What I'm going to discuss here is accountability, and various ways in which accountability is an issue regarding my Vienna mission experiences. I think this is not an unimportant topic, and it is my hope that if you don't agree yet, you will be the end of this post.
There are several broad areas that I have come up with so far, just based on the discussions of date. First of all, there is the issue of who is accountable to whom. Then, secondly, there is the issue of the accountability mechanism, which includes the following issues:
- What is the accountable entity accountable for? For example, the mission might be accountable to the local Austrian authorities to register their organization (according to local law). The italicize phrase is the part of the sentence that answers this question.
- In some cases there are specific criteria involved as well; that is, it is not enough for the mission to register itself with the Austrian authorities, it must do it correctly, and in a timely fashion, for example.
- If accountability exists, there often is a mechanism for knowing whether the accountable agency does what it is accountable for doing. So, in continuing with the above example, the Austrian government might have an annual auditing process set up to make sure all the organizations that are supposed to be registered are and the information is up to date. That auditing process answers this question.
- In addition, there is often also a mechanism in place for dealing with not living up to one's accountability standards - punishments, if you will. In this way, then, the Vienna mission could be liable for hefty fines if it failed to register in a timely fashion, for example.
- Finally, there is usually some kind of reasoning for the accountability and the nature of it in any particular context. The Austrian authorities would likely refer to laws in place (and perhaps the reasonableness of them) and the mission office being located on territory that makes it subject to those laws, that is in their jurisdiction.
A was [not] accountable to B for doing/being C in D manner [criteria]. The mechanism for assuring compliance was B and punishment for noncompliance was E. The reasoning for the accountability relationship was F.
Not all of these 5 aspects of accountability in the data are immediately evident (especially based on the data and discussions alone), but some are not difficult to surmise. So some of my discussion will be based on specifically what discussion to date has elicited, but I may augment that in some cases by filling in the blanks as seems reasonable based on what I knew and experienced of the Vienna mission.
1. Accountability of the mission to others
According to the discussions so far, the mission would have been accountable to many different others. Some of these are not well developed in the discussion so far, which is not to say that they weren't important; it just means the literature I've discussed so far hasn't flushed everything out yet.
a. Accountability to supporters back home
I've only identified 3 comments so far about the mission being responsible to supporters back home. The first comment is that the mission presented itself back home as a "regular" Christian mission, that is, not all that dissimilar from any other mission anywhere else. A second statement puts supporters back home as the least influential stakeholder group of the mission as pertains to the mission's decision-making considerations. The last comment is a question wondering how the mission might explain its treatment of me back home to supporters.
Based on this, grated rather sketchy, depiction of this accountability relationship, it seems that how the mission presents itself back home works well enough for it and allows it to disregard supporters back home in its decision-making process. For this to function well, the supporters back home must have been satisfied with how the mission presented itself.
As such, we see, then, that the mission doesn't really have any accountability to the supporters back home. That is, as long as the supporters back home are satisfied with its public relations image (i.e., how it presents itself to its supporters), the mission does not really have any accountability to them.
The mission was not accountable to supporters back home for internal functioning in any manner [criteria]. The mechanism for assuring compliance was nonexistent and punishment for noncompliance was likewise nonexistent. The reasoning for the accountability relationship was to protect the mission's secrets.
b. Accountability to Scripture
The discussions thus far have a lot more to say about the mission and its accountability to Scripture. Mainly, the discussions focus on how the mission apparently disregarded Scripture. It is assumed that the mission should have been accountable to Scripture because it was a conservative Evangelical Christian missionary organization. The accountability criteria is Scripture itself and what it has to say that might pertain to the mission. The mechanisms for ascertaining compliance and the results of noncompliance are necessarily theological in nature and as such I'm going to defer this discussion, to a later time. That's not to say these things are not important, however.
