Wednesday, February 29, 2012

322. Organizational Behavior, Pt., 46 (Miner, pt. 4)

I feel so much more refreshed this morning.  I see the cardiologist this afternoon and then on to physical therapy.  I have to do some cooking today too.  Right now I'm doing my morning stimulator session (electrical stimulation therapy for pain, 45 minutes twice a day).

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Continuing with our text, I'm skipping over the "task or entrepreneurial sytem" because there really isn't anything helpful to glean from that section and I can't see it applying, even in part to the Vienna mission.  Basically, this system is not only a small system, but also has just two hierarchical levels: the owner(s) and everyone else.  The owner(s) work on their own and are their own critic, etc.  In the Vienna mission, no matter how powerful the top leadership was, they weren't going to do anything of substance without the go-ahead of the mission board, because the mission could not exist without them (since much of their personal and staff came from them and some of their external "contracted" work also came from them - such as textbook delivery).  So this system is a no-go.

The "group or sociotechnical" system likewise does not fit as it puts the onus of group management and guidance on the group itself (rather than, as in the task or entrepreneurial system, organizational owners).  This system couldn't work in the Vienna mission for the same reasons as for the "task or entrepreneurial system," but also because the mission could not tolerate divisiveness and anything smacking of an independent spirit.  Everything had to fit under the ospices of the mission writ large, and no department had anything like the kind of independent responsibility described in this text.  For example, departments only had minimal input into new member selection (and chances are the department head would be the only one with any input at all, I expect); conflicts within the group would have been a security risk for the whole mission and (depending on the specific conflict) would have been at the very least of interest to leadership higher up the mission hierarchy, etc.  That being said, however, if I were interested in going into greater details in the nature of the country teams, certain aspects of this type of system might have fit or born a semblance to fitting them.

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Next I'm moving to a new sub-section of the chapter: "Mintzberg's Power Configurations."  These power configurations theorize how power is wielded and where it resides in an organizatinal system.  When systems change then politicking occurs, but that was discussed in an earlier chapter of the book.

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The first power configuration is:

"The Autocracy.  An autocracy is a small, often newly founded organization; power resides entirely in the chief executive, who is usually owner and founder as well." (p. 547)

This is clearly not a good fit at all.  There was no room for individualism in the mission, even amongst the top leadership.  That being said, however, part of the security mindset might have wanted there to be an external appearance of independence of action.  That way, in the case of a security breach those higher up the chain (e.g., the board members and their respective missions) could be protected.  It was generally always good for those posing a threat (e.g., border guards) to think each individual was acting independent of an organization or anyone higher up.

But this doesn't mean that they woldn't have wanted to give the appearance of their being an autocracy either, depending on the situation and the particulars of the threat.  Giving the impression that everyone was equal and the organization was more or less an anarchic or socialistic organization might have allowed attention to be drawn from leader-individuals.


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"The Instrument.  The instrument is hierarchically structured; it is a bureaucracy.  Its distinguishing characteristic is that the primary power over it is external - in the hands either of a single individual or of a group of people who think alike.  Often this power over the organization is mediated to the internal managers through the board of directors." (p. 547)

This description does seem to have some potential in describing the mission power configuration.  I would say, though, that the board of directors didn't, as I understood it, think as much alike as this text might suggest.  However, I know that for nonprofit boards it's often advised to try to seek out board members with different viewpoints, in which case boards aren't all of one perspective.  The mission wouldn't have sought out missions with differing views, though; rather, it just ended out with them by virture of the missions available that wanted to work together on the seminary project.  As I understood it, the differences were mainly around security issues or theological issues (although they agreed on the major theological points).

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"The Missionary. In missionary organizations, a clear mission and an ideology or culture supporting it are accepted by all members as guiding principles.  Thus power really resides in the shared ideology.  People do not become or stay members unless they hold to the ideology.  There is a missionary zeal.  Many voluntary organizations, such as the League of Women Voters, have this form.  So too do certain political movements and religious groups.  Often the mission is to change society.  The structure of the organization is much like that of a group or sociotechnical system, which achieves linkage among groups through cultural rather than hierarchic means." (p. 547-548)

Despite the name, I don't think we can assume that this is necessarily the main power configuration of the mission (when I was with it in the late 1980s).  So let's check it out.

