happy. That might sound overdone, but that really is how I felt, and I hope I can pull together enough details of my time in Vienna to help you understand. (I mean presenting the details when I get to the chronology.)

11. Organizational commitment norms. Everybody, manager or not, was expected to be committed to the Vienna mission above pretty much anything else while with the mission.

12. Work commitment norms. Because of the nature of the work, I don't think this was an issue. Everyone felt the importance of the work, which they would have spent all of deputation conveying to others before even arriving in Vienna.

13. Organizational dependability. The mission didn't do what it said it would because I didn't end out, really ever, working as the secretary of the assistant director. That is, the few months that I was technically in the position I only nominally played the role of what someone would usually think such a position would entail. I did a lot of filler stuff, mostly. That's not to say I didn't do anything meaningful at all, but it was the exception rather than the rule.

***

Next time I'll respond to some aspects of the results of this study.