So that leaves us with what the mission is accountable to Scripture for. There are a lot of things that the mission might be responsible to Scripture for, some of which it undoubtedly followed and obeyed. But the ones I've discussed here are where I think it has failed in obeying Scripture. Here are the ways discussed so far: 1) attempting to hide its activities behind a veil of secrecy; 2) the use of habitual deception; 3) demanding unbiblical things of its members, therefore having an unbiblical understanding of deviance; 4) having some unbiblical values and beliefs; 5) dishonestly couching some of its activities in Scripture; 6) being unequally yoked with worldly organizations via its military chaplains; 7) supplanting its Scripture with its own organizational culture as the final word in a lot of its activities; 8) valuing organizational stability over Scriptural mandates; and 9) the level of its focus on security was unbiblical.
To fully understand these assertions, the reader might want to look back at the original discussion these came from. You might note here that numbers 1, 2, and 9 above would serve to weaken accountability to others. So while numbers 1, 2 and 9 might be most directly unbiblical, the effect of the mission doing these things is also lessened accountability to others.
Number 3 deals specifically with how the mission treated its workers, in what it expected from them and what constituted deviance. In as much as these things were unscriptural, it means that the mission made its workers sin and not sinning was deviance. Not exactly the kind of thing you expect in a Christian mission.
Then there is the issue of values, beliefs and priorities of the mission. At least some of the missions values and beliefs were unscriptural (4), including its valuation of security (9) and its willingness to have unbiblical relations with secular organizations (6).
Then there's the issue of the relationship with Scripture as a yardstick. The mission's action indicated that it placed its own norms, values (4) and organizational stability (8) above Scripture. That is if organizational stability were at stake, for example, it followed its own norms and values even if they were at odds with Scripture. Then it would dishonestly couch activities, such as the unscriptural stability-maintenance ones, in Scriptural terms (5).
In summary, then, the mission only conditionally held Scripture in highest regard, its disregard for it was based on its own values, norms and priorities and included demanding things of its workers that were sinful (contrary to Scripture), then it would couch its activities in Scriptural terms. In addition, the mission had unbiblical worldly ties, which could have been a cause and/or result of the mission's disregard for Scripture.
c. Accountability to its workers
The discussions so far have also, it turns out, covered a fair amount of territory regarding the mission's accountability to its workers. Unfortunately, everything so far points to how the mission was not accountable to its workers, that is, the mechanisms that inhibited accountability.
First of all, the mission was not open to genuine inquiry, was more concerned about finding flaws in its members than having its own flaws pointed out, and didn't value open exchange or debating of viewpoints.
Secondly, the segmentation of knowledge and limiting of the availability of knowledge according to the responsibilities and trustworthiness of an individual and the fact that a lot of the ethical decision-making involved knowledge the individual might not have access to, made it difficult for anyone to know enough to question the organization.
Thirdly, the organization was difficult to understand without having the relevant background for making sense of it.
Fourthly, there may have been characteristics of the workers themselves that made it unlikely that they would question the mission.
Fifthly, the mission used social control to limit accountability to its workers. It did this by making certain subjects taboo and also by fostering an otherwise positive attitude in its workers and the mission as a whole. The positive attitude would have made it unlikely that anyone would have any questions, but if they did that organizational norms would have dissuaded them from expressing such concerns.
Sixth, the mission did not have a viable grievance process in place by which the individual might broach concerns to the leadership. That is there was no neutral channel open where the individual might be certain that their concerns would be heard and given serious consideration.
In this way, then, we see that the mission had erected a formidable wall against any possible accountability to its workers, who might otherwise have been in one of the best positions to know something to hold the mission accountable about.
d. Accountability to me
Again, we see that there is more about how the mission was not accountable to me.
One of the biggest obstacles to the mission being accountable to me was the ambiguity I experienced and lack of understanding as to what was normative at the mission. That is it was often difficult to understand enough of what was going on to formulate clear issue statements. Despite this, I was motivated to try to understand the mission; I just wasn't completely successful in this endeavor.
Another obstacle to my holding the mission accountable was my fear of it, which started when they sent me back to the USA. I was too afraid to tell anyone what I was thinking, let alone attempt to broach them directly on anything.
Again, as we just saw regarding the mission's accountability to its workers in general, I didn't know of a way to express my grievances. That is, I never thought there was a way in which both parties, me and the mission, would be free to accept or reject the other's views. Similarly, I felt powerless as far as getting any restitution for any mistreatment by the mission.
