233. Pre-Vienna Comments 5

I think that a stand-alone discussion of the issue of values is warranted in the lead-up to the chronological narration of my Vienna days.

To start off, I'm going to start off with something I learned about in my Adult Education coursework, and that is Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development. Now I know that there is disagreement about certain aspects of Kohlberg's theory, but well accepted enough that I think it should serve as a good jumping off point. Kohlberg developed this theory by interviewing teenage boys (see the above link for more details) and later extended it to include interviews of subjects of different demographics. He posed the following question and then asked the interviewee what he or she would do in this situation:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $ 1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug-for his wife. Should the husband have done that? (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19)

Through this process he determined that people generally follow this sequence of moral development:

Level 1: Preconventional morality
Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation
> Example: Obeying the mission authorities because of being afraid of being demoted otherwise (and the mission knows what's best and so has the right to demote you if you don't obey).
Stage 2: Individualism and exchange
> Example: Obeying the mission authorities because of being afraid of being demoted otherwise (although you know there are other standards than that used by the mission to determine right or wrong)

Level 2: Conventional morality
Stage 3: Good interpersonal relations
> Example: Obeying the mission because you don't want to raise a stink.
Stage 4: Maintaining the social order
>Example: Obeying the mission because chaos would ensue if everyone were to live by their own individual values.

Level 3: Postconventional morality
Stage 5: Social contract and individual rights
> Example: Obeying the mission because you believe it treats its members well.
Stage 6: Universal principles
> Example: Obeying the mission because it functions biblically.

Now here are my propositions in regards to how Kohlberg's theory fit the Vienna mission (when I was there):

1. The mission wanted newcomers to start out with a Stage 1 orientation to it, which would be blind obedience irregardless of any other standard.
2. It was probably possible to enter the mission with a Stage 2 orientation as long as one was willing to relinquish comparisons with other potential morality schemes other than those proffered by the mission (for its members to adhere to).
3. Once one passed that test, one had begun the process of internalizing the mission's moral structure.
4. In addition, once one passed that test one could turn one's focus to the group, which act was encouraged by the group treating the newcomer well as s/he progressed. The newcomer is now in Stage 3.
   
5. As one interacted with the group and internalized more and more of the group's value structure, the individual would begin to give more importance to maintaining the social order (and at the same time start playing more of a control function). This is stage 4.
6. Ultimately, the individual comes to believe that the mission treats its members well, thus validating the normative beliefs and values of the organization. This is Stage 5.

In this context, as I'm suggesting here, is stage 6 possible? The thing is that this whole way along the group has served as a reference for itself and managed to define what is just and true and right and good, and to reach stage 6 you have to have something outside the mission that serves as a guide. If that were to be Scripture, the mission would only accept Scripture as the norm on the group's terms, and we'd probably be talking in terms of ecclesiology - the theology of the church - as being the most relevant. I've already, in earlier posts, presented some biblical mandates the mission contradicted; what would they do with these things? In any case, in my experience of the mission, it could not tolerate anything that might oppose it or otherwise bring its authority into question or undermine its value structure.

So stage 6 is bothersome and maybe some hardcore philosophers or theologians or psychologists could help me out here.

But the other thing that really, really, really bothers/bothered me is how the relationship with the mission starts. Why in heaven's name does one have to start all the way at square one? [Or was I the only one the mission seemed to require this of? Which would open a whole other can of worms if answered in the affirmative.]

And, surely you'd expect a bunch of theologians to have reached a higher level of moral maturity than Stage 1 by the time they came to work for the mission, right? Or am I missing something here? My expectation is that these theologian/missionaries (which comprised the bulk of the staff, including the administration) were otherwise way up on levels 5 or 6.

So they come to the mission, supposedly, at those advanced levels and seem to willingly agree to take a level 1 stance before the mission upon arrival in Vienna. Am I the only one bothered by this? Isn't anyone else concerned or even just a tad bit curious about how this can be?

