Monday, April 4, 2011

231. Pre-Vienna Comments 3

4/10/11 1:08 p.m.: I just finished going through all the posts, so now I'm going to concentrate on organizing them and trying to come up with some potential theories that I can use to try to make sense of what I was experiencing and witnessing while I was with the mission.

I couldn't go to sleep last night, so by the time my alarm went off to go to church I'd only gotten 3 hours of sleep. I was supposed to read something during the service, though, so I had to get out of that. Then I went back to sleep for a few more hours. I'm not sure why I couldn't sleep, although I know that sometimes I'm too warm, so I tried putting the air conditioner on, but that didn't seem to help either.

***

4/9/11 12:05 a.m.: This is taking longer than I expected. I guess I should stop suggesting when I'm going to do the next step (in this blog) because it always takes longer than I think.

I still have 30 posts to go through and then there is a LOT of cleaning up to do and also organizing these thoughts better. In the meantime, I'm thinking of doing a couple "filler" posts ("filler" but not irrelevant). So I'm going to work on the first of these now.

***

4/7/11 4:15 pm: I just made a bunch more changes, including re-organizing things here. I still have more things to add to this though, as well as more organizing.

***
Okay, I'm doing something here that I might not normally do, and that is post a semi-complete post. I've spent most of the day getting this far, but I haven't gone through any of the socialization file comments yet. As you can see, this is a pretty rough draft, as well as being incomplete. I need to organize it better, too, after I finish with the socialization file comments.

There's some pretty strong stuff here. One thing is that I'm encouraged that my typos weren't as bad as I feared, and most of my writing is pretty clear, I think. (I haven't been proofreading as well as I ought or I'd be going a lot slower, for sure.)


Nevertheless, I think it's worth posting in this form and it'll give you something to chew on while I finish it up. I should be able to get through the socialization file posts tomorrow, but I might not get to sorting them until the next day. Then I'll start work on moving on to the chronology narration, where I land in Vienna. I hope you can see how these things might be helpful before jumping in to the chronology. Also, I plan to cover parts of my time in Vienna punctuated with more file discussions.

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Using the recent literature discussions to help guide me I'm going to present a list of issues to bear in mind when trying to make sense of my experiences with the mission and what I witnessed. Some of these might be more relevant to specific times during my experience with the mission.

*Note: These assertions are based on my experiences with the Vienna mission and my limited observations.

I. I KNOW THAT... [Givens/What I know / am 99% or more confident of]

I. A. Uncategorized
  1. Secrecy often means there is something contrary to Scripture going on.
  2. Outsiders often don't understand the significance of what is happening in an organization.
  3. People change more easily in new contexts.
  4. From the standpoint of Anglo-Saxon American culture, the Austrian was not very 'tough.'
  5. It is possible for otherwise highly educated people to miss incongruities in their culture that to outsiders (especially trained outsiders) might seem obvious.
  6. Having ethnographic background and/or very good observational and analytical skills before coming to join the mission would be very helpful in making sense of it.
  7. Socialization involves cultural adjustment.
  8. The ends do not justify the means, and Scripture concurs.
  9. Christians are called to be willing to suffer for their faith.
  10. Starting a new job is an anxiety-producing experience.
  11. The mission and I had different ideas about what "living in harmony" meant.
  12. Neither the mission nor I 'had an exchange of words' because our disagreements were unspoken, but visible in our actions.
  13. In as much as initial term commitments with the mission were 2 years, the person had two years to be socialized and also prove him/herself as a full-fledged functioning individual.
  14. Individuals experience divestiture socialization differently, which could be because the their socialization is different from others' and/or they themselves are different from others.
  15. Divestiture processes generally lead to a custodial orientation being taken by the new recruit.
  16. Once someone has undergone a divestiture process s/he has created a new identity, there are strong forces to maintain that identity.


I. B. Vis a vis chaplains
  1. The mission had an H.R. Dept. comprised of two U.S. military reserve chaplains
  2. Chaplains have been involved in quashing dissident activities in the military.
  3. Chaplains in the military can serve social control functions.
  4. Military chaplains sometimes play socialization roles in the military.
  5. Chaplains in the military often have psychology-related responsibilities.

I. C. Vis a vis me
  1. I knew enough German to get by reasonably well right away and attended a German-speaking church from the start also
  2. I had spent virtually all of 1979 to 1987 in preparation for full-time ministry in Eastern Europe.
  3. I wasn't very interested in politics, although I had taken some effort to understand Communism to better understand the context and ideological influences in Eastern Europe. I was not taken in by Red Scare mentality, however. That is, I had not adopted that emotionally charged perspective on Communism.
  4. Psychology was misused in the USSR (and I knew this before I arrived in Vienna).
  5. I came to Vienna with a lot of self-directed learning and Eastern European experiences under my belt. That is, these were obtained apart from major institutional oversight.
  6. Before I arrived in Vienna I had spent 2 lengthy periods of time (5 months & 6 months) in Europe, 2 months of which was spent in a Viennese suburb on a short-term mission trip to Eastern Europe.
  7. I'm an idealist in the nature of St. Augustine.
  8. While I was willing to work as a secretary with the Vienna mission, my professional identity (and knowledge and experience) was as a missionary to Eastern Europe, rather than as a secretary.
  9. The Vienna mission was the first organization I'd ever worked for that placed so many limits on me (that denied the use of what I had the skills and knowledge to do) just because I was a woman.
  10. I had values that, no matter how much I wanted ministry, I could not compromise in order to work with the mission.
  11. I had more of a cosmopolitan view of my role than the mission expected and wanted.
  12. I was an outsider to the mission.
  13. I had unmet expectations of the mission, but not unrealistic ones before arriving in Vienna.
  14. I functioned well in Austria, except in relation to the mission.
  15. I am field independent.
  16. Being American, I view socialization as "alien and vaguely sinister."
  17. Being American, I am "intellectually and culturally opposed to the manipulation of individuals for organizational purposes."
  18. If the mission had been straight with me before I arrived in Vienna regarding the organizational culture, etc. I would most likely have deselected myself.
  19. While I may have been in kindergarten regarding what I knew about the organization when I arrived, they were also in kindergarten regarding what they knew about me.
  20. As a professional I placed a high value on "commitment and role innovation."
  21. I'm usually not very good at defending myself or taking stands.
  22. I had a naive and trusting streak in me (which my life experiences had largely eroded into skepticism and cynicism by the time of this writing).
  23. By my second year with the mission I had a very real fear of failure, irregardless of whether I thought I was right in my taking the stands I did, I was afraid that my career was in shambles.
  24. My experiences with the mission did not so much make me think I'd made the wrong career choice, however, but rather convinced me that I had taken the wrong approach to ministry; that is, I began to doubt whether I'd made the right choice of organization to work with.
  25. I think I had some fear that others back home would see me as a failure, although this wasn't nearly as strong as it would have been for a lot of people.
  26. My naivety was somewhat selective (i.e., not uniform across all issues).
  27. My adult life crises (using Mezirow's learning cycles as a framework) were such as to make it difficult to "relate [my] discontent to the experience of others" and "reintegrat[e] into society".
  28. There was only one person at the mission that I thought might have been having some problem accepting the missions attempts to "influence [her] attitudes and values," and that was the other secretary (the one from Alaska) who had arrived a few months before me. I was in a position to see some of this because of our positional proximity within the mission and also our chronological proximity. I don't know the nature of her apparent issues though, nor the details regarding her relationship with the mission through all of that because she was in a different part of the organization that I didn't interact with much. In other words, I only witnessed her as a secretary and not her interactions with her department and boss.
  29. I didn't do a lot of role searching in the mission; once I arrived in Vienna I was more concerned with the nature of the mission than my role in it. I think I thought that any role I might play in the mission was contingent upon the nature of the mission. (Although I don't think I was conscious of this distinction at the time.)
  30. I was extremely strongly committed to ministry in Eastern Europe.
  31. I'm tenacious and resourceful.
  32. I did not experience culture shock in Vienna (i.e., vis a vis the Austrian culture) (or here)
  33. I had a lot of pertinent "cross-cultural training" in advance of my arrival in Vienna.
  34. I had many non-American friends prior to working with the mission.
  35. I didn't have good stress management skills when I arrived in Vienna, although I did have a high tolerance for stress (as noted by my long-time primary care doctor, Dr. Sherwood B. Fein during my deputation).
  36. I had good relations with Austrian nationals in as much as I was able to foster these in defiance of the mission's wishes.
  37. I think I had pretty good cognitive abilities that allowed me to "correctly perceive and evaluate the host environment and its actors."
  38. My cross-cultural abilities and success in the Austrian context were better than with the mission itself.
  39. I had a low desire for feedback, in part because I thought I had a good idea of who I was, what was required to do the work (tasks), what the work entailed (Eastern European ministry in general - gained through experience with rather prestigious organizations), and the skills to do what I thought I was supposed to do.
  40. I have a high tolerance for ambiguity.
  41. Prior to arriving in Vienna I thought I was going to have enough secretarial work to justify my raising support and them bringing me over there to Vienna.
  42. Before I arrived in Vienna, I thought I had a pretty good handle on Eastern Europe in general, the status and general experience of believers in Eastern Europe and Eastern European missions.
  43. I had an accurate understanding of Austrian host-country nationals, the general culture, and daily life in Austria before starting work for the mission. My understandings of other Eastern European countries was likewise accurate.
  44. My prior work experiences proved to be more of a hindrance than a help in my adjusting to the Vienna mission work context.
  45. My prior nonwork experiences proved to be more of a hindrance than a help in my adjusting to the Vienna mission work context.
  46. Prior to arriving in Vienna, during my time in Vienna and after my time in Vienna I had a strong belief in myself and my ability "to deal affectively with the foreign surroundings [i.e., Austria].
  47. Prior to arrival in Vienna I had a high sense of self-efficacy in regards to my ability to function well in Austria, my Eastern European ministry knowledge and skill, and my ability to function within the mission as a secretary.
  48. At times I've had a lot of anger towards my dad because of how I saw him affecting my chosen work. I felt that at least he had a career, whereas mine was pretty much nipped in the bud.
  49. I realized that a lot of my anger towards my dad was unfair because there were other things possibly or probably going on that might not have related to him and also it wasn't like he got into his line of work thinking it would affect an offspring that way.
  50. As an adult I've often had a lot of ambivalence towards my dad.
  51. I'm a main idea learner.
  52. I'm naturally a relatively observant person and like trying to figure things out.
  53. By virtue of my being close to the head leadership of the mission in my formal role (and hence also informal relations), I was in a better position to understand the big picture of the organization than someone in a lot of other positions in the organization.
  54. I'm not a politicking and positioning type of person (and I think that's a family trait).
  55. I am not intimidated by authority.
  56. I don't respond well to pressure or use of force to get me to change something important to me. (or here, or here)
  57. Having relatively high self-esteem, self-confidence and intelligence I am not very influenced by social pressure.
  58. I may have had more relevant background to facilitate my adjusting to living in Austria quicker than most others at the mission.
  59. Although I felt myself a foreigner in Austria but a member of the mission, in the end I really didn't identify with either.
  60. I saw myself as more functional in the Austrian context than in the mission because I understood the former better than the latter.
  61. My experiences (and my responses to them) have played a significant role in defining who I am.
  62. The mission I worked at before coming to Vienna had "stories about being fired."
  63. Because of my experiences in the years following my departure from the mission my experiences with the mission took on even more importance, than they otherwise might have.
  64. I believe that Christian missions shouldn't use deception in their work, and this includes work in closed countries, such as how much of "tentmaking" is done.
  65. I felt that my European Studies background and other related learning and experience opportunities had equipped me well for work in Eastern Europe, and I felt that this background made a useful contribution to my overall preparations for ministry.
  66. I like to pull ideas from different fields in my effort to try to understand something.
  67. I'm generally not a competitive person by nature.
  68. I didn't and don't believe that force is a way Christians should treat anyone.
  69. I didn't and still don't believe that ends justify means, especially for Christians.
  70. The amount of influence a group has on my self-identity depends on how this image of myself comes out after going through relevant filters, such as how well the group knows me, for example.

