Thursday, April 28, 2011

257. Organizational Behavior File, Pt. 6 (Ouchi, pt. 4)

I'm still not completely unpacked, but I e-mailed our thank you message to the church for the Sunday bulletin. Now I'm working on developing an Excel spreadsheet of all the people I need to send notices too. I'm not sure what I'll do for stationery, but I do have to get copies made of the obituary.

I'm taking my dinner break now and having my evening stimulator session.

***

This next sub-section is titled: "Loose Coupling and The Clan as a Form of Control."

This sub-section starts out by discussion a matrix that provides one way of describing the basic options available for behavior control. These options are 1) behavior or output measurement; 2) output measurement; 3) behavior measurement; or 4) ritual and ceremony, "clan" control. I'm skipping the discussion about the first 3 of these options and jumping straight to the 4th.

***

"Finally, suppose we are running a research laboratory at a multibillion dollar corporation. We have no ability to define the rules of behavior which, if followed, will lead to the desired scientific breakthroughs which will, in turn, lead to marketable new products for the company. We can measure the ultimate success of a scientific discovery, but it may take twenty, or even fifty years for an apparently arcane discovery to be fully appreciated... Effectively, we are unable to use either behavior or output measurement, thus leaving us with no 'rational' form of control. What happens in such circumstances is that the organization relies heavily on ritualized, ceremonial forms of control. These include the recruitment of only a selected few individuals, each of whom has been through a schooling and professionalization process which has taught him or her to internalize the desired values and to revere the appropriate ceremonies. The most important of these ceremonies, such as 'hazing' of new members in seminars, going to professional society meetings, and writing scientific articles for publication in learned journals, will continue to be encouraged within the laboratory." (p. 844)
This thought continues in the next paragraph, but I wanted to cut it off here as there's a lot to discuss already. The theologians on staff, as I've said before, would have received some schooling which might have served as a good foundation for the organizational culture of the Vienna mission. I think one seminary in particular might have provided professional socialization that seemed to fit well with the mission. I think I've also questioned how this might be since it seemed that there were so many non-biblical aspects of the mission's operations.

Also, however, I think that similar to the corporate laboratory, there wouldn't be a lot by way of behavior or outputs to measure for control purposes. So this issue alone (without the added security concern even) might argue for the use of the clan as a control measure. However, I think the addition of the security concerns (because of the work being focused on communist countries) led to more unethical use of clan control than might have otherwise been used if the work were focused on countries more open politically to Christianity. Whereas the mission might have wanted to "control" its workers to make sure the work was being done and no one was going off in some direction not otherwise sanctioned by the organization, the addition of the security issue meant that the organization would also be motivated to protect its interests and those of its students as well.

***

"Now, it is commonly supposed that such rituals, which characterize not only research laboratories but also hospitals, schools, government agencies and investment banks, constitute quaint by essentially useless and perhaps even harmful practice. But if it is not possible to measure either behavior or outputs and it is therefore not possible to 'rationally' evaluate the work of the organization, what alternative is there but to carefully select workers so that you can be assured of having an able and committed set of people, and then engaging in rituals and ceremonies which serve the purpose of rewarding those who display the underlying attitudes and values which are likely to lead to organizational success, thus reminding everyone of what they are supposed to be trying to achieve, even if they can't tell whether or not they are achieving it?" (p. 844)
The question regarding the Vienna mission that comes to mind in response to this paragraph is: What is the organization whose success control is meant to protect? Is it the Church (i.e., the church universal, the "body of Christ")? Or is it the mission?

Now, the mission leadership would undoubtedly respond that the whole purpose of the mission was the building up of the church, so the fate of the mission was closely linked to the fate of the Church. This comes back to faith and the fact that Christ is the head of the Church. That is, Christ as the head of the Church is the one who will ultimately see to the survival of the Church and the mission is just called to do its part in the ministry but let Christ determine how the Church will continue. This involves, of course, faith that Christ will carry out His promise.

So here we find a bit of a dilemma regarding the Vienna mission's organizational controls: If the mission was concerned mainly for its own survival, then it seemed to put that concern above Scripture because in pursuing this aim it used unbiblical means, which I've discussed elsewhere. On the other hand, if the mission's controls were out of concern for the continuance of the Church, then it seemed to have usurped Christ's role as the head of the Church. In either case, there is a biblical and theological problem.

***

"Whereas output and behavior control (see also Ouchi and Maguire [30], Ouchi [31]) can be implemented through a market or a bureaucracy, ceremonial forms of control (see Meyer and Rowan [28]) can be implemented through a clan. Because ceremonial forms of control explicitly are unable to exercise monitoring and evaluation of anything but attitudes, values, and beliefs, and because attitudes, values, and beliefs are typically acquired more slowly than are manual or cognitive abilities, ceremonial forms of control require the stability of membership which characterizes the clan." (p. 844)
The Vienna mission had much more stability of membership, I think than do most businesses, because members committed to 2 years at the minimum, and many worked with the mission much longer. So it did have the requisite stability of membership to effectively use the clan form of control.

Also, it is worth pointing out the comment here that clan control can only monitor and evaluate attitudes, values and beliefs, so if I can effectively determine and/or prove that the Vienna mission had a clan culture and used the clan form of control, then it logically follows that they were most interested in the attitudes, values, and beliefs of its members. So if the mission denies this focus on attitudes, values, and beliefs, it must also show that it used some other form of control, such as bureaucratic or market control. If it can not do this, then we are stuck with the focus on attitudes, values, and beliefs. I think this is very significant and goes a long way towards confirming my assertion that the mission used clan control and also that it was mostly concerned with things like attitudes, values, and beliefs (rather than behavior or outputs) of its members.

***

That's all for this sub-section and I should be able to finish this article with the next post.