What went wrong? It seems to me that there had to be something really strange going on if I'm at all right in this description of affairs. Because it seems very strange to me that around 50 theologians could do this, and apparently do it willingly. Of course, if they were afraid of experiencing anything like what I did maybe it wasn't so willingly, either. Or, as I said before, maybe I was the only one this seemed to fit.

***

Now let's look at some moral, ethical and axiological theories and see how the mission stacks up from that approach.

Consequentialism: One judges 'rightness' by the consequence of an act.
> Example: How the mission carries out is work is good because the consequences of it are good.

Rights theory: A right for you to do X implies a correlative duty on others to not interfere with your performance of X.
> Example: The mission has a right to carry out its work (in part because the consequences are good, see "consequentialism" above), so you don't have a right to stop us or otherwise interfere with our carrying out of our duties.

Virtue ethics: Focuses on the character of the person, rather than the action.
> Example: The mission is good because it is a Christian mission and so its actions are likewise good.

Deontological theory: What matters is that an action conforms to an external norm.
> Example: The mission's actions are good because they conform to biblical mandates.


So how might these be applied to the Vienna mission context (as I knew it from 1987 to 1989)? Here are some possibilities of where ethical concerns might be especially pertinent:

1. how the mission portrays itself to various outsiders (e.g., supporters back home, local Austrians, believers in Eastern Europe, etc.);

2. how the mission assimilates new members;

3. how the mission carries out its ministry;

4. how the mission functions in general (e.g., its culture, organizational structure, etc.)

Here's my take on it (based on my experiences and observations with the mission from 1987 to 1989):

The mission used "virtue ethics" in its relations with supporters back home, but used "rights theory" to justify its demands regarding newcomer assimilation. The content of its teaching and textbooks reflected a "deontological" perspective, but it used "consequentialism" to justify how it carried out its ministry. The details of various administrative aspects of its work would probably have involved a mishmash of different ethical positions, depending on the specific task.

In other words, the mission's teaching involved a "do as I say, but not as I do" element and the mission presented itself deceptively (i.e., other than it really was in its day in day out functioning) to supporters back home.

Now I may be naive, but I do know that the Vienna mission was far from the only organization (even conservative Christian mission organization) that this could be said about. But I think the difference in this case is the pervasiveness of the inconsistencies, the level of intentionality of the inconsistencies, and the size of the gap these inconsistencies represent between what actually was going on inside the mission and what was presented to others.

***

Supposedly, then, these morally advanced theologians go back to Stage 1 to enter the mission and then continue on up to Stage 5 (or maybe 6 if that's possible) all the while internalizing more and more of the mission's values and norms, so that then they also become part of this whole ethical process, including working to preserve the organization.

Now, I should say that if my experience was very dramatically different from everyone else's in the mission (which, as I said before, would open a whole other can of worms), then my description here of the mission is all wet, but the mission somehow was able to interact with me in a way that gave me this understanding of its nature, values, and how it operated.

And as for myself, I think I entered at Stage 2 and stayed at Stage 2 for the duration of my time with the mission. The mission might have thought I'd gotten to Stage 3 or maybe Stage 4 for a while (about three-quarters of the way through my term with them). If they thought that way, it would mean they probably misinterpreted my taking social initiative, not realizing that I was doing this irregardless of what they thought was "best" for the group, but rather just because I was living by the same standards as I had before I arrived in the mission, which included a general desire to reach out to others and be a positive presence in general. So I think I was doing it because of individuals that I wanted to invite over to get to know more or just spread a little kindness around or the like; but I did not do these things for some mission-centric motivation per se.