I. D. Vis a vis my response to the mission
  1. After about the 5th month in Vienna I became afraid of the mission and afraid to tell anyone what I was thinking (or here)
  2. I stayed with the mission because I had a premonition that leaving it would be a death knell of any hopes of formal ministry to Eastern Europe (or here, or here)
  3. The mission succeeded in crushing my spirit, which my diary of the year after illustrates (and which you'll have to wait for until I get to that part of my chronology)
  4. In my work relationship with the Vienna mission, I had poor "control" because I had poor predictive ability
  5. My self confidence gave me the ability to tolerate this lack of "control" for longer.
  6. I tried to stay emotionally detached from the mission, but my success in this deteriorated over the course of the two years I was with the mission.
  7. I felt betrayed by the Vienna mission.
  8. I didn't seek redress concerning how the Vienna mission treated me because I felt I had virtually no "power and control over the transgressor or parties who have the capacity to extract restitution from the transgressor."
  9. I felt the 'curtailment of freedom to regulate [my] own off-duty activities' as a deprivation.
  10. If they intended the event that happened about my 5th month into my commitment with the mission to be intended to socialize me, it backfired, because it made me trust them less (although it did make me fear them more).
  11. I submitted to the mission's outward demands of me as much as I felt I could, but I (mostly) did not let them change my thinking, especially by force.
  12. The unexpected ambiguities after my arrival in Vienna made me "too psychologically disorganized and overwhelmed to think of formulating a coherent resistive response."
  13. The glue that made me obedient was fear, not because I cared what the group thought of me, (although I also had a Protestant work ethic vis a vis the work itself).
  14. I withheld my 'illegal' thoughts about the mission in a context (Dallas) where I thought I wouldn't be believed and the consequences most likely would have been disastrous for me.
  15. I did not complain or gossip or otherwise have a bad attitude or do anything that might be considered divisive or morale deflating.
  16. I was deviant in relation to the mission's norms in as much as it seemed to want 100% submission (i.e., withholding of any right to personal judgment).
  17. My coping mechanisms in difficult aspects of my time with the Vienna mission include: trying to forming a mental map of what was going on;
  18. I had poor 'anticipatory socialization.'
  19. I experienced 'reality shock' in Vienna (or here, or here, or here, or here, or here).
  20. The mission set too narrow of a reference group (i.e., the other secretaries) for me to accept. (also, here or here, or here )
  21. My dissatisfaction with the mission spread to disillusionment regarding most missions to Eastern Europe and a lot of conservative Evangelical Christianity.
  22. I didn't think the mission's demands of me were legitimate because they were unbiblical.
  23. I have never regretted not going along with the mission, that is "totally submitting" to them.
  24. I didn't comply with the mission very well.
  25. Actively complying with external demands can result in changed value and reward structure (in the individual), and I was afraid of this happening to me because I didn't like the values I saw in the mission.
  26. Disconfirmation of self (by an employer) "induces a sort of guilt anxiety or inadequacy feeling within the individual." Most of my 2 years with the mission consisted of them disconfirming my self.
  27. [I believed that] The Vienna mission overstepped acceptable limits in their treatment of me.
  28. I rejected the missions pivotal demands, but accepted many of their 'most relevant and peripheral role-behaviors.' (or here)
  29. The mission-defined mold for me felt like a straightjacket.
  30. While curtailing my outside roles pretty much did away with any role conflicts I might have had, it did create new identity conflicts for me. (also, here)
  31. Early on in my experience in Vienna I had hopes that the standoff between me and the mission would ultimately lead to a detente in which the mission would give serious consideration to my concerns (and change even!) and then start also giving me "real" work to do that was closer aligned with my skills and knowledge.
  32. In as much as I experienced anxiety from being in a new situation I would have done something to reduce that anxiety, although in my case there were things I thought were more important even than reducing anxiety. (also, here)
  33. It felt to me that an inordinate amount of my experiences were somehow related to socialization, or pressure to change.
  34. It often (maybe about half the time I was there) felt like I wasn't doing anything the mission really needed done.
  35. I understood, certainly by 5-6 months into my time with the mission, that deviating from what the mission wanted could well put my job at risk.
  36. Not bonding well enough with my "reference group" (the secretaries) and my boss was a deterrent to my socialization.
  37. Sometimes (especially early on) I thought that the mission might have seen me as a "high-potential employee."
  38. In hindsight, it could be said that I felt that the mission was unacceptably colonizing my lifeworld (I didn't know about Habermas at that time to word it exactly this way).
  39. My socialization was hampered, in part, by my never really understanding what the mission wanted of me (and my not willing to submit without such an understanding).
  40. I felt that the mission wanted nothing less than total submission from me.
  41. My biggest surprise upon arrival in Vienna was regarding the organization itself (rather than the position or me being the main surprise).
  42. Absent insider knowledge, a certain amount of not understanding what's going on in an organization is bound to be confusing. In a situation where this is intentionally so, as in the Vienna missions's security efforts, it would be even more confusing and more hard to make sense of.
  43. There was a poor congruence of values and needs between me and the mission.
  44. Changing positions so often made it difficult for me to clarify my role within the mission.
  45. One problem that was created by my not having a realistic understanding of the organization before I joined this denied me the opportunity to avoid making a decision that would result in conflicts between me personal life and work life.
  46. I'm not sure I had a realistic understanding of the position I was ostensibly brought on to do because I wasn't in that position long enough.
  47. My not having had a realistic understanding of the mission (the organization itself) before arriving in Vienna resulted in me being poorly matched with the organization.
  48. I think I shared the values of missions, but I didn't share the values of (arguably most) Eastern European missions. Before my Vienna mission experience, I didn't know how pervasive the issues were that I'd seen before that.
  49. My resistance to values change attempts by the Vienna mission was normal.
  50. Job fit for me was poor and hampered my socialization.
  51. I didn't have unmet relatedness needs to push me to develop relationships at the mission until later in my mission experience, when I experienced mission-induced unmet relatedness needs because of their cutting off so many of my other relationships. By that time, however, neither the mission nor I liked each other very well and neither of us was particularly driven to relate to the other.
  52. I resented the pressures the limit put on me regarding how I spent my off-time.
  53. I had a lot of reservations that inhibited me from being properly socialized into the mission.
  54. I had a lot of suspicions that a mission that operated in so much secrecy and demanded complete surrender from its members is "fundamentally amoral and their members, once socialized, will pursue inappropriate goals."
  55. It was hard for me to 'excel' at my job because I didn't have a good idea of what was expected of me a lot of the time.
  56. The mission didn't provide a good context within which I could practice 'role innovation.'
  57. My boss was NOT my chief source for determining job requirements.
  58. I did not have affective or continuance commitment to the mission.
  59. I thought the mission did not value my skills and knowledge.
  60. Demographic similarity was not enough to "facilitate informal networking, greater information exchange, and a reinforcement of socialization tactics."
  61. The "level of uncertainty" was increased because I was "missing information concerning [my] organizational future."
  62. Individualized socialization tactics may have increased my "role conflict, role ambiguity, and intention to quit."
  63. My high levels of self-efficacy affected the results of the mission's efforts to socialize me because this self-efficacy prompted me to "interpret situations as [I] saw fit."
  64. Left to my own devices, I had to use a certain amount of role innovation to figure out on my own what was going on and what I should do.
  65. At first I didn't want to try to innovate because I didn't know enough of what was going on, so I didn't want to start out trying to rock the boat as a new upstart suggesting changes. The context seemed too ambiguous to me to determine what, if any, innovations might be acceptable. So I chose to work toward lowering ambiguity instead of role innovation. (I wasn't conscious of it exactly in this way at the time though.)
  66. I felt like the mission stereotyped me as a: 1) single, 2) female 3) secretary, and as such didn't tread me as an individual, but rather as a single, female secretary. (or here)
  67. I felt like my problem with accepting the mission was its values, but I think the mission (especially towards the end) felt their problem with me was more attitudinal. I suspect that if they'd know there was a values difference they might have treated me differently (read: even worse than they did).
  68. I sometimes felt like the mission knew more about me than they let on (especially at the beginning).
  69. I experienced 2 years of corrective action for not having the appropriate identity valued by the group.
  70. I reacted to the mission's identity they had evidently pre-fabricated for me before my arrival.
  71. Since I was highly motivated to digest information I was more a attentive to it.
  72. I rejected the mission's pegging my identity all-encompassingly as a secretary because I saw it as invalid, untrustworthy and unreliable.
  73. Instead of going through a "self-verification" process which was initiated by the mission, I went through a "mission-identification" process, wherein the change was not so much in how I viewed myself but in how I viewed the mission.
  74. I saw the mission as not being competent to make a determination about my identity.
  75. The way the mission seemed to view me was very much at odds with how I viewed myself.
  76. The mission [mostly] failed in their apparent attempt to change my self-conception.
  77. I was eventually devastated by the mission's apparent attempts to change me (or here, or here)
  78. Both the mission and I seemed to be stuck in 'advocacy' roles (or here).
  79. I felt like in my relationship with the mission I was the one who was supposed to be the one learning and changing; the only learning they might have been interested in was to learn about me so that they could more easily change me (not change themselves).
  80. I also felt like if there was going to be any making of "thinking explicit and subject to public examination" it was going to be me and only me (not the mission or its leadership).
  81. Both the mission and I being stuck in advocacy mode could only result in a win-lose relationship.
  82. Since the mission was not willing to be wrong (and it was the most powerful of the two of us), it was not safe for me to be willing to be wrong. This deterred me from speaking up.
  83. My experiences with and observations of the mission pretty much demolished my affective attachment to the mission (because of my disagreement with its lived-out values), greatly weakened my attachment to my role in meeting the missions goals (because it became hard for me most of the time to see how I was helping meet those goals and also because I didn't like the means the mission used to meet them), and in the end crushed any attachment I may have had early on to the mission for its own sake, apart from any instrumental worth.
  84. By the end of my time with the mission I had no continuance commitment (because I thought that the mission in many ways might be doing more harm than good because of its modus operandi), no cohesion commitment (because I didn't want to become a part of the in-group because of the values differences), and no control commitment (because I thought the group needed more accountability which would mean more exposure of how it really operated which thinking was diametrically opposed to what control commitment would mean in that context).
  85. While I was concerned with getting established in the mission in the first months of my time with the mission (up to the 5th month when they pulled the rug out from under me), I don't think I was particularly concerned about being accepted by them, and I wasn't concerned about job 'safety' until about the 5th month of my tenure with them. That is, their pulling the rug out from under me served to decrease my desire to be accepted by them while at the same time increasing my concern about job 'safety'.
  86. My desire to learn about the organization continued until perhaps the last few months of my time with them, but my desire to surrender to them was weakened pretty quickly when I saw things right away that I didn't like and couldn't agree with. Also, my desire to learn about the organization change in nature, from wanting to learn in order to properly do my job and fit in to wanting to learn to try to just figure out what was going on with less and less intention of ever using that knowledge to try to fit in.
  87. My feelings of mistrust and suspicion of the mission grew until in the end I was virtually completely mistrustful and suspicious of the mission, and thought I had good reason to be.
  88. I thought my role in the position was not very clear (to me at least).
  89. I thought there was moderate peer group cohesion (cohesion amongst the secretaries, the group the mission intended to be my peer group).
  90. I thought the group attitude towards the mission was so positive as to be intentionally monolithic, to the point that no one ever questioned the mission about anything of any importance (unless they hadn't been socialized yet).
  91. My expectations (prior to my arrival in Vienna) about the mission were only partially met; that is, they did the work they said they did, but not in the way I expected.