The mission was more interested in my trusting it than understanding it. Trust would counter any possibility of holding it accountable, and understanding it might have undermined trust, at least in starting out with the mission.
In summary, then, the mission didn't particularly want me to understand the organization, and there was enough ambiguity in the organization and my experiences in it that made it difficult to formulate clear complaints against the mission. Then eventually fear also precluded my doing anything to hold the mission accountable, and finally, I didn't see a realistic way I could air my grievances. So, once more, the mission is left unaccountable to anyone.
e. Accountability to me & dad
In following from the last discussion, there eventually were questions that came up in my thoughts about the mission and whether how it treated me was related to my dad. I'm placing this possibility separately from accountability to just me, because accountability to my dad might also have come into play somehow too (whether because he would have been upset that the mission's treatment of me was - even partly - a result of his work; or because mission's actions displayed sentiments of accountability to him - and mom). Accountability here also includes the sense that both dad and I would have wanted to know if anything related to his work was involved in how the mission treated me.
f. Accountability to the law
This came up in the discussions because I questioned if the mission did anything illegal in how it treated me.
g. Accountability to the Hippocratic Oath
The Hippocratic Oath comes into play here regarding the mission's thoughts and intentions in how it sent me back to the States for counseling. My concerns were 1) that it might not have had valid medical cause for doing that, 2) whether they wanted it to change my attitude (perhaps making me more docile), and 3) whether there was anything related to my dad's work that influenced the mission's treatment of me. This line in the modern version of the oath is particularly apt:
"I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required, avoiding those twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism."
h. Accountability to outsiders (in general)
We find here, too, obstacles to the mission's accountability to outsiders. First of all there is the lack of understanding about what goes on in the mission. Secondly, there is the mission's proactive efforts to control its external image. And then, thirdly, the mission's defensive tactics prevented outsider understanding using the felt need for security as a foundation for use of an 'organizational vernacular' and inner secret life, all of which had the added benefit of freeing the mission from outside accountability.
i. Accountability to the Board
According to my understanding, the mission Board was one of the most influential stakeholders on the mission. How much of an accountability function it served, however, I do not know.
j. Accountability to the local Austrians
According to my understanding, the local Austrians were one of the least influential stakeholders of the mission, and probably had little possibility of holding the mission accountable, other than for routine legal issues.
k. Accountability to the nationals (believers in E. Europe)
According to my understanding the indigenous believers were among the most influential stakeholders, if not the most influential one, and as such they might have been able to hold the mission accountable to a certain extent.
i. General external accountability (e.g., to anyone)
The mission's focus on secrecy (for the sake of security), and its use of hard to document deception would have made it difficult for anyone in the general public to hold the mission accountable. The mission's use of social control in its treatment of its members would also have made it difficult for outsiders to find out what was going on in the mission that it might need to be held accountable for. These social control features included the fostering of clan/culture control, fear of speaking out (e.g., my fear of speaking out), and by demanding complete surrender from its workers. All of these things served to preclude the likelihood that anyone in the general public could hold the mission accountable.
2. Accountability of the mission workers
a. Accountability to the mission (i.e., the leadership, administration, etc.)
Here we're turning the table around; previously I discussed how the mission was accountable to the workers, and now we're going to see how the workers are accountable to the mission. Obviously, there's bound to be a lot of overlap. This is the largest group of comments from previous discussions.
First of all, several areas of accountability came up, sometimes including criteria for determining compliance. I hope you understand that this list is not complete and that this is so for much of the accountability issues described in this post.
The mission required that the workers use their crosscultural skills only in ways approved by the mission, although what exactly might be approved by the mission was not discussed. Also, the mission required that its members adhere to both the core and noncore aspects of the organizational culture and failure to do so would be seen as an act of dissidence. The mission wanted the newcomer to submit totally and identify with all of its norms, and thought of this as more important than the individual figuring out how things worked at the mission. Similarly, it demanded blind trust in, and obedience and moral commitment to the mission 24/7 (twenty-four hours a day/seven days a week). In this way the mission became a sort of 'superego' for its workers. It also required that its members deceive outsiders to the mission.