I think the only viable options for me would have been Stage 2 or Stage 6. As an idealist after the manner of St. Augustine, Stage 6 would have been my normal position, but that would have been completely untenable for the Vienna mission. So for purposes of my relationship with them, I set aside the "universal principles" that I would normally hold to. However, I could NOT deny that such principles existed or that they were actually preferable even. So that leaves Stage 2 or 6, because Stages 3, 4 and 5 are based on something other than an external normative ideal. At least with stage 2 I could still hold on to the acknowledgement that another ideal besides what the mission offered existed. There was no way I was going to go so far as to completely let go of that other ideal. Also, I think that even in Stage 2 if the mission asked anything that too clearly contradicted the other normative ideal, I wouldn't go along with such a demand.

So then, I suppose one could argue that I was really in Stage 6, but I don't think so because even though I might normally function in Stage 6 (which isn't to say that I always abide by it perfectly - that is, I do sin from time to time), if I were really functioning in Stage 6 I would have taken more offense by the things that bothered me in the mission. After all, even though I didn't understand a lot that was going on at the time I understood enough to know to resist it and also taken a stand if I'd been so inclined. In this way, there might have been a discrepancy between my thoughts and my actions, in as much as my conscience was thinking Stage 6 (which is how I determined the mission was wrong), but I acted out Stage 2. In this case, it could even be said that I sinned, in as much as "whatsoever is not of faith is sin" and I perhaps acted against my better judgement. At any rate, you couldn't say I followed in Bonhoeffer's footsteps in this situation, because if I had I would have stood up for what I knew to be right despite any potential cost to me. And I didn't do that.

The other thing I would just mention here in passing is that I hope you can see through this kind of insight into my psyche that I might not have been a very easy target for the KGB to recruit any more than I was an easy victim (if you will) of the mission.

122. Socialization File, Pt. 5 (Dubin, pt. 5)

Now remember that I did the research that resulted in my having all these articles and book segments in the mid 90's, so my thinking along these lines has stayed pretty constant all this time and that was much closer to the time when all this happened to me - specifically the Vienna years.

Also, the fact that I've kept them all this time is an indication of my continual intention of using them eventually, when life circumstances permitted it.

***

"When an individual enters an organization as a newly recruited member, he is likely to experience what Hughes (1958b) calls a 'reality shock.' The extent to which the shock affects the outcome of the organizational socialization process depends largely upon the extent to which the person has correctly anticipated the various expectations of the organization." (p. 84)

Whoooa, Nelly! Need I say that I didn't anticipate "the various expectations of the organization" very "correctly"? I got along pretty well in Austria apart from my dealings with the mission, which indicates that I knew the Austrian culture better than I understood the organizational culture mostly made up mainly of fellow Americans, and evangelical Christian Americans at that. How can that be? Where had I ever had problems among American evangelical Christians? So as you can see, this is not just any ordinary group of (mostly) American evangelical Christian. No, this is a group of (mostly) American evangelical Christians who had developed a way of thinking and doing that seemed very foreign to my American evangelical Christian experience, which spanned about my whole life.

Now it's one thing to do things a little differently, but how could more fundamental things like way of thinking and rationalizing ways of doing that seemed antithetical to all that I knew about my faith and biblical teaching? Had I been mistaught? Had I all these years misunderstood the Bible?

If these perceived differences were real, and not just ephemeral or a misunderstanding somewhere along the line on my part, how could these seemingly astute theologians and Bible teachers come to such divergent understandings and ways of thinking?

If they were correct, was their way of thinking something that needed to be taught back home too - after all if they were right, surely they should spread it to Christians back home (and elsewhere) too, right? Or was it that they were right only in the narrow context of working in Eastern Europe (or "closed countries" anywhere), which mandated a different reality, a different understanding of things?

But if there was a real gap between the mission's reality and what I'd been taught, experienced and read in the Bible, how could they bridge that gap? I can tell you my theory on this: they were convinced that these differences were necessary to be able to "successfully" carry out their work... in the context of Communist countries. So then the issues become: 1) What is "successful"? 2) Was this really necessary to be "successful"? and 3) Was it biblical?