  92. I felt that the work my first year was either routine and dull or nonexistent (when I was pulled out of the work).
  93. I thought that any verbalization by others asserting the importance of my work to the mission was a bunch of b.s. and lies.
  94. I felt that the mission (and by extension its members - since no one ever disagreed with the mission) did not accept me for who I was and I did not feel at all free to be who I was.
  95. I did not feel compelled to particularly imitate anyone, or only to a certain limited extent, but I don't think this was because of "self-esteem" but rather a sense of "self-efficacy."
  96. In as much as the mission wouldn't be direct in expressing its values and ways of doing things I was motivated to think the worst.
  97. In as much as none of the scripts I'd previously been familiar with seemed to work in my relations and understanding of the mission, my socialization to the mission was hampered.
  98. It felt to me (although I didn't know these categories then) that the mission was using socialization tactics that were random, disjunctive and involved divestiture. (That's how it felt, but I'm not sure that's what the mission actually intended.) This didn't lead me to be motivated to "change aspects of my work role" however, but rather turned my attention to the mission itself because I thought these tactics were uncharacteristic of missions.
  99. I believed that the mission purposely heightened my "role conflict, role ambiguity...and work environment novelty" because I wasn't responding to them as they wanted.
  100. "Role conflict, role ambiguity... and work environment novelty" made my adjustment to the mission more difficult because they increased uncertainty.
  101. I didn't (and still don't) believe that the reason for any of my problems was because, as the mission asserted, I was experiencing culture shock.
  102. Since I didn't have a good grasp of what was normative in the mission, it was difficult for me to discern the differences in how I was treated and how others were treated.
  103. After my experiences in Vienna my understanding of Eastern Europe in general and the status and experience of believers in Eastern Europe remained virtually unchanged, while my understanding of missions in Eastern Europe (i.e., how ministry was actually carried out, not how it should be carried out) changed drastically.
  104. I did not need to change my pre-arrival in Austria understanding of Austrian host-country nationals, the general culture, and daily life in Austria nor my understandings of other Eastern European countries because my pre-arrival understandings proved to be accurate and not in need of changing.
  105. My experiences with the mission did not affect my sense of efficacy in my ability to function well in Austria, nor my Eastern European ministry knowledge and skill in general, but it did greatly diminish my sense of efficacy regarding my ability to function within the mission and within most Eastern European missions, in as much as I extended what I learned about the Vienna mission to a large degree to other Eastern European missions (because of there being 15 member missions working together to form the mission).
  106. My sense of self-efficacy, in everything but my secretarial skills (which were arguably my weakest area of all the potentially relevant skills I brought with me), was more of a hindrance than a help in my socialization to the mission.
  107. The fact that I had a low need for feedback as well as a high sense of efficacy made my adjustment to working with mission even more difficult than if I'd only had a high sense of efficacy and not also a low need for feedback.
  108. My high sense of self-efficacy emboldened me (foolishly as it turned out) to hope I could be an instrument for positive change in the mission.
  109. Role conflict, by way of the mission's attempts to curtail my outside relations inhibited my adjustment to working with the mission, and it might have increased uncertainty as well.
  110. The fact that the mission used serial socialization methods (by way of a secretary-mentor) which should have led to my taking a custodial approach to my duties and an effort to change myself, was counteracted by their giving me otherwise little to guide me, resulting in my having a lot of discretion in what I did and how I carried out my duties which resulting in my attempting to change the situation.
  111. Faced with a work context that was characterized by low role novelty, I tried to compensate for this by seeking satisfaction outside of the mission and my work with it.
  112. I experienced the mission's culture as having "high organizational culture novelty" in as much as it didn't fit anything I'd ever experienced before (or since, either, for that matter), and this inhibited my assimilation into the organization, although the biggest problem was not that it was different from my past experiences (or expectations of it), but that it was different from my values, particularly how I understood the Bible and its teachings.
  113. In as much as I didn't understand the big picture of the mission and the parts of the big picture I did understand contradicted my values and beliefs, I couldn't willingly submit to the mission's attempts to socialize me.
  114. I felt like there was something akin to "social engineering" going on in Vienna (and I didn't think it was appropriate for a Christian mission that valued biblical authority because I thought it was unbiblical).
  115. For the most part I didn't have as much trouble with the noncore culture of the mission as I did the core culture, but that's assuming I correctly understand what was core and noncore as far as the mission was concerned.
  116. I was guilty of "sleuthing" in the mission in as much as I had absolutely no intention of conceding but I wanted to make sense of what was going on around me anyway.
  117. Any cognizance I had of incongruities would have contributed to ambiguity unless I was able to identify reasonably accurate patterns to the incongruities and/or determine a reasonably likely cause for the incongruities, both of which would have helped lessen the ambiguity.
  118. My experiences with the mission greatly affected my subsequent spiritual life because of my having become disillusioned with a lot of Christianity because of those experiences and the things I saw and learned there. (or here or here )
  119. I took initiative in developing relationships with others at the mission, but did not necessarily focus primarily on building relationships with the other secretaries.
  120. I had difficulty "updating my frame of reference (finding out how and why things are done)." (Hence this blog.)
  121. My clamming up after what I experienced at the mission's hands in the 5th month of my term could have enabled the mission (at least in part) to see me as understanding less than I did. (And if they had known what I was really thinking things would undoubtedly have been much worse for me.)
  122. The only "positioning" I might have done was to wriggle out of the secretarial straightjacket the mission had constructed for me.
  123. I never really understood the mission's "organizational vernacular."
  124. I originally had every intention of adapting to the mission's "expectations, norms, and values", but I soon learned that their "expectations, norms, and values" contradicted and overstepped what I thought was needed, reasonable and biblical.
  125. I eventually lost all belief in any "carrots" the mission might throw my way by way of suggestions unless they were followed by very explicit parameters of it's actually coming to pass. So I virtually ignored all the others as at the least untrustworthy, but possibly also as ploys and as such manipulative in nature.
  126. My perception that the mission's actions were more or less arbitrary added to my growing mistrust of them.
  127. I felt that the mission wanted me to make a decision to completely trust them to go along with everything they wanted without really knowing specifically what those things were that they were going to require of me (i.e., what values, etc.).
  128. There were barriers to me constructing my identity based on the mission's "sociocultural context."
  129. My personal memories helped me survive my 2-year ordeal with the mission, but my anticipations were more of a hindrance and were left mostly unfulfilled.
  130. My private self was a kind of hell for me during my time with the mission because I couldn't tell anyone what I was thinking.
  131. I may have felt something similar to the Stockholm Syndrome while I was with the mission.
  132. I never changed my stance on the things I disagreed with the mission about.
  133. The mission used faulty logic in their efforts to socialize me.
  134. I never was completely sure what it took to do well at the mission; I only had an idea about what the first step in that process might be (namely, submission).
  135. I never really knew how one found out what was really going on in the mission, although I suspected that 1) one had to be accepted as an insider to have this kind of information available to one; 2) the mission intentionally operated in a way, for security reasons, that hid "what was really going on" from outsiders; and 3) in order to become an insider one had to submit unquestioningly to the mission.
  136. I felt like the mission actually wanted to squelch a lot of the skills and knowledge I brought with me to the mission.
  137. I didn't (and still don't) really know how to suggest something to the mission - that is, suggest it in a way that might realistically be heard and given serious consideration.
  138. I didn't (and still don't) think there was a way open to me to suggest something to the mission - that is, suggest it in a way that might realistically be heard and given serious consideration.
  139. I can think of a lot of things I would like to have suggested to the mission (although I probably couldn't have separated these things out and the most pressing suggestion would have concerned how the mission was treating me at any give moment of time during the duration of my time with the mission.)
  140. If there was a formal procedure for making suggestions, I don't remember it.
  141. There were times when it seemed like the mission seemed to be giving me almost exclusively negative feedback, and other times when it was more mixed.
  142. I felt that the Vienna mission's culture was a lot more foreign to me than the Austrian culture was.
  143. I felt that there was conflict between me and the Vienna mission.
  144. I felt like the mission wanted to control me.
  145. I felt like the mission wanted to destroy my "self" my personal identity.
  146. I felt that the mission was shaming me in the positions and work it gave me and also in denying me the use of my skills and knowledge.
  147. I felt like I hadn't done anything to deserve the mission's wrath. For example, I hadn't complained, I did my work well, I did not gossip and nor was I ever divisive.
  148. I remained passive in the face of the unjust way I was treated, rather than responding in kind or trying to initiate a discussion about my concerns.
  149. The mission wanted me to "abandon freedom and personal dignity for the sake pf gaining a happy manipulated society"
  150. I never felt that I could have an open discussion with the mission (or my sending mission either) in which either side would be free to accept or not the other's views.
  151. I didn't think that the mission functioned in a biblical manner.
  152. My experience of reality shock was a result of the mission's deviance from Scriptural teaching relevant to how it should function.
  153. The mission's love for me felt insincere.
  154. My fear and distrust of the mission probably tarnished any love I might have had for them.
  155. Because I felt that the mission never really wanted to know me and seemed to be more bent on changing me, I didn't feel honored by them.
  156. I felt like the mission persecuted me.
  157. I didn't repay the mission evil for evil.
  158. The mission didn't act as I thought was right.
  159. I responded with good to their evil treatment of me.
  160. I held on to anger at the mission for too long.
  161. The mission, contrary to Scripture, pressured me to leave off outside activities, including evangelism.
  162. I never had much influence in the mission.
  163. By the time I left the mission I felt farther from my dream of ministry in the East Bloc than when I first started my work with the mission.
  164. I felt that my role and the required knowledge base for the position I held in the mission were poor fits for me (i.e., I was over qualified for the position).
  165. I didn't understand enough of what was going on to know what my strategic base was (or should have been).
  166. In the areas of my work (that is, the position I was brought to Vienna to do) where there was similarity between what I was supposed to do and what my boss's boss's secretary did I took a mostly custodial approach to the work.
  167. In the areas that didn't correspond well with the work of my boss's boss's secretary I did not take a content innovation approach to the work, because I didn't have an adequate framework for doing so. (For example, I didn't have a job description and didn't know what might be allowed or forbidden by way of content innovation.)
  168. I did not take a rebel position vis a vis my work responsibilities.
  169. I felt like the relationship with my boss had (intentional) therapist-patient undertones to it (and this would have been similar to how I would have described it at the time).
  170. It wasn't until about the fifth month of my time with the mission that I understood that things the mission seemed to be demanding of me were nonnegotiable and that it meant business in regards to them.
  171. It took a long time for me to understand and fully accept that I was expendable (in the mission's eyes) if I didn't submit as the mission wanted.
  172. Even when I thought I might understand the immediate socialization demand the mission was putting on me, I generally did not understand what they wanted ultimately.
  173. I didn't believe that totally submitting to the mission would relieve me of responsibility for my actions and thoughts that followed from taking that step.
  174. I always took my mentor (my boss's boss's secretary) seriously because I respected her skill and knowledge as a secretary.
  175. I wasn't very motivated to accept the mission's view of myself as the final word on who I was.
  176. By the end of my time in Vienna I was wearing down and beginning to give in to the mission's demands and assessments of me.
  177. My giving in to the mission's demands and assessments of me at the end of my tenure with them was at least partly because they pulled out all the stops at the end, which I attribute to being a security tactic since I was leaving under less than ideal circumstances.