Furthermore, the mission didn't want any competing professional identities in its workers. Members' knowledge, skills and spiritual gifts were to be used only in ways the mission approved of, and it did not like surprises or political machinations among workers either. Attitude was very important to the mission, but over-conformity would have been seen as nonconformity.
Also, not all means of deviance were equal, as the worst offenses were those that put the security of the mission (or its other workers or the nationals) at risk. Likewise, it valued commitment in its members, but control and cohesion commitment were more important than continuance commitment.
The mission had several mechanisms in place to assess, monitor and influence individuals and the group to fulfill these demands. One tool it had in this toolbox was the use of positive reinforcement for good behavior, such as being granted access to more information in the mission, friendly relations with others in the group, and increased happiness. The mission didn't have a formal feedback mechanism in place, like the ubiquitous annual review, however, so one generally had to rely on informal feedback.
But where the mission lacked in formal feedback, it made up for in discipline strategies. If a member of the mission was identified as being deviant s/he could be susceptible to any of the following: 1) formal means, such as intervention by the human resources department; 2) informal means, such as being socially ostracized by the others or the group otherwise coming across as "vicious in their efforts to corral the deviant individual"; 3) the use of "co-optive rational control," where, in brief, the mission came across first in a friendly manner and then came in for the kill, so to speak; and 4) the use of stress inducement as a means of social control.
Finally, the reasoning behind a lot of the mission's expectations of its workers were based on a desire to 'create a sort of psychological barrier... to compromising the mission" and to otherwise minimize security risks. [Note: These expectations were not based on Scriptural mandate.] Probably because of this reasoning, the mission sometimes seemed to have a disregard for its effects on its members (like me).
b. Accountability to me
Other worker accountability to me (as one person to another - not in any kind of authority sense; accountability does not necessarily indicate an authority relationship) comes up mainly in questions about how the other workers justified their actions towards me, especially at the end, but also whether they ever questioned the mission's treatment of me. Based on what I've already said in this post alone you can probably guestimate what the answers might be.
c. Accountability to each other
The only statement I found in the discussions so far about workers being accountable to each other is that "as long as one wasn't deviant (or potentially deviant) the members of the mission were friendly and looked out for one another." [Note: The inverse of this statement gives a clue about my treatment by the group.]
3. Accountability of me to the mission & its workers (i.e., administration and rank & file members)
My discussion on this relationship is mostly from the perspective of how I thought the mission wanted me to be accountable to it. As such, it seems that I've made several comments in this blog to the effect that I poorly understood what exactly the mission wanted, although I thought it involved "nothing less than total commitment," but I didn't know what it would take to satisfy the mission that I had totally submitted nor why it was so important. Also, at some point it became clear that the mission wasn't happy with me, so I wondered what I was doing to make it think I wasn't submitted to it enough. However, the other thing, which was probably part of the "submission" package, was that I understood that it wanted to limit my outside socializing and contacts, which I couldn't understand since I didn't think I was doing anything that should conflict with the mission's work, including security concern-wise. It might have wanted control, cohesion and continuance commitment from me also.
If I was accountable to the mission, I didn't act like it, because 1) I rejected its norms which it wanted me to include in the submission package, 2) my cohesion eroded as a direct result of how the mission was treating me, and 3) I also "remained passive in the face" of what I saw to be the mission's unjust treatment of me.
The last thing is that it's possible that my opinions (which I voiced in candidate's course with my sending mission) about the former mission I had ties with became known by the mission leadership and their responses to me could have been affected by that knowledge. That is, they knew I could be an independent thinker and come to my own conclusions about things.
4. Accountability of dad to me
Dad would have been accountable to me in as much as he would have known more of the risks to me because of his work. [Note: This needs to be taken in light of other things I've said in this blog too, though, such as the issue of intentionality, that is, his work affecting me unintentionally.]
***
Here is the source material I used for coming up with these summary statements. These statements are from my comments on texts earlier in this blog.