Here are my answers to these questions:

1) "Successful" in their eyes involved minimal human suffering (e.g., imprisonment of nationals, missionaries being banned from countries, etc.) and more equipped national church leaders to build the Church in those countries. I think the first part of this equation is based on our modern/cultural thinking and does not biblically justify their tactics (although if broken down into specific individual tactics, some might not have been an issue).

2) To meet their idea of "successful" (as I've just surmised) the complete package of their tactics might have been more or less necessary. But since I disagree with their concept of "successful" (as I've interpreted it), I also don't agree that their means were necessary.

3) No, I don't think it was biblical. If it were possible to have one of the leadership (i.e., one of those that would have had the greatest knowledge and understanding of the tactics used) list out the various specific tactics - including the things not written down - and then give a biblical/theological explanation for each of them, I would be very interested in seeing such a list. But first of all, there would need to be corroboration that the list was relatively complete and accurate and not snow job. But since I think that these tactics are still in use in other "closed" countries (i.e., countries not open to Western missionaries), I highly doubt that you'll find anyone willing to do this, unless there was someone else out there (besides me) who was disgruntled about these things but had more insider access than I did.

So all that is to say that I had a very incorrect understanding of the "various expectations" of the mission before arriving in Vienna.

***

"In many cases, anticipatory socialization sharpens the positive features of the organization and dulls the negative features. For example, recruitment procedures seek to present the organization in its most favorable light. Consequently, the encounter period is likely to be an extremely trying period." (p. 84)

Hah! Missions give EVERYONE a glossed over view of their work!! Of course, the more deviance in the mission the more "glossing over" you'd expect. Most missions with any deviation, though, would be expected to having something like disagreements among workers or something scandalous about a particular missionary, or the like. But the glossing over that missions to Eastern Europe did involved intentionally hiding a major part of what they did!

Of course, in general terms I anticipated this, but the kind of discretion I imagined paled in comparison to the whole-scale spy-like institutionalized deception I encountered. You've heard of front companies? Here's something from the Sept. 17, 2008, Los Angeles Times:

The CIA set up a network of front companies in Europe and elsewhere after the Sept. 11 attacks as part of a constellation of "black stations" for a new generation of spies, according to current and former agency officials. (http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/17/nation/na-intel17)

That's about what it felt like.

***

I'm going to break off for now...

Ciao...

~ Meg

89. Defense & High-Reliability Firms File, Part 13 (Radine, p. 7)

I've looked through all the boxes of books, thinking that there might be some papers in them, but I still can't find the articles. I did find some books though that I can scan in pages from for the blog. For example, I mentioned the history atlas from the DDR (East Germany) that makes Martin Luther out to be a revolutionary; that's one of the books I found.

But for now I'll start chapter 4, which has ca. 50 pages of text followed by 15 p. of footnotes. I'm not going to use the footnotes here, but I just mention that because it's the kind of book that has references and the like. I'm just skipping over them for the purposes of our discussion here.

***

Chapter 4 of The Taming of the Troops
Co-optive Rational Control Through Behavioral Science Management

***

"The most nonconfrontive of domination on the social control continuum is based on two, but usually compatible principles. One is the liberal principle of inclusion and co-optation, and the other is the principle of rationalization - the application of social scientific knowledge to redesign human relations." (p. 88)

Basically, co-optation, as the author describes it with examples and the like, would be like giving dissidents a chance to air their grievances, so then just by virtue of having "been listened to" they are somewhat pacified and then on top of it, the army will make some other improvement completely unrelated to the grievance, and that co-opts the dissidents.

The rationalization part is the use of aptitude tests and the like to match soldiers to specific positions.

I've skipped over a lot here, because it doesn't seem to apply to Vienna. However, here's an interesting tidbit to chew on:

***

"In educational background, dissidents are more likely to have had college training than typical Army soldiers. Those having college training were most often listed as organizing dissident activities, whereas high-school graduates tended toward less serious activities." (p. 106)

I don't think this applies to Vienna either. I think I was the closest thing there was to a dissident, at least during my tenure there, and I certainly wasn't among the most educated there. I didn't even have a master's degree at that point yet, and the place was swarming with people with Th.M. and Th.D. degrees (masters and doctorate of theology).