I. E. Vis a vis the mission's treatment of me
  1. I was moved around, whereas no one else was in the Vienna mission
  2. The mission lied to me (e.g., in saying that there was too much work to do for me to take the German classes the rules said I could take, and then giving me practically nothing to do.)
  3. The mission did things to limit my outside contact (e.g., making me shorten my prayer letter list, not letting me have time off for a visiting supporter, etc.)
  4. Any stress I had was not because of living in Austria, but because of the way the mission was treating me
  5. The mission intentionally induced stress, at least on some people sometimes. (See: 1,
  6. The Vienna mission violated my 'pivotal expectations.'
  7. My whole experience (virtually) of the Vienna mission was like a 2 year boot camp in that the mission was "interested in destroying" my self confidence the whole time.
  8. My experience of the Vienna mission was similar to a 'flagged soldier' in that I was most of the time 'in a kind of limbo, unable to... maintain contacts.'
  9. The Vienna mission did not use with me the step-wise system of treatment preferred by the military.
  10. The "attitudes, values and behaviors" that the mission wanted me to relinquish in place of its own "attitudes, values and behaviors" were not based on a concern for my spiritual well-being, but the "well-being" of the organization as it defined "well-being".
  11. In many ways, I experienced the Vienna mission as a coercive organization.
  12. I felt like there was intended (by the mission) to be a closeness between me and my boss that I wasn't all that comfortable with.
  13. The work the mission gave me to do was intentionally way too easy for me.
  14. I experienced both "continual changes" in my work setting and "the same task" (repetitiveness) at the hands of the mission, resulting in frustration and boredom, respectively.
  15. My work with the mission involved low skill variety, of a nature that I didn't identify myself much with, didn't feel was significant, although I did get positive feedback about how I did this work and I did have significant autonomy in carrying it out.
  16. My boss was friendly, but I'm not sure how much trust and respect he showed towards me.
  17. I was not given a clear idea prior to my arrival in Vienna of how pervasive the mission's demands of me were going to be, and my sending mission had even assured me that they didn't think there would be a problem with me having ministry among Austrians. This difference (between the expected and the actual) contributed greatly to my dissatisfaction while working with the mission.
  18. I was also not given a clear idea (in the sense of "job description"), either before or after my arrival in Vienna, of what I'd be doing. Because of the work being as a "missionary" not having a detailed job description was not a concern prior to my arrival, and it wouldn't have been an issue if I'd been given work the corresponded reasonably with what one normally considers to be "secretarial." (That is, maybe the title "office worker" would have been more like what I mostly did.) (Although I should say that I think the North American office of my sending mission spoke in good faith in what they relayed to me about the work in Vienna, so they weren't the ones playing these games with me.)
  19. Although work with the Vienna mission was mostly mundane (especially considering my skills and knowledge), instead of trying to offset this with some other organizational 'reward' it actually tightened the noose by 1) limiting other things I might try to do to find work satisfaction and 2) insisting that I make the other secretaries be my primary reference group.
  20. If the Vienna mission intended to socialize me, it probably determined fairly early on that I wasn't the 'right type' for the mission or the position.
  21. The Vienna mission did not need to worry about its demands on me conflicting with outside roles because it dictated what outside roles were allowable and the nature of those roles.
  22. The first few months of my tenure with the mission the mission was more proactive in its socialization efforts than I was.
  23. It would have been very difficult for the mission to make me leave the mission before my 2 years were up.
  24. The mission seemed to have a distorted or otherwise inadequate view of me.
  25. The mission was not one iota interested in finding flaws in its own views; it only wanted to find flaws in its members.
  26. The mission was not open to genuine inquiry.
  27. The mission tried to make me adopt values and practices I found personally repugnant.
  28. The mission reminded me by its moving me around so much (i.e., by its actions towards me, not necessarily by their words) that my job depended not on how well I performed (about which there was never any problem), but on my totally submitting to them.
  29. Secretaries, like myself, were expected to be personally totally committed to the organization, no holds barred.
  30. The mission never did the things it promised to do in as much as I was never given full secretarial duties working with for the boss I was supposed to be working for. When I was working for him I was only ever given partial duties and very limited control over them.
  31. The mission didn't want me to think I was having any difficulties adjusting to the mission.
  32. The mission wanted to discredit me as a potential witness of what was going on in it.
  33. By the end of my time with the mission it (at least the leadership and those closest to me) had come to see my problem as being attitudinal rather than emotional (the latter of which their earlier treatment of me would have indicated).
  34. The mission didn't particularly want to understand the 'big picture' of how it operated, but wanted me to trust it without this knowledge.
  35. The Vienna mission tried unrelentlessly to change me and would not give up this effort until it knew that it had "won" the battle of the wills or I left, which ever came first.
  36. The mission lied to me when they said the reason I couldn't take the German class I had the right, according to written policies, to take was because there was too much work to do - and then had me spend the next 2 months reading software manuals and virtually nothing else.
  37. The mission treated me differently from the others in not allowing me to take time off to spend with a visiting supporter, which was guaranteed me in the mission's written policies.
  38. The mission seemed to have a socialization feedback loop system in place whereby individuals would continually be tested, then given new opportunities to prove him/herself and then be tested in how s/he did on the test and then be given new opportunities, etc.
  39. The mission spent a lot of the time I worked with them trying to get me to abandon my past.
  40. The mission didn't value my European Studies background, nor my achievement aspirations in this regard.
  41. Towards the end of my time with the mission it wanted to exclude me.
  42. The Vienna mission, contrary to Scripture, tried to curtail my ministry efforts.
  43. I was the only one the mission moved around from position to position (not to mention between continents).
  44. The mission was very fickle in how it treated me.
  45. The mission was good at helping me with my needs.
  46. The mission was fickle in regards to hospitality towards me.
  47. If the mission saw me as their enemy, they didn't feed me, etc.
  48. The mission, contrary to Scripture, pressured me to withdraw from the world (i.e., outside contacts including ones with unbelievers).
  49. The mission changed my functional position several times.
  50. The way the mission socialized me indicates it was more interested in inculcating attitudes in me than skills.
  51. The mission side-tracked me and most of my time with it was spent this way.
  52. The mission believed that anyone was expendable if s/he is perceived to be a security risk.
  53. The mission did not want me to take a role innovation orientation.
  54. The mission wanted me to take a custodial attitude to my role in the mission.