There definitely was a clear mission and ideology and culture that had to be accepted by all members as guiding principles.  The mission was clear and above board as far as I was ever aware and know of no reason to think otherwise: it was to bring theological education to those in countries where political restrictions made access to this kind of training very difficult if not impoossible.  So everyone agreed to that.

The ideology, in my mind is somewhat more troublesome.  Part of the ideology was the theology, the usual doctrinal statement theology, which everyone had to agree to to get there and that also should not have been a problem either, because if it was there was clear opportunity to deselect oneself or for the mission to not accept the candidate missionary into its ranks.  However, there was the surprise (to me at least) ideology element that I learned about only upon arrival in Vienna, the ideology that approved of deception, that mandated 24/7 control of my life and seemed to disallow any free thinking and action.  The ideology that you're not trusted until you can prove yourself trustworthy and to prove yourself trustworthy you have to sort of sell yourself to the devil - let them be your conscience and your whole life while with them.  At least that's how I felt.

Then the edges of ideology and culture sort of blurr together so that it's difficult to distinguish the one from the other.  Of course, culture also included the traditions and stories, the history and the other usual cultural accutrements.

But the issue here is what place did these things play in the mission?  Were they where the power resided?  I don't think so.

I studied social movement learning (a couple decades after leaving Vienna) and I would say that among the groups I studied that ideology was power in some of them, in a way it wasn't in Vienna.  That being said, however, in the Vienna mission you did have to pass the socialization and trust test and continue to grow in trust factor (that's the security-related ideology), but that wouldn't have been enough or central in the same way as for the social movement groups I studied.  So, looked at in this framework, I think the instrument power configuration is a better description of where power resided in the mission than does the missionary organization system. 

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"The Closed System. Closed systems are bureaucracies, but of a more mature nature than instruments.  Missionaries may also move to the closed-system form as their dominant ideology is replaced by hierarchy.  In either case power is now in the hands of the line managerial hierarchy.  It is internal; management runs its own ship, and need not be invariably responsive to some external power source or idology.  The large corporate with widely diversified ownership is a prime example." (p. 548)

It's true that some activists opined that activist organizations grew to become more bureaucratic with age (and size).  Also, when I was with the Vienna mission it was just 10 or so years old, so maybe it did move on later to become a closed system as described here.

I've said in past posts that the mission tried to be a "closed system" but I used that term somewhat differently that it is used here; that is, I didn't use it in management terms.  I meant that the mission wanted to limit uncontrolled outside contacts by its members, which is quite diffeent than the way the term is used here.  Here it means that management operates on its own apart from outside controls, such as a more hand-on board of directors. 

In any case, when I was with the mission this is not how it operated and I do not particularly want to get into whether or not it later did operate like this.

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"The Meritocracy. In a meritocracy, a group of experts or professionals with specialized knowledge have the power.  These experts may work as a federation of single individuals or in what amount to project teams." (p. 548)

The mission did not operate like this.  The professionals did not have authonomy to operate independently as federations and the departments and country teams were to interconnected to the whole to really be viewed in this way, I think.

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Altogether, then, it appears that the Instrument system best described the power structure of the Vienna mission when I was with it.

In performing this exercise something came to mind from a research project I did in Russia that might be worth comparing to this process.

In my research I analyzed a wide variety of classroom criteria to determine on a sliding scale the level of focus on languae vs. communication in English instruction in higher education instruction in three provincial capitals in Russia.  Included among those criteria, for example were: testing, textbooks used, classroom time use, classroom objects on display (posters, etc.) and other such things.  One of the issues was that instructors could use a lot of communication focus, but if, in the end they tested on language (grammar, spelling, etc.) and graded on language, then language was actually where the focus was at the end of the day, at least in one way of looking at things.

So, if the real power in the mission was in the board, and the board was the one that had the final say in "hiring,", in mission direction, etc., then it's really necessary to look at the board and  some of the things coming from lower down need to be understood in the light that it's the board that really ran things and any semblance of democracy, or the importance of the individual was only as real as the board said it was or allowed it to be.  So this might be a significant issue to keep in mind regarding the mission.  Again, remember, I'm talking here about the Vienna mission of 1987-1989.