***

"Officers could monitor potential dissidents or transfer them to some position where they would have little responsibility or contact with other soldiers. They could be kept out of power or sensitive positions, such as intelligence, aviation, or military advisers to foreign nations." (p. 107).

I was eventually side-lined in Vienna, and I also often didn't have much work to do, and the thinking described here is probably part of the reason, but there are other approaches to describing my experience than what is given here. Hopefully we'll get to them. But this reasoning here isn't completely off-base as far as my experience in Vienna is concerned.

***

After a discussion of attitude studies in the Army, the author has this to say:

"Why is such detailed information so important? Subordinated people have complex attitudes: they may, at the same moment, hold contradictory conceptions of themselves. For example, if a GI is continually told he is lowly and worthless and it is always demonstrated to him what an incompetent bumbler he is, then he beings to accept this image and to view himself in the same terms his "superiors" use to define him. He may indeed feel that he could not run the Army any better than it is already being run, and that he really is not enough of a man to measure up to Army traditions. Repression produces a feeling of worthlessness in the repressed. But simultaneously, repressed people are often conscious of their powerlessness, and they resent those who have power over them." (p. 111)

I won't say I was constantly berated like in the army, but somehow the process did result in some of the reactions described in this chapter. Except in my case fear was also a big thing, more than anger.

The author continues this discussion showing how this process can lead to an intense one-person revolt. Then he refers to Hegel:

"Hegel argues that the most important struggle is within the slave's own mind, rather than between the master and the slave. I think this interpretation of reactions to oppressive conditions is what is missing when idealism and psychopathology are given as the only reasons for resistance." (p. 111)

It sounds like there are 3 possible internal bases, on a personal scale, for responses to repressive situations: 1) from an ideological basis; 2) from a psychopathological basis (e.g., insanity); and 3) an internal struggle between being made to feel incompetent and his resentment of those over him.

I think I came from the first of these, but there are people who would prefer to say I am coming from the 2nd or 3rd basis. It's possible that the third one was used a bit in socialization, to break newcomers guards down. I certainly experienced it, but I'm not sure how widespread that was.

***

Here's one that's not related to Vienna:

"Officers, reflecting their more educated backgrounds, feel that since soldiers are resisting the army, they must be highly political and ideological and opposed to imperialism and to United States policy." (p. 115)

Are the officers really that brash about being pro-U.S. imperialism? I would definitely make a very terrible soldier on that count alone!

***

And continuing directly from that quote:

"The real explanation is precisely the reverse. Soldiers resist the Army because they find it oppressive. They do not like regimentation, pretty uses of authority, constant, useless formations and marches, and, to them, ridiculous constraints on their lifestyle. Once they express their hatred of the Army, then they are predisposed to think in more ideological terms. They being to search for a justification to legitimate their feelings because they feel no civilian would support their resistance in merely the kinds of terms that preserving their own humanity would require... So being anti-war or anti-imperialist is often the consequences of being anti-Army." (p. 115)

Which comes first, the chicken or the egg?

Humanity is over-rated anyway, who needs it? It's really nice and pleasant to be treated like a robot...

Have you ever read the book "We" by Zamyatin? It's a satire along the lines of Animal Farm, but pokes fun at totalitarian regimes. Zamyatin predated Orwell and influenced his work. Anyway, this book is great for considering life as a human robot. It's probably almost as fun as life in the Army.

But getting back to Vienna...