I. F. Vis a vis my father and/or parents
  1. The mission did things to things to "please" my parents (i.e., the last minute special women's meeting after the season had ended - they normally didn't meet in the summer
  2. My father was a "Program Planning and Control Manager" in the Free Electron Laser Systems Department, Huntsville Division, of the Boeing Defense & Space Group's Aerospace & Electronics Division".
  3. My father's last security check (Jan. 12, 1990) was investigated by the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII), FBI Headquarters (FBI-HQ), FBI Identification Division (FBI-T), Criminal Background Check (CBC), CIA, and Defense Investigative Service (DIS). (I have dad's DCII Person record, which a U.S. Congressman helped me figure out how to get and Dad signed for so that I could request via a Freedom of Information Act request to the Defense Security Service (FOIA #014-98(2))
  4. Dad knew at least some of the risks to me in my professional interests.
  5. My dad seemed to think the way the mission treated me was reasonable.
  6. My dad was very conservative politically and had held local elected party positions.
  7. My dad correctly understood that my problem was with the mission and not with the Austrian context.
  8. After my experiences in Vienna, my dad saw me as emotionally weak.
  9. My dad had a lot of very positive qualities.
  10. My dad believed in his work.
  11. Dad told me about my work affecting him, because he had to turn down certain proposals he could have worked on at Boeing.
  12. Dad supported (i.e., approved of it) my going into mission work.
  13. If in no other way, dad was ethnocentric regarding language. If this was the only way he was ethnocentric I think this is probably because this was an area where he was "inadequate" and/or he really thought that everyone should know English.
  14. Dad grew a lot spiritually after his retirement.