My responses to what I was experiencing in Vienna probably had a tinge (or more) of wanting to preserve my own humanity. And the experiences that I've had in the last couple decades have very much been a cause of trying to understand them and thus developing changes in my ideology. I don't know that I've thought about it like this, but it's very possible that I've had hatred for those people in Vienna for how I was treated. Initially, upon arrival in Vienna, I didn't react so much to how I was being treated, but to how the mission seemed to operate. But eventually as my experiences indicated that I was being singled out for bad treatment my reaction became more personal. My problem, unlike the hypothetical resister in the Army was not so much whether a "civilian" would support my resistance, but whether those back home would even believe me... which wasn't helped by the fact that it was so hard for me to even explain what happened.

I must admit that my becoming a pacifist was initially because of my own treatment in situations that I feel were aggravated by virtue of me being my father's daughter. But I also see the things that affected me as having somewhat systemic roots, so it's not just for myself, but that I've had a glimpse into some awful things that are built into the system, sort of like a dormant virus as far as some specific emanations of the system are concerned. By "system" I mean things like the missions and military-related systems, but which are actually part of larger systems, like the missions being emanations of western evangelical Christianity. These missions, for example, didn't just sprout up from a vacuum and it's the churches back home that support them.

***

"...the Army's reluctance to present strongly ideological propaganda to its troops is a result of a variety of forces in addition to survey research, such as the civilian furor resulting a few years ago from General Edwin A. Walker's extreme right-wing ideological indoctrination programs." (p. 116)

ECM didn't have any such inhibitions or external constraints regarding right-wing ideological indoctrination, albeit it was a very minor part of the Candidate's Course. I don't know that I remember anything like this from SGA, though.

***

In this section, the author discusses some changes in the leadership style that took effect in the 70s. He finished discussing some things that are becoming more lax, but now introduces new aspects being add to the leadership repertoire.

"The change is one from a fatherly role to closer to a counselor, therapist or labor-relations expert. The change is partly one of a different attitude towards soldiers. Since many soldiers seem unwilling to learn 'followership,' the leader cannot deal with them as dependent, loyal, but errant children, but, rather, must see them as a potentially oppositional class.

..."According to a West Point leadership text... nondirective counseling is the best approach... In this way the soldier should not feel that anyone is trying to manipulate him or sway him. Nondirective counseling allows a wide range of sentiments to be expressed and many kinds of complaints can be aired. An officer could give the impression that he will redress these grievances or otherwise correct the problem, or he could deal with the soldier as a therapist, helping him surmount his maladaptive behavior and feelings.

...This emphasis on understanding social psychological processes is apparent in The AWOL Soldier - a Challenge to Leadership... This pamphlet is typical of many recent Army leadership documents that de-emphasize punishment and emphasize getting the men to set standards for themselves through exploiting knowledge of their motivations." (p. 125-126)

It's possible that this was one approach to leadership in Vienna, although there were "punishments" (negative reinforcements) in play there too, although the leadership would probably deny any use of these things. But it sure felt like it anyway, and I think this may have been used with other new people too, but not to the extent it was with me. They did use a kind of counseling approach though, and I think it wasn't uncommon for secretaries to go to their bosses for spiritual guidance and help with personal problems, for example. I didn't really do this though. I don't remember ever talking about personal problems with my boss, although it's possible I did, but if so, probably regarding something incidental.

***

"Democratic, decentralized organizations have high morale, respond well to changing conditions, and are quite productive in certain kinds of tasks. Instead, with co-optive techniques, the Army tries to create an illusion of the unity of officers and men but not the reality. Without a true unity of purpose and a diffusion of power, co-optive techniques can be only a smokescreen for class relationships." (p. 127)

This author really cuts to the chase here, and I find it refreshing. I am not sure that the Vienna mission was co-optive, although the leadership may at times may have used these approaches, and it was certainly not democratic and didn't claim to be.

***

There was a lot in this chapter that I just zipped through and didn't see at all relevant and even what I did get out of the chapter wasn't anywhere near as helpful as the previous one was, as far as a tool for making sense of my experiences is concerned. The next chapter is a shorter one, but I'll pick it up next time.

Good night.

~ Meg