I. G. My family
  1. My dad especially had a lot of influence in framing things in the family.
  2. My family had limited exposure to the things I experienced when not living in Seattle.
  3. There is a hierarchy in my family.
  4. Gender is important in my family.
  5. My family has a strong sense of commitment for one another.

I. H. Vis a vis politics
  1. The man I helped (as a part of the Lions Club program) sponsor at the Seattle Goodwill Games was most likely a spy who was substituted out for the person the team I was part of was supposed to have when the Soviets realized I would be one of his hosts.
  2. The U.S. wanted to hasten the defeat of Communism.
  3. We didn't know very much about U.S. special activities (as of 1992).
  4. Reagan (president 1981-1989) increased the use of covert operations.
  5. "Propaganda and disinformation campaigns," including the use of radio was one 0f 6 types of covert action used by the U.S. government during the Cold War.
  6. The Soviets were especially interested in U.S. satellite and communications systems (my dad's area of work).
  7. There were Soviet spies among refugees to the U.S., making it possible that the Soviets could have first become aware of me (as my father's daughter) in my work with Soviet refugees, in which case they would have already had me on their radar when I went to Austria.
  8. Some conservative U.S. Christians around the time I was in Vienna were strongly anti-Communist.
  9. SDI was a 'black' research program with severely restricted access politics during the 1980s.
I. I. Vis a vis the Vienna mission
  1. The Vienna mission lived a life of deception.
  2. The Vienna mission was not really accountable to anyone (because of the secrecy, etc.) (or here, or here)
  3. The Vienna mission didn't have any complaints about the quality of my work.
  4. The mission's concept of deviance was not biblical.
  5. The Vienna mission was a 'normative' organization.
  6. The fact that the work of the Vienna mission involved risk of danger was undoubtely the impetus of making such "far-reaching claims over the participant's life."
  7. The mission's ideology, if accepted by the the new member, created a sort of psychological barrier to... compromising the mission.
  8. The demand of total commitment to the mission puts the mission's desires above God's (although the mission would say that its desires are God's, or something along those lines).
  9. The Vienna mission wanted and expected internalization compliance of its members.
  10. The Vienna mission cared about the 'attitude' of its members and, thus, had to have a way to assess, monitor and influence this aspect of the individual.
  11. The felt need for security had the added 'benefit' of freeing the mission from outside accountability.
  12. Some of the values and beliefs (about the ministry in particular) of the mission were unbiblical.
  13. A lot of what the mission did was couched in biblical terms and the use of Scripture to justify what they were doing.
  14. The mission had low to none tolerance of deviance in its members. (or here)
  15. The main way one could be deviant in the Vienna mission was to not submit completely to its authority, and the only way one could understand what else might be required of one was to take that step of submitting completely to its authority. After that you would be granted some understanding and given more chance to prove yourself, after which you might be given more understanding, etc. In this way submission always preceded understanding in an individual's relationship with the mission.
  16. The mission seemed to be more concerned about security issues than about the work itself (or about anything else, for that matter).
  17. The mission had a highly developed inner "secret" life that was intentionally difficult for outsiders to understand.
  18. The mission was ultimately probably not totally accountable to anyone.
  19. The mission put more importance on culture (with a small 'c') than on Culture (with a big 'C').
  20. The Vienna mission, as a strong culture organization, had organizational cultural obsessions.
  21. The external context of the mission had significant ambiguity.
  22. The mission, to a certain extent, valued fluidity and flexibility.
  23. The mission focused too much on 'survival of the organization.'
  24. Public celebrations in the Vienna mission (like just about everything else in it) carried corresponding symbolic messages.
  25. The mission felt more comfortable than I did with the work having political connotations.
  26. The fact that outsiders not only couldn't but also weren't supposed to be able to understand what went on in the mission probably served to increase internal interactions and dependence on the group.
  27. The mission was extremely concerned about controlling its external image.
  28. The mission had many real and potential threats of external disturbance.
  29. Internal disturbances constituted real and potential threats of also being or becoming external disturbances.
  30. The mission had no neutral channel for grievance resolution. (or here, or here, or here)
  31. Members of the mission, having internalized the mission's value structure, acted "automatically to reduce errors affecting the preservation of the system concept, or identity, of the social 'organism.'' In this way, they all played control roles in the organization.
  32. The Vienna mission, as a total mission, had a lot of power in deciding my identity.
  33. The mission was an open system that wanted desperately to be a closed system.
  34. The mission operated like a molecular cell, rather than a flock in its relationship with outsiders.
  35. The Vienna mission didn't particularly value the gift of debating unless, perhaps you were in a powerful position in the organization.
  36. There were a lot of questions at the mission that would have been taboo to discuss or question.
  37. The mission valued commitment in its members over role innovation.
  38. The mission had a low regard for secretaries (as demonstrated by their actions more than their words).
  39. Technical skill was optional in order to become a secretary with the mission.
  40. The mission only valued cross-cultural skills that served its purposes and did not conflict with the ability of the mission to control the individual member.
  41. Use of cross-cultural skills was only allowed within very strictly mission-defined boundaries.
  42. The only possible means open to new recruits adjusting to life in the mission was 'reactive change' (vs. proactive or replication).
  43. The mission, as a work context, was not flexible.
  44. The mission indicated a lack of concern for cross-cultural adjustment in as much as it disallowed language learning (despite it being a written policy that we had that right) and it limited interaction with nationals, both of which would have facilitated newcomer cross-cultural adjustment.
  45. The mission existed in a highly charged political context, both in the regular sense of the term and in the "office politics" sense of it.
  46. Submission to the mission and internalization of its values and norms did not result in loss of individual identity in the mission, although it seemed that members did grow to have a sort of "family resemblance" to one another.
  47. In respect to the mission identifying potential dissidence, both core and noncore aspects of the culture were important.
  48. The mission put a higher priority on submission than on the newcomer "figuring things out."
  49. The mission's "organizational vernacular" was intended to only be understood by insiders because of it's role a security measure.
  50. The mission was more Japanese than American in its not valuing independence in its members, despite the fact that the mission was mostly compromised of Americans. (or here, or here)
  51. Group cohesion and positive attitude toward the group and fellow members was highly valued by the mission.
  52. The Vienna mission did not seem to operate by commonly accepted commonly held American cultural values.
  53. The Vienna mission had a process (organizational) culture.
  54. Any occupational identities members of the mission had were not allowed to conflict with their mission-defined identity.
  55. The mission presented itself "back home" as a regular Christian mission, but its internal operations were more like an Eastern European mission and/or national security organization.
  56. The mission had a relatively flat organizational structure.
  57. There was little room or opportunity for advancement within the mission.
  58. The personalities of the director and assistant director (my boss) were quite different.
  59. Two wives of mission leaders had been sent home under similar circumstances as I was (at least according to what I was told).
  60. The mission misused psychology.
  61. The mission was very good at helping its members when it was needed.
  62. The worst "mistakes" (in the mission's value structure) a member could make would be anything that might compromise the mission's security, including willful insubordination (i.e., lack of total submission to it).
  63. The mission used both formal and informal means to deal with "mistakes". Formal means might mean an intervention by h.r. and informal means might include being socially ostracized by the other members.
  64. There were no rites of conflict resolution in the Vienna mission because conflict was not allowed.
  65. The mission had lots of 'rites of integration' because it valued conformity, solidarity and cohesion among its members, and the conformity, solidarity and cohesion had to be first and foremost to the group as a whole.
  66. Reliability was more important to the Vienna mission than was productivity.
  67. The complexity of the mission matched its perceived complexities of its organizational environment and mission-crucial tasks.
  68. The Vienna mission had a very strong culture in as much as it was thick, extensive and ordered in a clear way.
  69. Because of secrecy inherent in the way the mission functioned, it was difficult to know more than what was absolutely needed in order to do one's job, and knowledge beyond that would only be available to a member after they'd proved themselves trustworthy.
  70. The mission averted security crises, in particular, by means of its security precautions.
  71. Lack of total submission to the mission was considered deviance.
  72. As long as one wasn't deviant (or potentially deviant) the members of the mission were friendly and looked out for one another.
  73. If one was deviant, the members of the mission could seem vicious in their efforts to corral the deviant individual.
  74. Feedback regarding one's work was informal (i.e., not via such things as annual job reviews or the like).
  75. The mission did the following things well: teach, include cross-cultural sensitivity in its Eastern European ministry (such as textbook illustrations, etc.), security, organizing their work (in part by keeping of accurate and detailed records), textbook writing and publishing.
  76. The mission only wanted knowledge, skills and spiritual gifts of its members used in ways that it approved of.
  77. I was probably the poorest fit of anyone at the mission for the position held in the mission.
  78. The men's ministry was the most mission-critical part of the work, followed closely by security, with the third most mission-critical aspect being the women's ministry.
  79. In decision-making the mission considered the following stakeholders, in order of influence on the decision-making process: the nationals they worked with, the in-country governments, the board members/member missions, the members of the mission (the missionaries themselves), the Austrian environment, supporters back home.
  80. The mission didn't like "surprises," especially ones coming from its members.
  81. The mission wouldn't have liked "political machinations" in its intra-mission interactions because these would be divisive.
  82. In order to have any influence at all for "getting things done," you had to be an insider in the mission, and one's ability to "get things done" increased the farther in one progressed. (or here)
  83. If one tried to get something done for which one hadn't progressed sufficiently inward into the organization, one would be thwarted.
  84. The mission only gave members things to do that reflected how far into the organization they thought the person had progressed.
  85. The others in the mission understood how far inward one had progressed because of what the mission gave the person to do. The others would then treat that person accordingly.
  86. The Vienna mission took a conservative education approach to how it socialized new recruits.
  87. The Vienna mission's educational approach to its teaching ministry (in Eastern Europe) was also conservative but may have had elements of classic "folk education" in areas of "applied" teaching, such as evangelism.
  88. The Vienna mission demanded identification with all of its norms (as a package deal, not pick and choose).
  89. The Vienna mission demanded identification with all of its norms earlier in the socialization process than other strong culture organizations did.
  90. The mission demanded moral commitment of its workers.
  91. The Vienna mission was comprised of individuals not developed enough for organizational change to be possible.
  92. The mission didn't possess values that would result in developed members.
  93. The mission acted in such a way as to demonstrate that they believed the ends to justify the means.
  94. The mission used "weapons of the world" in their modus operandi.
  95. If the mission had political ties (incl. the military chaplains) this was contrary to Scripture.
  96. The mission was not good at evangelism in Austria.
  97. The mission spent more time and energy and money on the ministry itself than on security.
  98. The mission's culture and socialization efforts demonstrated that the mission put a higher emphasis on security than on the ministry itself.
  99. The mission's security focus was most evident in hard to document aspects of the mission's operations.
  100. While there was a fairly strong correlation of formal to informal power in the mission, in wasn't exactly a 1:1 relationship; that is, sometimes informal power was more or less than what one would otherwise expect of someone in a certain hierarchical position.
  101. A lot of the decision making on ethical issues would have been in areas where knowledge was segmented in a "need-to-know" way, resulting in only a few people knowing what was going on in these areas.
  102. The mission provided little opportunity for formal advancement within the mission, but there generally was room for being given more responsibilities within the position one held.



II. IN AS MUCH AS" ANALOGIES [similarities between the Vienna mission and certain types of organizations or activities]
  1. Assuming the intent was socialization, my experience of it was: as being serial (or here, or here); dependent first and foremost on being accepted as trustworthy; as involving an apprenticeship or mentoring aspect; involving affective aspects vis a vis my relationship with my boss; successful socialization was pass/fail; involved debasement; overconformance was tantamount to unconformance; individual (vs. collective); variable (although it's possible the mission thought of it as fixed and my deviance just prolonged it) (or here, or here); tournament (in that it was win or lose at each test), and having failed I might then have been subject to only custodial socialization efforts; divestiture (or here, or here, or here, or here or here or here, or here); the (mis)use of psychology;
  2. The Vienna mission had similarities to a "high-reliability firm" in as much as: reliability was more important than product, the informal organization was more important than the formal organization, carrying out its work could involve high levels of risk, had a "self-protection culture," had detailed procedures in place to protect its workers (and others), a culture of cohesion was in place, identification with one's superiors was valued, the work was stressful,
  3. The Vienna mission had several cult-like qualities, among these might be: cutting off members from the world (an us-them relationship), a certain amount of grandiose thinking, intentionally cultivated symbiosis, how it inducted newcomers (or at least me), it's suppression of my outside interests, the use of stress inducement as a means of social control, the role of emotions in the integration process (of the individual into the group), in requiring blind obedience/trust, the mission's focus on a common enemy, the mission induced its members to things that I find incomprehensible (especially from theologians), in their ambiguous feedback, its apparent disregard of the effects it had on individuals, the emotional aspects of its attitude towards the Communist regimes, intolerance of independence in its members, its demand of blind obedience, the more one succumbed to the mission the happier one would be, the mission became the 'superego' for its members, taught members to deceive outsiders, 'conversion' to the mission's ways brought release and intense emotion, there were escalating tests of faith, it used "denial, or even assault on the" members' "basic experiences and discriminatory capacities," it was hierarchical in nature, the higher up an individual went in the organization the more s/he'd have at stake in it and the harder it would be to disagree with it, actions reflected social reality better than did words, no one would take a stand on anything in defiance of the mission,
  4. Was an authoritarian total institution in as much as it: was power-driven, demanded of its members that they let go of 'a level of self-control,' there was a sense that the group was sufficient for meeting members' needs, no deviation from the party line is allowed, relied on its members to trust the leadership blindly to know/do what is best, there were restrictions regarding external communications, individual doubting about the mission resulted in fear and confusion, 'believing surrender' was required to attain 'the inner circle,' its members were 'cut off' from the rest of society, values and motivation of members were important to it; it was in a good position to hold its members 'captive'; it attempted to overcome role strain by providing only one mission-defined relevant role and setting; desired that the new inductee let go of their old ways very quickly; it used divestiture socialziation tactics;
  5. The Vienna mission used methods of induction similar to brainwashing, in as much as: they induced fear and doubt in the newcomer, the phase of 'physical control', induced anxiety while at the same time offering relief from it, its socialization process mirrored the steps of brainwashing (including upping the ante when new recruits fail to respond appropriately), it alternated between reward and punishment in its attempts to socialize someone, it used isolation as a tool of gaining cooperation, it differs from the patient-psychologist relationship by the new recruit in that the new recruit is not aware of changed being attempted, the affects of mission-induced changes in the individual fade away after the person leaves the mission, made their 'subjects' feel powerless, communication is a one-way process, created uncertainty for the individual, sought to create a relationship with the mission where the individual saw it (or particular leader(s) in it) as being 'omniscient', used the 'big lie' as a tool of coercion, induced doubt in new comers' trust of their own perceptions, used isolation as a tool in socialization newcomers, wanted such a total revamping of my psyche and relations;
  6. The Vienna mission was like the military in as much as: in that military law "is based on protecting the organization from the individual rather than the reverse;" the military uses similar means to pressure soldiers to conform as what I experienced at the hands of the Vienna mission; the mission "harassed" me similar to how the military harasses its dissidents by moving them around; it sought to have workers who had internalized the rules of play; there were built in conflicts in the Vienna mission similar to the military; social isolation from the rest of society in the Vienna mission is similar to that experienced in the military; as in the military, my educational background served (at least to some extent) as impetus for being "dissident;" the Vienna mission used psychology/counseling as a means of deviance control, similar to the military. (also, here); I was just as afraid to talk about what was happening to me as was the military stockade prisoner who got beaten up his first night in stockade; in its culture;
  7. The Vienna mission was like the Soviet Union in that: it operated like the Soviet Union in its legal nihilism. (Or here, or here, or here); in their imitation of their tactics (or here, or here); in its attempt to construct their version of the "homo sovieticus" out of me; in their hate for their members having any outside authority (as the Soviets hated the Catholics with their Pope in Roms);
  8. The Vienna mission was like a covert operation in as much as: In some ways my position was more like that of a secretary in a covert operation that of a secretary in a mission; its culture was similar to one; its security demands on the individual were a 24/7 affair; it sucked you in by incremental steps - like in enemy spy recruitment;
  9. The Vienna mission's socialization tactics might have been like those used in fraternities in that: true acceptance as an insider to the mission only came after one was able to help socialize someone else.
  10. The mission functioned more like a security organization and/or East European mission than a seminary, Christian mission in general.
  11. The "culture as symbolic interaction" model fit the Vienna mission pretty well, especially since adherence to organizational values and norms was so important to the leadership.
  12. The relationship was unlike that of King Ahasuerus and Esther in that they didn't value and respect me as much as King Ahasuerus did Esther.
  13. The mission's culture was not like American culture, Evangelical Christian culture, White American culture, middle-class American culture, Evangelical Christian missions.



III. I HYPOTHESIZE THAT... [What I'm 75% to 98% sure of]
  1. I was the only one at the mission that had formal European Studies background (or anything comparable to this
  2. One mission I worked with took money from the CIA for their short wave radio work
  3. The Vienna mission misused psychology.
  4. The mission's overriding philosophy was pragmatism (ends justifies the means)
  5. The cult-like symbiosis of the mission and my leaving it under less than ideal terms may have contributed to my emotional struggles the year after I left the mission.
  6. I experienced a cult-like withdrawal from the mission (but I was unique in this, I think).
  7. I think I (and mom) might have been victims of "hot surveillance" when we were followed from Klagenfurt back to the hotel in Vienna.
  8. I probably wasn't on the Soviet's radars yet during my first trip to the USSR (Moscow) in 1981.
  9. Milgram's study might explain, at least in part, why everyone in unison was able to shun me so cohesively at the end of my time with the mission.
  10. Despite dad's protestations to the contrary phone-tapping did occur in the U.S. (and maybe the U.S. exported it to Austria?)
  11. I experienced a certain amount of 'paralysis' in response to 'severe' conflict in my relationship with the mission.
  12. Leadership style in the Vienna mission might be characterized as "transformational."
  13. My opinions about my former mission might have flagged me as an 'individual resister' prior to my arrival in Vienna. (I had mentioned it during a Candidate's Course interview.)
  14. Leadership style in the Vienna mission might be characterized as "paternalistic."
  15. The Vienna mission might have used "co-optive rational control" as a means of social control.
  16. The Vienna mission didn't realize the type or seriousness of my doubts about them.
  17. The Vienna mission's dealings with me did not primarily have my interests at stake, but their own (similar to military counseling), or possibly even the U.S.'s interests.
  18. If the Vienna mission was trying to get rid of me because of my father, they might have tried to get me to go AWOL.
  19. Sending me to the USA could conceivably be compared to military disciplinary barracks (and being reinstated).
  20. My being defined as 'ill' by the Vienna mission was primarily about my relationship to the mission, rather than my state of health, similar to what happens in the military.
  21. The mission might have wanted me to limit my socializing to people within the organization in order to facilitate a quicker socialization of me.
  22. The mission might have been giving me the opportunity to "de-select" myself when it tried to present me with a roommate (when I'd said I didn't want one) and also in requesting me raise more money at the last minute.
  23. When the mission brought me back from the States I think they might have thought I was farther along than I was in the socialization process.
  24. Continued contact with each other by working together in the mission probably resulted in people becoming even more like each other than they were to begin with (although other things might also have contributed to this). That is, homogeneity was partially intended via the selection process and part a result of working together.
  25. The mission wanted to capitalize on the fact that the new missionaries were in unfamiliar surroundings as an opportunity to elicit substantial (mission-desired) changes in the individual.
  26. The mission thought I was more susceptible to influence than I was because they didn't adequately account for my experiences and knowledge that placed me farther along in my career than they thought.
  27. Others might not have experienced the mission as a 'total institution'.
  28. "Over adaptation" or "over conformity" would be seen as non-conformity by the mission.
  29. "Collective over-adaptation" may have resulted in loss of creativity, because of questioning being suppressed by the organization.
  30. In order for a new comer to notice incongruities in the mission they would have had to have come with sufficient background to be able to pick up on the incongruities.
  31. Participating for the first time in helping to socialize a newer member could have been seen as a 'rite of passage'. (or here)
  32. It's possible that the mission intended a few opportunities it gave me about 3/4 of the way through my time with them to be seen as "rites of enhancement". (That is, the English teaching trips to Bratislava, the one women's ministry trip, and helping with the board meeting.)
  33. The strong organizational culture supplanted Scripture as the gold standard of how individuals and the group as a whole should function.
  34. The mission justified its use of clan or culture control (rather than marketplace control or bureaucracy control) because of the uncertainty and complexity inherent in its work.
  35. The mission defined deviance in its members primarily in terms of security risk.
  36. The mission valued control commitment and cohesion commitment over continuance commitment in its members.
  37. Although research shows that highly educated people are generally less committed to their employing organization, and most of the workers at the Vienna mission were highly educated, the fact that the mission's whole purpose was closely tied to the specialties of the highly educated staff members might have served to increase their commitment to the mission.
  38. Since I was almost as highly educated as the others, but educated in differently and I couldn't use my primary professional skills in the mission, this decreased my commitment to the mission even further.
  39. The mission might have put too much importance on organizational stability in relation to other things that should have taken biblical priority.
  40. The mission probably misinterpreted some of my actions, assuming motives that I didn't have.
  41. Newcomers to the mission were probably expected to undergo something akin to a 'secular conversion.'
  42. Socialization was a group affair, although one or two people closest to the newcomer's position in the organization would have played more central roles in the socialization process.
  43. Individual socialization, in the context of the Vienna mission, might have commonly resulted in a certain amount of loneliness feeling on the part of the newcomer because of the organization-induced sense that there were things you couldn't discuss with others because of security concerns and the segmentation of knowledge in the mission.
  44. The mission generally intended for newcomers to have a therapist-patient relationship with at least one seasoned mission-selected member of the mission.
  45. It's possible the mission intended my socialization to be formal and individual in nature.
  46. The mission usually used a variable form of socialization with newcomers, but within the confines of the usual 2 year commitment.
  47. The concern for security would have made the mission want a quicker socialization so that the newcomer would not become a security risk.
  48. Having workers on staff that hadn't yet internalized the organization's norms and values would have been a drain on mission energies that could otherwise have been used to carry out the mission's main purpose (the teaching ministry).
  49. Newcomers who were able to think consciously about the socialization process they were experiencing might have seen everything as related to socialization, although some may have tried to distinguish between what was intentional by way of socialization and what wasn't.
  50. It's possible that what the mission considered "custodial" (in what it wanted my orientation to it to be like) was what I understood to be a demand for "total submission."

IV. QUESTIONS [What I'm less than 74% certain of]

  1. Was the mission trying to socialize me?
  2. When did the Soviets first learn about me (vis a vis me being my father's daughter)?
  3. Did dad have any intelligence roles/responsibilities?
  4. Did the Vienna mission have any other U.S. government ties besides having 2 U.S. reserve chaplains on staff (and having a retreat at a U.S. military retreat center, the former Hitler's Crow's Nest)?
  5. Did workers at the Vienna mission view the leadership as less authoritarian over time [i.e., the longer they were with the mission]?
  6. Did the theologians at the Vienna mission use similar lines of logic as that used by military chaplains to justify any apparent discrepancy between their work and biblical teaching?
  7. Did the Vienna mission intend for me to return to the mission when it sent me home?
  8. Did the Vienna mission really believe it had valid cause (i.e., I needed it) for sending me home?
  9. Is it possible that the military chaplains / human resource staff at the Vienna mission intended this (mental "transformation," "personality changes") to be the end result of my going to the states for counseling?
  10. Did the Vienna mission send me to the States to reform my "attitude"?
  11. If the military chaplains in the h.r. department gave me troubles (we'll get to that later), was it for the mission or because of my dad's work, or (even more insidiously) both?
  12. Why did the mission mostly give me either useless work to do or work that was way below my abilities?
  13. What mechanism (reasoning, influences) was (actually) behind the inordinate (I think), and therefore unbiblical, focus on security? (also here)
  14. How did the mission leadership in particularly, but also the other workers, (actually) justify and/or rationalize the level of deceit they functioned with?
  15. Do (or did) I tend towards the extreme on any personality characteristic continua, and if so which one(s) and how (if at all) did this affect my ability to be socialized into the mission?
  16. Were the mission's demands on others the same or similar to the ones that I perceived as being illegitimately and unbiblically made of me? If not, why not and in what ways were they not the same?
  17. Did the mission intentionally try to discredit my previously held value structure as being unhelpful (or worse) in my relationship with them? If so, was this goal and how they tried to attain it the same for everyone? If not, how was it different and what variations were they as pertains to different types of people in the organization?
  18. Did the mission overstep acceptable limits in how they treated other people? Or was my treatment by them unique? If it was unique, why? If other people were treated unacceptably, who was treated thus and how exactly were they treated unacceptably?
  19. What laws might have limited the mission's treatment of me?
  20. What laws might have been pertinent to some of the other things I experienced while working for the mission?
  21. If the cause for my receiving differential treatment by the mission was (to a certain extent) because of something in me that affected my ability to be socialized, what was it about me that was a barrier to being socialized and what was it about the others that facilitated their being facilitated?
  22. How well (or poorly) did others' value structure upon entering the mission match that of the mission's and in what ways did it match or not?
  23. How aware was the new inductee of any value differences between his/her values and those of the mission?
  24. How did the mission view the compatibility of its values with those of its new members?
  25. In giving me the software manuals to read and then almost just letting me be, was the mission waiting for me to make some move that they could capitalize on to socialize me?
  26. Were the mission and I (especially in the early months) "like two monkeys staking the other out"?
  27. Did my being socialization in an individualized manner contribute to my having lower role clarity and commitment?
  28. Why didn't the great demographic homogeneity among the missionaries seem to facilitate my development of "role orientation, commitment, and role clarity?"
  29. Did anyone else feel like they were being forced stereotypically into a role in the mission? If so, how?
  30. How much did the missionaries change in the values, opinions, beliefs, etc. while working for the mission? What was the change and how did it happen?
  31. Was there any Milgram-type conformity to authority (even in what would otherwise be considered unethical - or unbiblical - ways) in existence in the mission? If so, how widespread was this and how did this develop?
  32. What criteria (and mechanisms) did the mission use to select me? (or here, or here)
  33. If the most minimal definition of organizational socialization "refers minimally ... to the fashion in which an individual is taught and learns what behaviors and perspectives are customary and desirable within the work setting as well as what ones are not," AND I never really had a clear idea of "what behaviors and perspectives are customary and desirable within the work setting as well as what ones [were] not, would this seem to support the idea that I wasn't being socialized at all, but that something else was going on? [I'm not saying this necessarily concludes that socialization wasn't happening, as there might have been other intervening factors resulting in my being a poor organizational socialization student.]
  34. What affect, if any, did my dad's work have on my experiences with the mission?
  35. If the mission knew of my dad's work and that knowledge affected how it treated me, 1) how did they know of his work? 2) who in the mission (including my sending mission) knew what? and 3) how was it decided how to respond to this information?
  36. Did any members of the mission ever have questions or qualms about how the mission was treating me? If so, who had questions or qualms and what was the nature of these questions or qualms?
  37. Was my experience of the mission being a total institution at all related to my dad's work and how that affected the mission's relating to me?
  38. Why did the mission stop trying to prove I had culture shock?
  39. When did the mission decide that culture shock was not the main issue?
  40. What exactly did the mission want vis a vis submission and why was this submission so important?
  41. In what ways was I exhibiting non-submission? (Or, how did they determine I hadn't submitted as they desired?)
  42. What would have satisfied them that I was sufficiently submissive?
  43. How do or might the answers to these questions affect my understanding of my experiences while with the mission?
  44. Were there any differences between my expectations of "(1) the job, (2) the organizational culture, (3) the host-country nationals, (4) the general culture, and (5) daily life in the foreign country" prior to arrival in Vienna and the expectations of other new recruits to the mission? If so, what were these differences and who held them?
  45. How did the mission come to be the way it was?
  46. Did the mission need a secretary or not in the position they brought me over to fill?
  47. How would the mission explain its treatment of me to my supporters?
  48. Since most if not all of the theologians on staff had high self-esteem, self-confidence and intelligence, why weren't they more independent than they seemed to be?
  49. If the self is capable of change to please the mission, why couldn't I change when everyone else there could?
  50. Would the missionaries in the Vienna mission stay irregardless of what the culture of the mission was like? If so, why? If not, what type of culture(s) would decrease their continuance commitment with the mission?
  51. Why did any occupational identities missionaries might have brought with them to Vienna apparently NOT conflict with their mission-defined identity? Or if it did conflict, how was this conflict resolved in order that the person could work successfully with the mission?
  52. From the mission's perspective was my socialization a formal one?
  53. Was the mission digging for my hamartia or fatal flaw in the changes as to how it treated me?
  54. Did seminary education give most of the workers at the mission a headstart in socialization to the mission's ways (in a way that other types of educational background might not have)?
  55. Did the socialized members of the mission have a sense of investment in the organization that motivated them to continue on and also work for the continuance of the organization (similar to in pyramid sales schemes)?


****


1) What were the objectives in how I was treated?

2) Why was it deemed necessary to use such means with me?
2a) Was it something about me personally that made it seem necessary?
2b) Was it something connected with my dad that made it seem necessary?
2c) Was it more to do with the mission (their plans, their vulnerabilities, their values...)?

3) Was any other approach possible?
3a) If not, why not?
3b) If so, ...
3bi) what other approach(es)?
3bii) why wasn't it/weren't they used instead?


Theory construction: Here, Here, Here,


Apparent or possible differences of how I experienced the Vienna mission and how others did.

Definite differences:
1. I was moved around a lot.
2. My treatment in being sent back to the states for ca. 6 months.
3.

Possible differences:
1. The mission required more "submission" than others.
2.

How to account for differences between how I might has experienced the Vienna mission and how others might have.

1.

Possible scenarios:

  1. The Vienna mission didn't want me there because of my dad but my sending mission didn't know that and the Vienna mission board (as a whole) also might not have known it. The 2 military chaplains might have been the conduit for information about my dad that was only shared with a few people. If this is the case, then the only difference of any importance between me and the others in the mission was my relationship to my father. If this is so, the mission never really intended to socialize me and there was nothing I could have done to please them (besides leaving). In this scenario, I would have a rather warped understanding of the mission, based on my unusual treatment.
  2. The Vienna mission did want to socialize me. In this case, since it's clear that I was treated uniquely by the mission we would have to address the issue of why and how I was different and how did this lead to my being treated differently....
  3. The Vienna mission was willing to have me work with them, despite knowing about my dad's work, but only if I didn't do anything that might put the mission at risk because of my dad's work. In this way, my dad's work wouldn't have precluded my working with the mission, but it would have limited my work with it.


Me
> my education and past experiences
> my personality
> my values and beliefs
> being my father's daughter (i.e., the offspring of someone in a responsible military industrial complex position

Mission
> socialization efforts
> security
> secrecy / knowledge segmentation
> mission's intentions towards me

Others in the mission
> my experience different from others
> how I might differ from others

My parents